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Abstract
Abstract
An initial public offering (IPO) of equity provides a significant source of finance for
Malaysian companies. Due to the existence of inequalities of wealth within Malaysian
society as a result of its colonial heritage, the government has used IPOs to redistribute
wealth among ethnic groups with the main objective being to increase the involvement
of the Bumiputera (local indigenous people) in the corporate sector.
This thesis consists of three inter-related studies on Malaysian IPOs that were listed on
the Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) during the
period 1990 to 2000. In particular, this study investigates post-IPO performance using
alternative performance approaches (market-based and accounting-based) and the
earnings management explanation for observed performance.
!
The results from the first study indicate that Malaysian IPOs significantly overperform
their benchmarks when performance is measured using both equally-weighted
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs),
except when matched companies are used as the benchmark. However, this significant
overperformance disappears when returns are calculated on a value-weighted basis and
also when Fama-French (1993) three-factor regressions are employed. Cross-sectional
analysis reveals differential performance related to year of listing, issue proceeds and
initial returns.
The results from the second study using accounting-based measures provide strong
evidence of declining operating performance in the IPO year and up to three years
following an IPO. The year-to-year analysis reveals that the declining performance is
greatest in the year immediately following the IPO. The deterioration in performance is
iii
Abstract
more pronounced when accrual-based operating performance measures are used. The
difference in the results using accrual-based and cash flow-based approaches suggests
the existence of earnings manipulation by the IPO manager. The investigation of the
possible sources of operating performance changes suggests that post-IPO declines in
asset turnover parially explain the poorer operating performance. Univariate analysis
of the association between family relationships, retained ownership and post-IPO
operating performance produces little evidence to explain the deterioration in operating
performance. However, underpricing partially explains the deterioration when the cash
flow-based performance measure is used.
The results from the third study reveal that Malaysian IPO companies employ
income-increasing strategies around offerings, and that these strategies were more
prevalent during the East Asian crisis period, especially for those companies that
provided a profit guarantee. Analysis of the assöciation between the magnitude of
!
earnings management in the IPO year and post-IPO performance provides some
evidence to support the view that aggressive earnings management at the time of an IPO
subsequently leads to poor stock market and operating performance.
Overall, the evidence in this thesis supports the consensus that has emerged from the
international debate on studies involving long horizon returns, which suggests that the
magnitude of long run performance depends on the method employed to measure
performance. The evidence derived from the accounting-based measure of operating
performance supports the existing international evidence that operating performance
declines following IPOs. The results also provide a degree of support for the earnings
management explanation of post-IPO performance. These findings have implications
for investors, security analysts, companies and accounting standard setters.
iv
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation to the present study
An initial public offering (IPO) or 'going public' is when a security, either debt or
equity, is sold to the general public for the first time. The main objective is to raise
capital for companies for the expansion of their business operations as an alternative to
borrowing from banks.
In Malaysia, equity IPOs are important for several reasons. First, they have been used
by the government as a part of its policy to redistribute wealth among ethnic groups,
with the main objective of increasing Bumiputera1 pwnership in the corporate sector to
30% by the end of 1990 from a level of 2.4% in 1970 (Koon, 1997). Under the New
Economic Policy (NEP, 1970-1990), which was replaced by the National Development
Policy (NDP) in 1991, companies making IPOs are required to reserve 30% of the
shares allocated to the public to be set aside for Bumiputera applicants. Second, IPOs
have been used by Malaysian companies as a means of raising funds. Over the period
from 1973 to 2004, a total of RM49.9 bilion (about £6.8 bilion)2 was raised through
IPOs (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005). This accounted for 36% of all capital raised from
the equity market, including ordinary shares (i.e. public issues, rights issues, special
1 Bumiputera is an offcial definition widely used in Malaysia, embracing ethnic Malays as well as other
indigenous ethnic groups.
2 The exchange rate used is taken as at 31 December 2004. It is approximately £1 = RM7.32.
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issues, private placements, restricted issues and offers for sale), preference shares and
warrants; the percentage of total funds raised was approximately 11%. Another
important motive for going public in Malaysia is ownership diversification. The
importance of IPOs as a means of redistributing wealth, increasing Bumiputera
ownership, raising funds, and ownership diversification attests to the practical relevance
of research into Malaysian IPOs.
The Malaysian economy was growing prior to 1997 but suffered an economic crisis in
1997 and 1998, with most companies suffering a decline in profitability. Overall, the
total earnings after tax of listed non-financial companies declined by RM3 bilion and
RM14 bilion in 1997 and 1998, respectively (Mohd Saleh and Ahmed, 2005). Given
that accounting earnings convey information about company values to investors
(DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik, 2004), it is expected that earnings management
might have been more prevalent in such a period of high uncertainty. Managers might
also have perceived a greater need to increase investors' confidence in their new share
offerings due to the economic crisis.
In addition to the unfavourable economic conditions suffered by Malaysia, there is a
mandatory requirement for Malaysian companies making an IPO to provide a profits
forecast in the prospectus. One of the unique features of Malaysian IPOs is that since
January 1996 certain Main Board3 applicant companies and all Second Board
companies have been required to provide a guarantee of meeting 90% of the profits
3 Companies listed on the Second Board are typically (but not always) smaller than those listed on the
Main Board of the KLSE. As of January 2001, companies seeking a listing on the Second Board must
have a minimum issued and paid-up capital ofRM40 milion comprising ordinary shares ofRMl.OO each.
Meanwhile, those companies with paid-up capital of RM60 milion or more are listed on the Main Board
(Listing Requirements of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, Chapter 3: Section 3.04).
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forecast in their prospectuses and 90% of the forecast profits for the two years following
the IPO. These provisions might increase the likelihood that IPO companies manage
their earnings following IPOs, particularly to achieve the guaranteed profits. Thus, the
Malaysian environment during the period of the present study provides a umque
opportunity to study IPO performance and earmngs management in a developing
country with unusual profits forecast regulations, under both favourable and
unfavourable economic conditions. Therefore, addressing and understanding IPO
performance and earnings management in a developing country such as Malaysia, with
its unique circumstances, is of a great interest and importance.
Academically, there are several interesting issues relating to IPOs including, in
particular, persistent anomalies in the pricing of equity IPOs, namely underpricing and
long run underperformance.4 Underpricing, or positive initial returns to IPO investors,
i
refers to the situation where the offer price of shares to investors of IPO companies is
considerably lower than the price at which they are subsequently traded on the stock
market. As summarised in Ritter (2003), there is pervasive evidence of underpricing in
virtually all markets, including Malaysia. Ritter (2003) reports that the average
underpricing for US IPOs over the period 1960 to 2001 is 19%, and he suggests that US
IPO companies leave a considerable amount of 'money on the table' .5 He states that the
degree of underpricing is even greater in Malaysia, with an average value of 104%
4 There is another pattern associated with an IPQ, namely 'hot issue' markets. This refers to the
time-series behaviour of first day returns and the number of companies coming to market, in which high
initial returns tend to be followed by rising IPQ volumes (Ritter, 1984). Ibbotson and Ritter (1995), Ritter
(1998), and Ritter and Welch (2002) have reviewed the literature concerning all three patterns.
5 The dollar amount of underpricing per share, multiplied by the number of shares offered, is referred to
as the amount of 'money left on the table' (Ritter, 1998).
3
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during the period 1980 to 1998. Underpricing is regarded as costly to IPO companies in
general, and to existing shareholders in particular. This is because both the absolute
holdings and the percentage holdings of the existing shareholders in the company are
reduced after the IPO but the shares are sold at an offer price which is lower relative to
the market's valuation on the first day of trading. However, from the new investors'
point of view, positive initial returns wil benefit them as they gain higher returns for
purchasing shares at a lower offer price.
The second anomaly is IPO long run underperformance, whereby the long run returns of
the IPO companies are lower than an appropriate benchmark. In this scenario, investors
appear to lose out by continuing to hold the shares of IPO companies. The findings of
significant long run under/overperformance can be regarded as evidence inconsistent
with market effciency and 'imply a profitable trading rule (ignoring trading costs)'
(Kothari and Warner, 2004).
While the majority of studies in the UK and the US find that IPO companies in general
are found to underperform their benchmarks in the three to five years post-IPO period,
the international empirical evidence on long run stock market performance is less clear.
Different findings are observed when different methods are used to measure long run
stock market performance. There is a debate in the IPO literature (e.g., Loughran and
Ritter, 1995; Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Fama, 1998; Lyon,
Barber and Tsai, 1999; Gompers and Lerner, 2003) on the measurement problems
involved in estimating long run stock market performance, such as which benchmark to
use to estimate abnormal returns, how to calculate long run returns and how to construct
test statistics. This is due to the fact that the benchmark used may not adequately adjust
for risk and the methods used are subject to various statistical biases (Fama, 1998). The
4
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underperformance phenomenon might merely be a function of poor research design or
measurement. These measurement problems may provide a possible explanation for the
conflcting evidence found in different countries.
In prior research on long run stock market performance Malaysian IPO companies are
found to overperform their market benchmarks over a three year p~riod (e.g., Wu, 1993;
Mohamad, Nassir and Ariff, 1994; Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston, 1998; Jelic,
Saadouni and Briston, 2001; Corhay, Teo and Rad, 2002; Sun and Tong, 2002). The
method used to calculate long run stock market performance by these studies is based
on the event-time approach, using metrics such as the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) and the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). The event-time approach is
adopted when performance is measured relative to the date of the IPO. For the CAR
metric, the abnormal return for each period is cumulatively summed over the holding
i
period, with rebalancing. On the other hand, when the BHAR metric is used, the return
is compounded over the holding period without rebalancing. Fama (1998) and Mitchell
and Stafford (2000) argue that both metrics suffer from the cross-sectional dependence
of observations in addition to rebalancing bias and skewness bias inherent in the CAR
and BHAR metrics, respectively. They suggest the alternative calendar-time6 approach
to control for event clustering and cross-correlation in IPO returns. This approach is
adopted by obtaining the returns for each sample company which had an IPO event in
the last post-event period of interest (e.g., three or five years). The portfolios of these
companies are re-formed every month and the portfolio return in that month is then
6 The calendar-time approach was developed by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974).
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calculated. The abnormal returns are then estimated using a return-generating model
such as the Fama and French (1993) three-factor.
The existing Malaysian evidence on IPO long run stock market performance has some
limitations. Some studies have used relatively small samples (e.g., Wu, 1993;
Mohamad et aL., 1994), others have examined only those companies listed on the Main
Board of the KLSE (e.g., Wu, 1993; Mohamad et aL., 1994; Paudyal et aL., 1998; Jelic et
aL., 2001), while all the studies have examined periods up to the year 1997. Several
studies are restricted in scope; e.g., by focusing on the effect of underwriter reputation
(Paudyal et aL., 1998; Jelic et aL., 2001), privatisation (Paudyal et al., 1998; Sun and
Tong, 2002), management earnings forecasts (Jelic et aL., 2001) or the effect of
growth-value stocks (Corhay et aL., 2002). In addition, all the studies on the Malaysian
market employ the event-time approach and none have fully addressed the measurement
iproblems which have been subject to intense debate in studies involving long-horizon
returns.
In line with the focus of recent studies on long horizon returns, the first empirical
component of this thesis takes steps to address the measurement problems and
re-examines the robustness of existing Malaysian evidence by using several methods to
measure returns, using different market benchmarks to adjust the returns, and by using
more robust statistical tests. The variety of methods wil enable a view to be formed as
to whether the findings of this study are sensitive to the methods employed. This study
therefore adds to the growing body of international evidence on the long run
performance of IPOs. It is also of interest to examine long run returns as they may
capture the impact of share trading by investors who did not have an opportunity to buy
shares at the initial offering price.
6
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Operating performance is an alternative performance approach that provides a potential
explanation of the somewhat anomalous short run and long run stock market
performance of IPOs. In general, existing international studies find that operating
performance declines in the post-IPO period (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994; Cai and Wei,
1997; Balatbat, Taylor and Walter, 2004). However, the majority of prior studies are
based on the accrual measure of accounting profits. Althougll this approach draws
attention to the existence of poor operating performance following IPOs, by its nature it
fails to capture the impact of earnings management at the time of IPOs. This is due to
the fact that accrual-based profit measures are potentially subject to accounting
manipulation by managers, for example through working capital adjustments (Teoh,
Welch and Wong, 1998a). Furthermore, the operating cash flow measure adopted by
several studies (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994; Kim, Kitsabunnarat and Nofsinger, 2004) has
not always been 'properly' calculated, thereby resulting in a poor proxy (Bowen,
Burgstahler and Daley, 1986).
Only one study has been carried out on the Malaysian market to examine operating
performance (Sun and Tong, 2002). This employs the accrual-based profit approach on
a sample of just 24 privatisation IPOs (PIPOs), and finds that the operating performance
of Malaysian PIPOs insignificantly improves in the post-PIPO period. This small
sample is unlikely to be representative of the overall IPO population which consists
mainly of private companies rather than previously state-owned companies. There also
appears to be a distinct lack of investigation into the use of both accrual- and cash
flow-based measures of operating performance: using both accrual- and cash flow-based
proxies to examine IPO companies' operating performance should improve reliability.
Thus, the second empirical component of this thesis explores post-IPO operating
performance using both accrual- and cash flow-based approaches for a large sample of
7
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both private and privatisation IPOs. Comparison between these results wil also allow
some broad inferences to be reached about the likelihood of pre-IPO earnings
management in Malaysian IPOs.
The earnmgs management hypothesis suggests a potential explanation for poor
post-IPO performance. According to this hypothesis, investors may overvalue new
issues because of misinterpreted high earnings reported at the time of offerings, and fail
to realise that the earnings management symbolises a transitory increase in earnings
(Teoh et aI., 1998a). Therefore, investors are likely to be disappointed by the declining
post-IPO operating performance and adjust their valuation downwards, which in turn
causes the poor stock market performance. Existing literature in the US and the
Netherlands (e.g., Teoh et aI., 1998a; Roosenboom, van der Goot and Mertens, 2003)
provides evidence in support of this hypothesis.
In Malaysia, a working paper by Abdul Rahman and Wan Abdullah (2003) is the only
study to investigate earnings management by companies involved in IPOs. It finds
evidence to support the existence of earnings management prior to the IPO, but no
significant relationship between earnings management and post-IPO long run stock
market performance. However, it examines only earnings management prior to the IPO
and its relationship with post-IPO share returns for a sample period up to the year 1998.
The time-series and cross-sectional patterns of post-IPO earnings management are not
analysed. In addition, the relationship between IPO year earnings management and
post-IPO operating performance is not investigated.
The third empirical component of this thesis addresses this earnings management issue
by assessing the earnings management from the IPO year up to three years post-IPO,
8
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and its association with both stock market and operating performance. As Malaysia
suffered an economic crisis in 1997/1998, earnings management may have been higher
in this period due to the need to increase investors' confidence in new issues. In
addition, the mandatory earnings forecasts and unique profit guarantee feature of
Malaysia IPOs may have increased the likelihood that earnings are managed following
IPOs. Therefore, the present study also explores whether eaqiings management is
higher during unfavourable economic conditions and whether companies continue to
manage earnings following IPOs.
In summary, compames that are in the process of gomg public provide umque
opportunities to investigate some important issues in accounting and finance. Based on
the issues highlighted in this chapter, this thesis evaluates the performance of Malaysian
IPOs and earnings management for equity issues during the period 1989 to 2003.
1.2 Research questions, approaches taken and thesis organisation
This thesis consists of three inter-related studies on Malaysian companies involved in
IPOs. It investigates alternative performance approaches (market-based and
accounting-based) and the earnings management explanation for post-IPO performance.
Using share price data (market-based) to examine the long run performance of IPOs
provides a direct measure of performance in terms of returns to shareholders. However,
the accounting measure of performance can be used as a gauge of the efficiency of
managers in managing their companies. Due to the fact that stock prices may not reflect
all available information, accounting profitability is a useful additional measure of
performance (Wang, 2005).
9
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This thesis is organised into 13 chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 briefly
outlines the Malaysian environment in order to provide a background to its IPO market.
It starts with an overview of the Malaysian capital market, economy and culture. It
further describes the regulatory structure and the reporting framework for Malaysian
companies as well as the IPO listing process. Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical
explanations for both underpricing and long run underperformanc~.
This is followed by the first empirical study on market-based performance, which spans
Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 reviews prior empirical studies and identifies the
research hypotheses relating to stock market performance. Two broad research
questions are addressed: 'How do Malaysian IPO companies perform relative to several
benchmarks in the long run?' and 'do both event-time and calendar-time approaches
produce the same results?' Using both approaches can mitigate various statistical
biases involved in the event-time approach employed in previous Malaysian studies of
this nature. The research design used to investigate the stock market performance is
described in Chapter 5. The study uses a sample of 454 IPO companies that were listed
on the Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange or
KLSE)7 during the period 1990 to 2000. The three-year post-listing performance of
these companies is examined using both the event-time and calendar-time approaches.
In the event-time approach, the CAR, BHAR, and wealth relative (WR) are calculated.
The monthly stock returns for each IPO company are compared with the monthly stock
returns of a matched company or market index benchmarks. In each case,
7 Because the KLSE was renamed Bursa Malaysia, effective from 1 May 2004, and this event occurred
during the period when the study was undertaken, the KLSE or Bursa Malaysia wil be used
interchangeably throughout the thesis.
10
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equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios are constructed. In the calendar-time
approach, the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model is applied. Chapter 6 then reports
the empirical results for market-based performance, including the time-series and
cross-sectional patterns of long run performance. To help explain post-IPO
performance, the sample of IPO companies is broken down by year of listing, sector,
board of listing, size, type of company (either private or pri~atisation IPO), gross
proceeds, and initial returns.
The second empirical study relates to post-IPO accounting-based operating performance
and is covered in three chapters (Chapters 7, 8 and 9). Chapter 7 reviews prior
empirical studies and identifies the research hypotheses relating to operating
performance. The second study addresses the following research questions: 'Are
accounting-based performance measures consistent with market-based performance
i
measures?' and 'do the accrual- and cash flow-based performance measures improve
or deteriorate following IPOs in the long run?' Chapter 8 outlines the research design
used to investigate the operating performance, based on a sample of 254 Malaysian IPO
companies over the period 1990-2000 using both accrual- and cash flow-based
measures of operating performance. The present study uses 'good' cash flow-based
performance measures with additional adjustments suggested by Bowen et aL. (1986).
To provide a control for changes in regulations, or economy or industry-wide factors,
the operating performance of IPO companies is compared to a matching company of a
similar industry, pre-operating performance and size. Chapter 9 reports the empirical
results of accounting-based operating performance. The potential sources of operating
performance changes, market expectation measures, and leverage are also reported. The
pattern of performance is also analysed by categorising the sample into family or
11
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non- family relationship groups, high or low retained ownership groups, and high or low
underpricing groups.
The third empirical study explores the linkage between earnmgs management and
post-IPO performance, and is provided in Chapters 10, 11 and 12. Chapter 10 reviews
prior empirical studies and research hypotheses on earnings management and IPO
performance. This study addresses the research question: 'Do Malaysian IPO
companies manage earnings at the time of IPOs?' If so, 'does more aggressive IPO
year earnings management lead to worse subsequent stock market and operating
performance?' The aim is to investigate whether the existence of earnings management
at the time of IPOs may provide an explanation for the stock market and operating
performance observed in the post-IPO period. Chapter 11 then describes the research
design used to investigate earnings management and its association with post-IPO
performance, using the same sample of 254 IPOs as in the second study. Discretionary
current accruals (DCA)8 are estimated using the cross-sectional modified Jones model
to proxy for earnings management. Chapter 12 provides the results concerning earnings
management and IPO performance and describes the earnings management pattern over
time. The level of earnings management is categorised by year of IPO and also by
whether companies provide profit guarantee or non-profit guarantee disclosures. An
analysis of the distribution of the stock market and operating performance changes by
the IPO year DCA quartiles is also provided.
Following the earnings management literature, the terms 'discretionary accruals', 'unexpected
accruals', 'managed accruals', and 'abnormal accruals' are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
Similarly, the terms 'nondiscretionary accruals', 'expected accruals', 'unmanaged accruals', and 'normal
accruals' are also used interchangeably.
12
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Chapter 13 summarises the main findings of the three empirical studies, discusses some
important implications of the findings and concludes with suggestions for further
research.
1.3 Contribution of the present study to the existing body of knowledge
This thesis represents the first comprehensive study of equity IPOs in Malaysia,
investigating both stock market and operating performance, and the earnings
management explanation for the observed performance. The research undertaken is
important because it investigates an issue that has not been addressed sufficiently in
Malaysia. Even though there has been tremendous growth in the IPO market in
Malaysia, shown by increasing numbers of listed companies on the Bursa Malaysia,
from just 285 companies at the beginning of 1990 to 963 companies at the end of 2004,
research on 'going public' in Malaysia is relatively 1Ìmited.
Compared to existing published Malaysian IPO studies, this research is the first large
sample study that exammes IPO performance (both market-based and
accounting-based) and the issue of earnings management. Moreover, this study uses
more comprehensive data by including the more recent sample of IPO companies listed
on the Main Board and the Second Board of the Bursa Malaysia from 1990 to 2000.
The sample is large and incorporates both private IPOs and privatisation IPOs, so is
more likely to be representative of the population of IPOs in the Malaysian market. In
this study, only IPOs up to December 2000 are included because the subsequent
performance of IPOs over one- to three-year periods is investigated. Stock market
performance is examined for three years while operating performance is examined for
13
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five years (a year before the IPO, the IPO year and three years after). Therefore, the
effective period of this study covers about 15 years (from 1989 through 2003/2004).
This thesis documents one aspect of the international evidence on long run performance
and earnings management and it contributes to the literature on IPO performance and
earnings management. Also, it investigates long run performance and earnings
management issues in a developing market whereas most prior research focuses on
developed markets. In addition, this study adds to the existing knowledge of the long
run stock market performance of Malaysian IPOs by incorporating the calendar-time
approach, using the Fama-French three-factor modeL. The use of this approach, which
has not been adopted in prior Malaysian studies, may serve as a control for the
cross-sectional dependence of observations that is inherent in the event-time approach
employed in previous Malaysian studies. The results observed from the first empirical
component of this thesis confirm existing knowledge that the long run stock market
performance depends on the method employed.
The IPO performance that is examined not only focuses on shareholder wealth effects
but also on accounting-based operating performance. Both accrual- and cash
flow-based performance measures are adopted in examining accounting-based operating
performance. The cash flow proxy incorporates additional adjustments suggested by
Bowen et al. (1986), representing an improvement on proxies adopted in prior IPO
studies. The second empirical component of this thesis adds to the existing knowledge
that the operating performance of Malaysian IPOs declines in the post-IPO period, using
either accrual- or cash flow-based performance measures. The study also finds that the
accrual-based performance measure shows more deterioration than the cash flow-based
14
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measure, suggesting that post-IPO performance is potentially related to the reversal of
pre-IPO accruals.
The third empirical component of this thesis confirms existing knowledge on the
existence of earnings management by Malaysian IPOs at the time of going public. It
finds that earnings management activity is more prevalent during unfavourable
economic conditions and among those companies that provide profit guarantee
disclosures in IPO prospectuses.
By examining IPO performance and earnmgs management, this study shows how
Malaysian investors react to publicly available information at the time of IPOs and in
post-IPO periods. The results of this study wil be of interest to accounting and finance
professionals, such as security analysts, financial managers, accounting standard setters,
and also to investors.
The following chapter provides the background to the Malaysian IPO market.
15
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Chapter 2
The Malaysian environment: Background to the IPO market
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the Malaysian environment with the intention of providing
knowledge and understanding of Malaysian culture, its capital market and economy, the
legal, regulatory and reporting framework for Malaysian companies,9 and IPO activities.
The first section describes Malaysian culture, its capital market and economy. This is
followed by the second section, which provides an overview of the laws, regulations,
rules, and standards that form the core corporate law10 in Malaysia. The third section
describes the Malaysian IPO market by explaining its listing process and features, while
the final section summarises the present chapter.
9 Public limited and private limited companies are the most common types of company in Malaysia.
Private limited companies cannot sell shares to the public, and are distinguished by the label 'Sendirian
Berhad, shortened to 'Sdn Bhd, or 'SIB' and must have a minimum of two members but are limited to
50 members. Public limited companies can sell shares to the public, and are distinguished by the label
'Berhad, shortened to 'Bhd and must have a minimum of two members with no member limit
(http://allmalaysia.info/msiacommerce/resources/business.asp, as at 25 October 2004).
10 Core corporate law in Malaysia includes company law, securities laws, exchange listing requirements,
accounting standards, and insolvency laws and regulations.
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2.2 Malaysian culture, its capital market and economyll
2.2.1 Culture
Malaysia is classified by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income country, with a
per capita gross national income of US$3,780 in 2003 (http://ww.worldbank.org/my).
Like the UK, Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy with an elected federal
parliamentary government. The country has a multi cultural society, consisting of Malay
50.3%, Chinese 23.8%, Indigenous 11.0%, Indian 7.1 %, non-Malaysian citizens 6.6 %
and others 1.2%, with a total population of 25.5 milion in 2004. The ethnic mix in
Malaysian society is due to the influence of the British, who brought immigrants from
China and India to work in tin mines and rubber estates during the period of colonial
rule from 1905 to 1957.
During the colonial period, the British introduced a 'divide and rule' system which
prevented the races from uniting. The Chinese lived mainly in towns and strongly
controlled business and trade; the Indians worked as rubber tappers and lived on the
estates, while the Malays lived mostly in rural areas, were involved in fishing and
farming, and suffered economic hardships. Therefore, inequalities of wealth emerged
within the society due to its colonial heritage.
Hofstede (2001) develops a model that identifies four primary dimensions to assist in
differentiating cultures, namely: (i) Power Distance (PDI); (ii) Individualism (IDV); (iii)
II This description is based on the KLSE publication, 'Investing in the Stock Market in Malaysia' (1998),
the KLSE, the SC (Securities Commission), the MIDA (Malaysian Industrial Development Authority),
the Department of Statistics Malaysia, the Economic Planning Unit, and the World Bank websites; and
the Bank Negara Malaysia annual reports (various years).
17
Chapter 2 - Background
Masculinity (MAS); and (iv) Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI). These Hofstede
dimensions correlate with country, cultural and religious factors. The inequality of
wealth within Malaysian society is consistent with the Power Distance dimension of
Hofstede (2001). As can be seen from Figure 2.1, Malaysia has a high Power Distance
Index (PDI), ranked at 95 compared to the average PDI for Asian countries of 71 and a
world average of 55. As interpreted by Hofstede, the high PDI ,indicates that there are
inequalities of power and wealth within Malaysian society. The next highest Hofstede
dimension is Masculinity (MAS) with a score of 44, which is slightly lower than the
world average of 50. The low masculinity score indicates that Malaysia has a low level
of differentiation and discrimination between genders. In Malaysia, females are treated
equally to males in all aspects of society.
Figure 2.1 Geert Hofstede's cultural dimensions
i1Vysia
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Source: htt://ww.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_malaysia.shtml.
The next lowest score in the Hofstede dimensions for Malaysia is Uncertainty
Avoidance (UAI), with a score of 30 compared to the Asian average of 58 and a world
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average of 64. A low Uncertainty Avoidance score indicates that Malaysia is less
concerned about ambiguity and uncertainty and has more tolerance for a variety of
opinions. As defined by Hofstede, Malaysian society is less rule-oriented since people
are more ready to accept change and take more risks. The last Hofstede dimension for
Malaysia is Individualism, with a low score of 20 compared to the world average of 40.
Hofstede interprets Malaysian society to be more collectivist (rattier than individualist)
by nature. Unlike the UK and the US, which have highest Individualism scores of 89
and 91, respectively, the Malaysian culture reinforces extended families and collective
responsibility among family groups.
2.2.2 The capital market and the economy
Over the last few decades, there has been a significant change in the capital market in
Malaysia. The Malaysian capital market consists òf primary12 and secondary13 equity
markets, private and public debt securities markets, financial derivatives markets, and
an Islamic-based financial instruments market. The capital market participants in
Malaysia consist of local and foreign retail and institutional investors, local and foreign
issuers, intermediaries (e.g., merchant banks, brokers, fund managers) and market
institutions (e.g., issuing houses/4 c1earing15 and depository institutions,16 and the stock
12 A primary securities market is a market in which new securities are sold. The function of the primary
market is to raise new capital for companies.
13 A secondary market is one in which outstanding issues of securities are traded. The function of the
secondary market is to provide required liquidity for investors.
14 There are two issuing house in Malaysia, namely MIDP Consultancy and Corporate Services Sdn Bhd
and Malaysian Issuing House Sdn Bhd.
15 Securities Clearing Automated Network Services Sdn Bhd (SCANS) is the Malaysian clearing house.
16 Malaysian Central Depository Sdn Bhd (MCD) is the central depository institution in Malaysia.
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exchange). The activities undertaken within the Malaysian capital market consist of
securities broking and trading, investment management, financial risk management, and
the provision of mergers and acquisition advice and underwiting.
The first formal organisation in the securities business in Malaysia was the Singapore
Stockbrokers' Association, established in 1930. This organisation re-registered as the
Malayan Stockbrokers' Association in 1937, but at this time there was stil no public
trading of shares. The public trading of shares began on 9 May 1960 when the Malayan
Stock Exchange was formed, which was then renamed as the Stock Exchange of
Malaysia in 1964. The common stock exchange continued to function, even after the
withdrawal of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, but was renamed as the Stock
Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore (SEMS). In order to guide the development of the
securities industry in Malaysia, a Capital Issues Committee (CIC) was formed in 1968.
The SEMS was separated into the Kuala Lumpur 'Stock Exchange Bhd (KLSEB) and
the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) in 1973, due to the termination of currency
interchangeability between Malaysia and Singapore. In the same year, the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange was established and took over operations of the KLSEB as the
main stock exchange. However, Malaysian companies continued to be listed on the
SES and vice-versa until mutual delisting took place in 1990. All 53 Singapore
companies were delisted from the KLSE's offcial list on 1 January 1990. The final
separation resulted in the KLSE being a truly Malaysian stock exchange. It finally
became a demutualised exchange and was renamed Bursa Malaysia in 2004.
The five major indices of the KLSE are the Composite, the EMAS (Exchange Main
Board All-Share), the Second Board, and the Syariah and Technology Indices. The
KLSE Composite Index was launched in 1986 as the main market indicator.
20
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Since its independence from the British in 1957, Malaysia has been dependent on
agriculture and commodities and is recognised as the world's largest producer of rubber
and tin. At present, Malaysia is involved in manufacturing-based industries,
particularly electronics, and has become an export-driven economy. In addition,
Malaysian economic development plans envisage a knowledge-based economy in terms
of research and technology development in the next ten years.
Due to the inequality of wealth within the society, the Malaysian Government
introduced a New Economic Policyl? (NEP, 1970-1990), which was replaced by a
National Development Policy (NDP) in 1991, with the main intention of increasing
Bumiputera involvement and ownership in the corporate sector from 2.4% in 1970 to
30% by the end of 1990 (Ko on, 1997). is According to the Economic Planning Unit, a
government body, more than two-thirds of corporate equity in Malaysia was owned by
foreigners in 1970.
Table 2.1 shows the share ownership by group (Bumiputera, non-Bumiputera,
Foreigners and Nominee companies) in 1990, 1995, 1999,2000 and 2002, respectively.
17 It was introduced following the race riots that took place in May 1969. Its twin goals are social
restructuring across racial lines and povert reduction, mainly within the Malay community (Ko on,
1997).
18 The restructuring target for other Malaysians and foreigners were 40% and 30%, respectively
(http://www.epu.jpm.my. as at 24 May 2005).
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The data excludes government holdings except through Trust agencies (e.g.,
Permodalan Nasional Berhad and the State Economic Development Corporations). It
shows that the objective of the NEP to raise Bumiputera ownership to 30% by the end
of 1990 was not achieved. However, the growth in Bumiputera ownership since 1970
has been significant. As of 16 September 2004, the Prime Minister of Malaysia
reported that Bumiputera equity ownership was RM73.2 bili~n, or 18.7% (Utusan
online at http://ww.utusan.com.my).
Apart from share ownership by ethnic groups, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) report
that there is a relatively high ownership concentration19 in Malaysia (52%) compared to
the UK (15%) and the US (12%). Similar to Malaysia, ownership concentration is also
higher in Germany (Goergen, 1998). Leuz et aL. (2003) find that earnings management
is more pervasive in countries with a more concentrated ownership and report that
Malaysia and Germany have relatively higher levels of earnings management, with an
aggregate scoréo of 14.8 and 21.5, respectively, in comparison to the UK and the US
with scores of7.0 and 2.0, respectively.
The Malaysian economy experienced a growth rate of 8.7% per annum, from 1990 to
1996, which contracted to 7.4% in the years 1997-1998. This was because of the East
Asian crisis that resulted from the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997, subsequently
19 This is measured by Leuz et aL. (2003) as the median percentage of common shares owned by the
largest three shareholders in the ten largest privately-owned non-financial companies.
20 This is measured by Leuz et aL. (2003) as the average rank across four earnings management measures,
EM1-EM4. EMl is the country's median ratio of company-level standard deviations of operating income
and operating cash flow; EM2 is the country's Spearman correlation between the change in accruals and
the change in cash flow from operations; EM3 is the country's median ratio of the absolute value of
accruals and the absolute value of the cash flow from operations; and EM4 is the number of 'small
profits' divided by the number of 'small losses' .
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causing a currency crisis and stock market crash in Malaysia. This is reflected by funds
raised through new equity issues, initially surging from RM9.9 bilion in 1990 to 20.8
billon in 1996, and then dropping to RM1. 7 bilion in 1998, as shown in Table 2.2.
Similar to the UK and the US, the degree of importance of equity markets21 in Malaysia
is high compared to other developing countries such as Indonesia and Thailand (Leuz et
aI., 2003).
Table 2.2 Funds raised by Malaysian companies
Year Public issues Rights issues Special
(RM milion) (RM milion) issues/Privateplacement/
Restricted issues
(RM millon)
1990 2,597.1 5,503.0 389.8
1991 230.3 1,6726 793.6
1992 3,909.6 3,762.5 312.5
1993 1710 2,429.1 782.0
1994 373.2 5,448.4 1,364.1
1995 1,155.6 5,594.1 2,436.0
1996 1,778.0 7,402.8 8,075.~
1997 2,928.7 9,362.4 4,037)8
1998 346.2 421.9 245.0
1999 634.3 6,1 07.6 8726
2000 820.6 3,814.6 1,015.0
2001 951. 1,84.5 431.
2002 2,883.5 4,069.0 1,820.0
Up to 772 232.9 26.9
31..2003
Total 5,713.5 15,830.5 4,411.2
Note:
* include Restricted offer for sale.
Source: KLSE Statistics, March 2003.
Offers for sale*
(RM milion)
Total
(RM milion)
1,440.1 9,930.0
1,367.2 4,063.7
2,268.5 10,253.1
1,149.4 4,531.5
2,931. 10,117.0
4,456.7 13,642.4
3,570.2 20,826.3
2,787.6 19,116.5
698.5 1,711.6
364.8 7,979.3
233.7 5,883.9
1,728.2 4,296.1
4,088.7 12,861.
308.2 645.2
7,422.1 33,3772
The growth of the Malaysian capital market prior to 1997 is not merely due to rapid
economic growth but also reflects the two broad policy objectives set by the
21 This is measured by Leuz et aL. (2003) as the mean rank across: (i) the ratio of aggregate stock market
capitalisation held by minorities to gross national product; (ii) the number of listed domestic companies
relative to the population; and (iii) the number of IPOs relative to the population. The scores for
Malaysia, the UK, the US, Indonesia and Thailand are 25.3, 25.0, 23.3, 4.7 and 14.3, respectively.
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government, namely the 'Privatisation Policy' and 'Vision 2020' (National Vision
Policy-NVP). The Privatisation Policy was announced as a national policy by the
Malaysian government in 1983. Based on this policy, privatised entities were required
to allocate 30% of their equity to Bumiputera but limit foreign ownership to a maximum
of 25% of their share capital (http://ww.epu.jpm.my. as at 24 May 2005). As of 26
December 2000, a total of 40 privatised companies were tisted on the KLSE,
contributing 30.3% of the total market capitalisation (Economic Planning Unit, 2001).
The Vision 2020 Policy, which embodied the NDP, was introduced by the Malaysian
government in 1991, with a goal of attaining fully developed ,22 country status by the
year 2020 (Mahathir Mohamad, 2001).
Due to the economic crisis, on 1 September 1998 the government discontinued trading
in its currency by pegging the ringgit to the US dollar (at RM3.80: US$l) and imposed
controls on its capital market, particularly on investment from overseas?3 With the help
of these measures, the economy began to recover in 1999 with a growth rate of 5.6%,
increasing to 8.3% by 2000. However, the global economic volatility and uncertainties
caused by international terrorism, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the sudden
appearance of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) badly affected the
Malaysian economy. It was also hit by the slump in the Information Technology (IT)
sector in 2001. Even though the growth rate recorded in 2001 was 0.4%, the Malaysian
economy improved in the subsequent four years (2001-2004) with growth rates of 4.2%,
22 As defined by Mahathir Mohamad, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, a 'fully developed' country
is one that is fully developed along a number of dimensions: economic, political, social, spiritual,
psychological and cultural.
23 In 1994, China also pegged its currency (the Chinese yuan) to the US dollar (McKinnon and Schnabl,
2004).
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5.3%, and 7.1% in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively. The savings rate in Malaysia is
high with the Gross National Savings (GNS) as a percentage of Gross National Product
(GNP) being 24.6% and 36.3%, as recorded in 2002 and 2003, respectively (Bank
Negara Malaysia Annual Report, 2004). Moreover, Malaysian economic growth was
accompanied by a relatively low inflation rate of 1.5% and a low unemployment rate of
3.8% in 2004. The Malaysian key economic indicators are report~d in Table 2.3.
According to the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), in 2004,
Malaysia was one of the largest recipients of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among
the developing countries. As argued by MIDA, this is due to its market-oriented
economy, accompanied by an educated workforce and a well-developed infrastructure
(http://ww.mida.gov.my. as at 22 May 2005).
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2.3 The legal, regulatory and reporting framework24
2.3.1 Law and legal system
The Malaysian legal system is based on English common law. Legal enforcement25 in
Malaysia is lower in comparison to the UK and the US, but is higher than in Indonesia
and Thailand (Leuz et aI., 2003). However, the business environment in Malaysia is
more highly regulated compared to the UK (Ow- Yong and Kooi Guan, 2000).
Malaysian corporate law is principally set out in the Companies Act 1965, administered
by the Registrar of Companies (ROC).26 The Act provides a comprehensive legal
framework for governing companies, which includes requirements for the birth, death
and existence of companies. The Act also contains requirements with respect to
disclosures on the contents of prospectuses.
2.3.2 Regulatory structure
Figure 2.2 shows the regulatory structure of the securities and futures industries in
Malaysia. Security regulation, particularly on new equity issues, is .administered by the
Security Commission (SC) and the Bursa Malaysia Berhad.
24 This section is based on the SC Policies and Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities, KLSE Listing
Requirements, website of Securities Commission, Paudyal et aL. (1998), Jelic et aL. (2001), Wan-Hussin
(2001), Koh (2004) and Securities Commission Publication 'Capital Market Masterplan'.
25 This is measured by Leuz et al. (2003) as the mean score across the index of: (i) the legal system's
effciency; (ii) the rule of law; and (iii) the corrption. The scores for Malaysia, the UK, the US,
Indonesia and Thailand are 7.7,9.2,9.5,2.9, and 4.9, respectively.
26 The Companies Commission of Malaysia Act 2001 was set up and came into operation on 16 April
2002. The Act established the Companies Commission of Malaysia through a merger of ROC and the
Registr of Business.
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Figure 2.2 Regulatory structure diagrams
" $e;; "no !ì,,¡mJ
~ilrlt"l "
Source: http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/aboutus/regstruct.htm (as at 23 October 2004).
2.3.2.1 Securities Commission (SC)
The Securities Commission (SC) was established in March 1993 as a statutory body
under the Securities Commission Act 1993. The role of the SC is to provide regulations
and to advise the Minister of Finance on all matters relating to the securities and futures
industries. Among its responsibilities, the SC has to consider and make
recommendations for the reform of the law relating to securities and futures contracts.
The SC holds the central supervisory power as the market regulator of all fund-raising
activities.
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2.3.2.2 Bursa Malaysia Berhad (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange, KLSE)
The KLSE is the official stock exchange of Malaysia under the Securities Industry Act
(SIA) which was passed in 1973.17 The KLSE is a self-regulatory organisation with its
own Memorandum and Articles of Association. It is the lead regulator for all exchange
traded securities and derivatives. The role of KLSE is to govern the conduct of its
members in securities dealings. It administers the Malaysian share market in which
investors buy and sell shares and other securities (e.g., loan stocks, debenture stocks,
bonds and warrants) issued by companies listed on the exchange. It is also responsible
for the surveilance of the market place and for the enforcement of its Listing
Requirements, which spell out the criteria for listing, disclosure requirements and
standards to be maintained by listed companies.
A company making an IPO in Malaysia seeks a listing either on the Main Board
(typically for larger capitalised companies), or the Second Board (typically for smaller
sized companies). The Second Board was established on 11 November 1988 to enable
smaller companies which are viable and have strong growth potential to be listed on the
KLSE. Each board is further classified by sectors which reflect the core business of
these companies. As of 3 1 December 2003, there were 13 industry classifications on the
Main Board, namely: Technology, Consumer Products, Industrial Products,
Construction, Trading/Services, Finance, Infrastructure Project Company (IPC), Hotel,
Properties, Plantation, Mining, Trusts, and Closed-End Funds. However, there are only
27 The SIA 1983 then replaced the 1973 Act in order to provide better supervision and control of the
industr.
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seven industry classifications on the Second Board, namely: Technology, Consumer
Products, Industrial Products, Construction, Trading/Services, Properties, and
Plantation. This is due to the fact that such companies under IPC or Financial Services
are allowed to seek a listing only on the Main Board of the KLSE (Policies and
Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities, Revised edition, 1 April 2003).
Companies wishing to transfer from the Second Board to the Main Board of the KLSE
have to fulfil all the Main Board listing requirements and the companies had to have
been listed on the Second Board for at least three years (prior to September 2001), now
reduced to one year (Amendments to Policies and Guidelines on Issue/Offer of
Securities, 3 September 2001).
The Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation Berhad
(MESDAQ) was set up in May 1997 as the se'cond stock exchange of Malaysia.
MESDAQ was established to provide a capital market for the listing, buying and sellng
of securities of technology-intensive companies and high growth potential companies
without a profit track record. However, MESDAQ merged with the KLSE on 18 March
2002 to form a single exchange as recommended by the Capital Market Masterplan. It
was referred to as the MESDAQ Market instead of a third board in order to keep its
identity of being a specialised market to cater for the capital raising needs of technology
and high growth companies.
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Table 2.4 summarises the minimum listing requirements of the Main Board, Second
Board and the MESDAQ Market effective from May 2003.18 Apart from the listing
requirements, there is also a mandatory audit committee requirement for companies
seeking a listing to the KLSE.
Table 2.5 shows the number of listed companies on the Main Board, Second Board and
the MESDAQ Market as at 31 March 2003. As seen from Table 2.5, the number of
companies listed grew from 413 in 1993 to 874. By 21 October 2004, when this section
was written, there were 947 companies listed: 614 on the Main Board, 280 on the
Second Board, and 53 on the MESDAQ Market, respectively.
28 Wan-Hussin (2001) describes the evolution in the quantitative listing requirement for the Main Board
and the Second Board for the period 1990 through August 2001.
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Chapter 2 - Background
2.3.3 Reporting framework and IPO regulations
New issues of corporate and government securities that are offered to the public through
an IPO are governed under the prospectus provisions of the Securities Commission Act
of 1993. Within the period of this study (1989 to 2003 inclusive), there were significant
changes in regulations pertaining to the offer of securities. Prior to 1996, a merit-based
regulatory regime was used to examine the merits of each capital issue proposal, in
order to make a judgement on the viability of the company and to decide on the
suitability of a company for listing. Under this regime, the pricing of new issues was
fixed and set out by the SC, in which the prospective price/earnings (P/E) ratio agreed
between the company and its underwriter had to fall within a certain boundary. For
example, the PIE ratio for the Trading/Services sector from February 1992 to December
1995 had to be within a range of 4 to 11. These issue prices were usually at levels
below market prices, resulting in large over-subscription rates29 on Malaysian IPOs.
Fixed IPO pricing is usually based on the need to protect the interest of minority
shareholders. Similar binding regulatory constraints were implemented in Korea and
India before 1988 and until 1992, respectively (Chowdhry and Sherman, 1 996b).
In order to enhance corporate governance and strengthen the regulatory framework of
the primary market, the disclosure-based regulatory regime (DBR) was implemented
after 1995 on a phased basis. In March 2003, the SC completed the transition from a
merit-based to a DBR for fund-raising. Effective from 1 May 2003, seven fund-raising
guidelines related to the offer of securities, private debt and asset-backed securities, call
29 Wan-Hussin (2001) reports the average over-subscription rate in Malaysia for the period 1990 to 2000
is 40.9%.
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warrants, asset valuations, prospectus and unit trust funds were revised by the SC to
enhance corporate governance (Securities Commission Press Release, 31 March 2003).
In order to increase transparency, it is compulsory for IPO companies to disclose timely,
accurate and material information on their corporate performance to potential investors.
Unlike the UK, Canada and Hong Kong, which have voluntary earnings forecast
disclosure, however, it is mandatory for the Malaysian IPO companies to provide
earnings forecasts for their next financial year end in their prospectus.30
With effect from January 1996, a revised regulation on earmngs forecasts was
introduced, requirng both the major shareholders and promoters of the compames
seeking a listing on the Main Board involved in construction, services,31 and
specialised32 activities and on the Second Board, to choose for either a three-year profit
guarantee or a three-year share moratorium. 
33 The'role of the profit guarantee or share
moratorium is to protect IPO investors from being expropriated by the controllng
shareholders and to align their interests, thus maximising the value of the company
(Wan-Hussin,2001).34
30 Another country that has mandatory forecast disclosure in the pr~spectus after 1983 is New Zealand
(Jaggi, 1997).
31 Services activities comprise Finance, Hotels, Properties, and Trading sectors.
32 Specialised activities comprise Mining, Plantation and Trusts sectors.
33 Share moratorium is called a lock-up in the US and a lock-in in the UK.
34 Wan-HussÌl (2001) provides detail investigations on IPO profit guarantee and share moratorium.
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Under the profit guarantee agreement, the major shareholders and promoters of the
affected companies have to provide a guarantee that the company wil achieve 90% of
the profits forecast in the prospectus, and 90% of the forecast profits for the two years
following the offcial listing. The guarantee can be in the form of either a bank
guarantee or the placement of shares by the major shareholders (the guarantors) with an
independent third party. The guarantors have to compensate ,the company for any
shortfalls in the guaranteed profit. This is one of the unique features of Malaysian IPOs
that make them different from the rest of the world. As an alternative to guaranteeing
profits, the affected major shareholders and promoters of the Main Board and Second
Board applicant companies must agree not to sell, transfer or assign any of their
shareholdings in the company within one year of the official listing. Thereafter they can
sell, transfer or assign a maximum of 20% (15%) for the Main Board (Second Board)
applicant companies per annum (Policies and Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities,
Guidance Notes 10-19).
Since 1 July 1997, the profit guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee was made
mandatory for all Second Board applicant companies (Updates and Revisions to the
Policies on Issues/Offer of Securities). It was subsequently abolished in April 1999 due
to the diffculty in obtaining bank guarantees and a tightening of credit policy resulting
from unfavourable economic conditions (Wan-Hussin, 2001). As a replacement for
this, a moratorium on selling shares is now a standard requirement. Promoters of the
affected companies are not allowed to sell, transfer or assign their respective
shareholdings amounting to 45% of the enlarged issued and paid-up capital of the
company for at least one year from the date of listing. Thereafter they are allowed to
sell, transfer or assign only up to a maximum of one-third per annum of the shares under
moratorium (Revised Requirement Profit Guarantee/Moratorium on Disposal of Shares
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on 30 April 1999). These share moratorium structures are different from those in the
US market, which are generally for a shorter period (180 days) and lock-in a greater
percentage of shares (Wan Hussin, 2001). However, the lock-in period in the UK
ranges from six months to about three years. In addition, the lock-in agreements in the
UK are more complex and diverse than in the US (Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed,
2001). Another difference is that lock-in agreements are coi;pulsory (for certain
companies) in Malaysia, but not in the UK and the US.
A company is also required to provide explanations for any deviation of 10% or more
between the reported profit after tax and minority interest in the audited accounts
following the IPO and any forecasts previously made in the prospectus (Chapter 9,
KLSE Listing Requirements). For any new issue of shares, the identity, compensation,
equity ownership and background of directors and senior managers also needs to be
disclosed in the prospectus.
After the company has been listed, the company is required to publish quarterly reports,
income statements, annual reports, annual audited financial statements, and auditors'
and directors' reports. The quarterly reports or the interim financial statements need to
be disclosed not later than two months after the end of each quarter of a financial year.
These interim financial statements report the consolidated and comparative figures for
the prior year. However, they do not provide information on the financial status of
companies' assets, liabilities and equities, or cash flows, and are not reviewed by
external auditors. The quarterly income statements need to be prepared for the current
quarter and cumulatively for the current fiscal year-to-date of the immediately
preceding financial year. In addition, the listed company needs to issue an annual report
together with the annual audited financial statements, and auditors' and directors'
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reports within a period not exceeding four months of the close of the financial year of
the listed company.
All Malaysian companies have to accord with the approved accounting standard of the
Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) and the Ninth Schedules of the
Companies Act, 1965, in preparing and presenting their financial statements. Since the
late 1970s, Malaysia has adopted accounting standards that are generally consistent with
those issued by the International Accounting Standards (IASs) Committee. The
approved accounting standards that constitute the Malaysian Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) consist of IASs adopted35 in Malaysia and Malaysian
Accounting Standards (MASs) issued in Malaysia. Topics not dealt with in IASs are
covered in MASs. The Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB), which came
into existence during the second half of 1997, is now the sole authority for setting
accounting standards for Malaysia. The MASB was established under the Financial
Reporting Act 1997.
Section 1 69(4) of the Companies Act requires companies' profit and loss accounts and
the balance sheets to be audited and certified by an independent external auditor. Under
the reporting framework of approved auditing standards36 in Malaysia and the
35 Twenty-five out of 
thiry-one IAS standards had been adopted in Malaysia by early 1998.
36 The approved auditing standards in Malaysia are based on the International Standards on Auditing
(lASs).
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Companies Act, the auditor is responsible for providing unqualified or qualified reports
on the companies' financial statements.37
A requirement also exists for a company to disclose the composition of equity
ownership in the company under Part II of the Eighth Schedules of the Companies Act
1965. Many Malaysian listed companies are owned by controlling38 and substantial
shareholders, which may influence the appointment of chief executive officers.
Furthermore, many of these shareholders are 'family' related, so they may be able to
influence the policies and directions of the company. The Securities Industry
(Reporting of Substantial Shareholding) Regulations 1998, which came into operation
on 1 May 1998, define a substantial shareholder in the company as any person or
institution having 5% or more of the nominal value of the voting shares in the company
(Regulation 7). However, effective from 1 November 1998, Regulation 7 of the
Securities Industry (Reporting of Substantial Sh'areholding) Regulations 1998 was
amended. Under the new Regulation 7 A, any person or institution having not less than
2% of the nominal value of all the voting shares in the company is regarded as a
substantial shareholder. Subsequently, effective from 1 August 2001, Regulation 7A
was deleted. Based on the Securities Industry (Reporting of Substantial Shareholding)
37 Unqualified reports are given when the auditor feels the company has followed all accounting rules
appropriately and that the financial reports are a true and fair representation of the company's financial
condition. Meanwhile, qualified opinion is given when some limitations exist, such as an inability to
gather certain information or a significant upcoming event, which mayor may not occur. In this
situation, a qualified report is produced because the auditor is unable to report affirmatively on those
matters required under the reporting framework.
38 A controlling shareholder is someone who can exercise the majority of votes in the election of
directors (Ow-Yong and Kooi Guan, 2000, footnote 9). Goergen (1998) defines the controllng
shareholder as the largest shareholder holding at least 25% of the voting equity (p. 113). Therefore, it is
likely that the controllng shareholder may be in a position to determine the outcome of certain matters
requiring shareholders' approval, unless they abstain from voting by law and/or the relevant authorities.
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(Amendment) Regulations 2001, an ownership stake of 5% is applied in defining a
substantial shareholder.
2.4 The Malaysian IPO markee9
2.4.1 Reasons for companies listing on Bursa Malaysia
An initial public offering (IPO) is also sometimes known as 'going public'. This is
when a company that has previously been privately-owned offers its shares to the public
in the first instance. Even though companies may have different reasons for seeking a
listing on the Bursa Malaysia, the primary reason is to raise capital for the expansion of
business operations. It is an alternative to borrowing from banks. Another important
motive for going public in Malaysia is ownership diversification.
,
Several other reasons for going public are to achieve a higher profie than unlisted
companies through the publicity generated by stock-broking companies, which
eventually helps to stimulate the company's growth and attract new business. In
addition, investors tend to have greater confidence in public listed companies because
the company has to fulfi stringent listing requirements before being listed on the Bursa
Malaysia. The company can raise more funds from existing shareholders via rights
issues and loan stocks for business expansion, new projects or reducing debt.
Furthermore, due to the increased publicity about their activities, listed companies may
be in a better position to expand their operations overseas.
39 The descriptions are based on the SC Policies and Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities, KLSE
Listing Requirements, Paudyal et aL. (1998), Jelic et aL. (2001), Wan-Hussin (2001), Koh (2004) and SC
Publication 'Capital Market Masterplan', SC and Bursa Malaysia websites.
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2.4.2 Features of Malaysian IPOs and the listing process
Apart from the SC intervention on IPO pricing prior to 1996, the imposition of the IPO
profit guarantee from 1996 to 1999 for certain companies, and the mandatory earnings
forecasts disclosure in the IPO prospectus, as discussed in the previous section, there are
several other unique features of the Malaysian IPO market that differentiates it from
other markets. The most important feature is that companies making IPOs are required
by law to reserve 30% of shares allocated to the public to be set aside for Bumiputera
applicants. However, these share allocations do not need to be approved by the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) or other government agencies. The
aim of this requirement is to increase Bumiputera ownership in the corporate sector.
However, companies which are controlled by Bumiputera do not have to comply with
this allocation requirement.4o A portion of shares are also reserved for Bumiputera
investors approved by the MITI or other government agencies. Apart from allocating
the shares to the Malaysian public and Bumiputera applicants, companies may also
allocate some of the shares to their directors, employees, and others who have
contributed to the success of the company, such as suppliers, distributors, dealers or
customers. 
4 1
40 SC defines the Bumiputera control companies as those in which: (i) at least 51 % of the company's
equities are owned by Bumiputera shareholders; or (ii) at least 35% of company's equity is owned by
Bumiputera shareholders, chairman, chief executive offcer, and managing director. In addition, at least
50% of the board of directors are Bumiputera.
41 Wan-Hussin (2001) reports that during the period 1996-2000, approximately 12% of enlarged issued
and paid-up share capital of IPO company upon listing is allocated to the Malaysian public, 3% to the
employee, directors, and others person who have contributed to the success of the companies, 6% to
governent-approved Bumiputera investors and 1 % to others (mostly institutional investors or
shareholders of other companies within the group).
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There are two common types of IPOs in Malaysia. The first type is the new issue of
shares, which is also known as a 'public offer'. The second type is an 'offer for sale' of
existing shares which have not previously been traded by one or more existing
shareholders. Several companies also make a combination of public offers and offers
for sale of existing shares, which is referred to as a mixed or combination offering.
Under a combination offering, the sale of shares is partially from the issuing company
and partially from existing shareholders. The absolute holdings of the existing
shareholders are not affected in a public offer since new shares are being offered.
However, this wil reduce their percentage holdings in the company. On the other hand,
in an 'offer for sale', both the absolute holdings and the percentage holdings of the
existing shareholders in the company are affected and reduced. Furthermore, the gross
proceeds raised from public offers which provide new investment capital wil go to the
company, but gross proceeds raised from offers for sale go directly to the owners of the
,
shares. Conversely, the proceeds of the combination offerings wil go partly to the
issuing company and partly to selling shareholders. However, there is no minimum
level for the public offer which can take the form of new and/or existing shares
(Amendments to Policies and Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities, as at 3 September
2001).
The listing process for Malaysian IPOs is ilustrated in Figure 2.3. Prior to May 2003,
the IPO processing time was approximately eight to twelve months (Jelic et al., 2001).
The procedure is extensive compared to that of most other markets (Paudyal et aI.,
1998). However, in order to spur the efficiency of capital raising, the processing time
for submissions received from May 1, 2003 onwards was reduced to three months.
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Figure 2.3 The IPO listing process
Register
Submit to f- Submit to .. prospectus .. Offer to f- Ballot, quotese KLSE with SC and public and listing
lodge with
Roe
Source: Capital Market Masterplan, p. 24.
Permission for a listing is first obtained from the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) and the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC). In order for a company
to be listed on the KLSE, it has to submit a listing application to the Securities
Commission (SC) together with a draft copy of the prospectus, once the application has
been approved by the MITI and the FIC. Prior approval from the SC is required for all
corporate proposals which involve issues or offers of securities to the public. A
financial and qualitative evaluation of the company, such as the profits and dividend
forecasts, has to be made to the SC. Once the application of issuance and listing of
securities has been approved by the SC, the compan:y wil fie with the KLSE its listing
application, together with supporting documents and articles of association. The final
copies of the prospectus are then fied with the relevant authorities. The KLSE requires
the company to provide to the KLSE a number of copies of the printed prospectus. The
company then issues and advertises it, thereby inviting members of the public to apply
for the company's shares. Similar to the practice used in the UK, prior to the formal
invitation to the public to apply for shares, the subscription price of the IPO must be set
as agreed between the company and its lead underwriter, and stated in the prospectus.42
The full prospectus and application forms must be published in a widely-circulated
42 As mentioned in Section 2.3, before January 1996, the IPO subscription price was determined by the
SC, based on a range of prospective price/earnings (PIE) ratio that was set for each industry. The
prospective earnings were based on the earnings forecast for the first financial year of listing. However,
since January 1996 when the disclosure-based regulatory regime was introduced, the IPO subscription
prices are more market-driven.
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daily Malay language (Bahasa Malaysia) newspaper and an English language
newspaper if a company seeks a listing on the Main Board. However, only a summary
of the prospectus should be published if a company seeks a listing on the Second Board.
Following the rationalisation of SC Guidelines in respect of Listing Requirements,
effective from 1 September 2003, the requirements for advertising the prospectus in a
widely-circulated newspaper have been abolished.
Underwriting arrangements must be in place before the offering of securities is made to
the general public. Underwriting may be arranged in terms of a minimum level of
subscription, which should be determined by the issuer and must be disclosed in the
submission to the SC and in the prospectus issued in conjunction with the IPO, together
with the basis for determining the minimum level of subscription. The principal adviser
making the IPO application to the SC has to be part of the syndicate of underwiters
who underwrite the securities offered under the tpO. The full list of underwriters,
together with their respective commitments, should then be submitted by the principal
adviser to the SC for its records.
The company has to announce the level of subscription and the basis of allocation if the
listing entails an offer of securities to the public. As highlighted earlier, at least 30% of
the shares offered should be allocated to Bumiputera investors (local indigenous people)
upon listing. This requirement is to comply with the National Development Policy
(NDP). This is one of the unique features of Malaysian IPOs, which makes the IPO
market different from that in other markets. As noted by Corhay et al. (2002), this
policy could provide an explanation for the high underpricing of Malaysian IPOs, given
the political need to transfer wealth to the Bumiputera investors (p. 55). Apar from the
unique features of Malaysian IPOs on share allocation, an interesting feature which is
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similar to the UK, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Bangladesh, among
others, is that issuers tend to favour small over large investors (Chowdhry and Sherman,
1996a).
Similar to the UK listing requirements, a company must ensure that, upon listing, at
least 25% of its issued and paid-up capital is in the hands of public shareholders. As of
January 2005, the minimum number of public shareholders upon listing must be at least
1,000, each holding not less than 100 shares. The employees of an applicant company,
its subsidiaries and the holding company are not excluded from the minimum number of
public shareholders. All the shares of an applicant company which are held by
employees and Bumiputera investors for the purpose of compliance with the NDP can
make up the 25% public spread (Chapter 3.05, Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements).
In Malaysia, most companies issuing shares use a firm commitment contract, and such
offerings use a fixed price approach.43 Under this method, investors specify the number
of shares for which they wish to subscribe at the pre-announced subscription price.
Apart from fixed price offerings, the hybrid pricing method (which comprises both
fixed and auction pricing) and the book-building method are also used in Malaysia.44 In
auction pricing, the price is set after bids are submitted, while in book-building an offer
price is set after the underwriters canvas potential buyers to establish how many shares
they want and how much they are prepared to pay (Ritter, 2003).
43 Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) find that countries employing fixed price offerings usually have
more underpricing than in countries employing book-building methods.
44 Wan-Hussin (2001) reports that the number of companies that used hybrid pricing during the period
1990 to 2000 is only 1% (seven privatisation companies). On the other hand, the book-building method
was first used in 1995 and subsequently adopted by four IPC companies.
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With a firm commitment contract, the underwriters guarantee to buy all the shares at the
offer price, less the underwriter's discount. If the issue is undersold, the underwriting
syndicate faces a market risk for these shares (Fishe, 2002). However, only IPO shares
that are made available for subscription by the investing public are fully underwritten in
Malaysia. IPO shares reserved for Bumiputera investors and approved by MITI or
governent agencies, and for eligible directors, employees, cust~mers and suppliers of
the IPO company, are not required to be underwritten.
In order for investors to apply for shares, share application forms for new public issues
have been made available in newspapers since 1994. Similar to the UK, Hong Kong,
Australia, and Singapore, among others, potential investors are required to pay in
advance for all shares for which they bid (Chowdhry and Sherman, 1 996b). The
members of the board of directors, representatives from the Malaysian Industrial
Development Finance Consultancy and Corporate Services (MIDFCCS), MITI, the FIC
and the SC meet after the closing of the share application date to agree on the basis for
allotting the shares. The applicants are sorted based on two criteria: (i) the number of
shares they are applying for; and (ii) whether they are Bumiputera or non-Bumiputera
investors.
Balloting is used to allocate oversubscribed IPO shares to the investing public. The
balloting process is carried out in two different phases. In the first, Bumiputera
investors are balloted, while in the second, all unsuccessful Bumiputera application
forms are added to the public portion for the second balloting. By doing so, the
probability of success for the Bumiputera investors is increased. In order to reduce the
time involved and the cost incurred in the IPO process, an integrated electronic system
has been introduced for each process of share application, balloting and refund of
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momes. The computerised balloting using a random number generator computer has
replaced the manual balloting since the end of 1995. Therefore, the public has an option
to apply for shares either electronically or on paper. Investors who wish to apply
electronically can use Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) cards to subscribe for shares at
the ATM machines of participating financial institutions. Successful applicants have
the shares credited into their Central Depository System (CDS) accounts, while
unsuccessful applicants have their application monies credited back into their bank
accounts. The integrated electronic system also involves the transmission of share
application data from participating financial institutions to the issuing house, where
computerised balloting is used to determine successful share applications during an
IPO.
2.5 Summary
An overview of the Malaysian background and IPO market is provided in this chapter
and demonstrates that Malaysia is unique due to its multi cultural society. The existence
of inequalities of wealth within Malaysian society as a result of its colonial heritage has
made the IPO an important tool for redistributing wealth among ethnic groups. Since
the country's independence in 1957, there have been significant developments in the
Malaysian capital market. The Malaysian economy was in an upward trend prior to
1997 but was badly affected by the East Asian crisis of 1997-1998. However, the
imposition of capital market controls and the pegging of the ringgit to the US dollar
from September 1998 has improved the Malaysian economy.
There have also been many changes in the IPO market in terms of its regulation and
activities over the period 1989 to 2003. The most important feature is that 30% of
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shares made available to the public are allocated to Bumiputera investors as a part of the
government's policy to increase Bumiputera involvement and ownership in the
corporate sector. Another significant change is the pricing of IPOs, which has not been
binding on the IPO regulator (SC) since 1996. One of the unique features of Malaysian
IPOs is the imposition of profit guarantees to major shareholders or promoters which
took place in 1996 to 1999. In addition, profit forecast disclosure in the prospectus is a
mandatory requirement for Malaysian IPOs. Having discussed the background to
Malaysian IPOs, the theories explaining the performance of IPO companies are
provided in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Theories of IPO performance
3.1 Introduction
The main focus of this thesis is on long run post-IPO performance. However, in view
of the potential link between IPO underpricing and long run underperformance, this
chapter reviews the various existing hypotheses concerning both phenomena, focusing
on market players involved in the IPO process: issuers, underwriters45 and investors.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the theories of
IPO underpricing, while Section 3.3 presents the explanation for IPO
underperformance. The final section provides a summary of the chapter.
3.2 Theories of IPO underpricing
The best-known pattern is the occurrence of large initial returns46 that are credited to
investors in IPOs. A number of explanations have been advanced for the new issues
underpricing phenomenon, with different theories focusing on various features of the
relations between issuers, underwriters and investors. However, 'these (theories J are
not mutually exclusive, and their relative importance difers across countries,
contractual mechanisms and time' (Ritter, 2003, p. 284). In addition, a given
explanation can be more significant for some IPOs than for others. Following
45 Several studies in the US use the term 'investment banker'.
46 Initial returns or underpricing are used interchangeably.
50
Chapter 3 - Theory
Ljungqvist (2005),47 the main theories discussed in this section are classified under four
broad categories: (i) asymmetric information-based models; (ii) institutional reasons;
(iii) ownership and control; and (iv) behavioural explanation (e.g., informational
cascades).
3.2.1 Asymmetric information-based models
The asymmetric information-based models of underpricing assume that the investors,
issuers, or underwriters have more information than the others. These models include
the winner's curse, the book-building, the principal-agent models, and the signalling.
3.2.1.1 The winner's curse
The winner's curse model was introduced by Rock.(1986). It is an equilibrium model
for large underpricing of IPOs that relies on information asymmetry. He hypothesises
that information about the value of the IPO company is distributed asymmetrically
among underwriters and issuing companies and among informed and uninformed
investors. According to Rock (1986), an informed investor is a person who has perfect
information regarding the realised value of the new issue compared to the others.
Informed investors subscribe to IPOs only in the situation where positive initial returns
are available. However, uninformed investors wil subscribe to every IPO, even though
the IPOs may be overpriced. Therefore, uninformed investors are said to face a
'winner's curse', in which they may obtain all the shares they request because informed
investors do not want the shares. This problem exists when informed investors crowd
47 Ljungqvist (2005) provides a detailed review of theories ofIPO underpricing.
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out uninformed investors if good issues are offered. As a result, across many offerings
uninformed investors receive an average return that is weighted towards overpriced
offerings. Due to this, they may not be wiling to bid for IPO shares. In order to attract
them to purchase the shares and ensure their continued participation in the IPO market,
all IPOs must be underpriced. The idea of winner's curse model has produced several
testable hypotheses and empirical evidence, as summarised in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Hypotheses and evidence from the winner's curse explanation of
underpricing
Source Hypothesis Empirical evidence
Rock (1986) The abnormal initial returns for uninformed Supporting
investors are zero when adjusted for
rationing, which is just enough to ensure
their continued participation in the IPO
market.
Koh and WaIter (1989)
Levis (1990)
Keloharju (1993)
Lee, Taylor and WaIter
(1996a)
Huang (1999)
Contradicting Khurshed, Mudambi and
Goergen (1999)
Amihud, Hauser and Kirsh
(2003)
Michaely and
Shaw (1994)
Michaely and Shaw (1994)Underpricing is lower if information is
distributed more homogeneously across
investor groups.
Supporting
Ritter (1984)
Beatty and
Ritter (1986)
The greater the ex ante uncertainty about
the value of the IPO company, the higher is
the expected underpricing. Numerous
proxies are used to measure ex ante
uncertainty (e.g., age of the company, IPO
gross proceeds, reputation of underwriters,
and earnings forecast).
Supporting
Contradicting
Ritter (1991)
Keasey and Short (1992)
Kiymaz (2000)
McGuinness (1992)
Beatty and
Ritter (1986)
Underwriters that underprice too much (too
little) wil lose business from issuers
(investors).
Supporting Beatty and Ritter (1986)
Nanda and Yun (1997)
Dunbar (2000)
Booth and
Smith (1986)
Carter and
Manaster
(1990)
Titman and
Trueman (1986)
Underpricing can be reduced by
minimising the information asymmetry by
means of choosing a prestigious
underwriter and a reputable auditor.
Supporting Carter and Manaster (1990)
Michaely and Shaw (1994)
Carter, Dark and Singh (1998)
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001)
Contradicting McGuinness (1992)
Beatty and Welch (1996)
Source: Ljungqvist (2005) and the papers published by the authors.
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3.2.1.2 Book-building
The book-building model of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggests that underwriters
play a major role in extracting information about pre-market indications of interest on
the demand for the IPO shares from better informed investors. This information is
gathered before the issue price is finalised when the book-building method is used.
Extraction of such information allows the underwriter to set a higher offer price for the
issue. This theory suggests that if the better informed investors have private
information, the pre-market demand of interest from them is greater in more
underpriced issues. In order to induce them to reveal their information truthfully, the
underwriter allocates more shares in IPOs that have a stronger pre-market demand. The
shares are also more likely to have higher first day returns, to compensate them. This
theory is supported by Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri (2002).
Benveniste and Busaba (1997) show that the expected offer pnce under the
book-building method is higher than in a fixed price offer, and this may be due to a
'cascade' inherent in fixed price offer. Therefore, the level of underpricing is lower in
book-building than in the fixed price offer.
3.2.1.3 Principal-agent models
The Baron and Holmstrom (1980), and Baron (1982), agency model assumes that
underwriters are better informed about demand conditions than the issuers. In addition,
the reputations of underwriters may facilitate confirmation of the quality of issues and
create demand. Due to the fact that issuers are unsure about the equilibrium price of
their securities, they may assign the pricing decision to the underwriters. Because of
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limited information, underwriters may determine an offer price which is not in the
issuers' interests. This creates a prinCipal-agent problem between issuers and
underwriters due to the fact that underwriters may use underpricing to limit the cost of
distributing the issue and ensure a successful one.
3.2.1.4 Signalling
Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989) have
argued that underpricing is used by issuers as a means to signal the quality of their
company to the market. Their models assume that the issuers are better informed about
the present value of their future cash flows than investors or underwriters. Grinblatt and
Hwang (1989) develop a signalling model with two signals to explain IPO underpricing.
They suggest that the percentage of insiders' retained ownership as well as the offering
price both convey the unobservable 'intrinsic value','ofthe company and the variance of
its future cash flows to investors. Welch's (1989) model posits that 'high quality'
companies underprice their stock at the time of the IPO in order to obtain a higher price
at seasoned offerings. Then, when the market price is established and the information
asymmetry is reduced, companies conduct a seasoned offering.
3.2.2 Institutional theories
There are two main institutional theories that may provide explanations for the
underpricing phenomenon; these are legal liability and underwriters' price stabilisation.
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3.2.2.1 Legal liability
The legal liability hypothesis suggests that issuing companies may underprice their
IPOs to limit their exposure to potential lawsuits from shareholders due to incorrect or
insufficient information in their prospectuses. Tinic (1988) develops this hypothesis
and finds results that support his hypothesis. However, Keloharju (1993) finds that the
initial returns of his sample of IPOs are unrelated to lawsuit avoidance.
3.2.2.2 Price stabilisation
Price stabilisation is the practice whereby an underwriter goes into the secondary market
to support the IPO price once the IPO starts trading in order to reduce price drops within
a few days or weeks following IPO. As argued by Ruud (1993), IPOs are not
deliberately underpriced but are priced at the expected market value, but underwriters
support those offerings whose prices fall below the offer price. Therefore, a positive
average price jump may be observed, suggesting higher underpricing.
3.2.3 Ownership and control theories
In conjunction with an IPO, there is normally a substantial change in a company's
control and ownership structure (Goergen, 1998). A reduction in management
ownership following an IPO is associated with an increase in the conflct of interest
between managers and shareholders, which leads to an increase in agency cost. As
argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers may use a company's assets for their
own benefit and have an incentive to consume any perquisites rather than maximising
shareholder wealth. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of: (i)
the monitoring expenditures by the principal; (ii) the bonding expenditures by the agent;
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and (iii) the residual loss. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the residual loss may be
incurred if the cost of the full enforcement of contracts exceeds the benefits.
Ownership and control theories suggest two opposing views of underpricing, namely
that it is a means to: (i) retain control; or (ii) reduce agency costs. The first view is
developed by Brennan and Franks (1997), who suggest that underpricing is used to
ensure over-subscription which allows managers both to ration the allocation of shares
in favour of small rather than large investors, and to discriminate between applicants.
They argue that managers may avoid allocating large blocks of shares to outside
investors in order to reduce external monitoring of the non-value maximising behaviour
of managers. This leads to investors holding smaller stakes in the company and allows
managers to effectively retain control. The second view, developed by Stoughton and
Zechner (1998), ignores control considerations. Their model suggests that underpricing
and rationing in favour of large shareholders may enable them to better monitor
managerial actions, which then reduces agency costs, with a net gain to the issuer.
3.2.4 Behavioural explanation (informational cascades)
The most widely stated explanation under the behavioural theories is 'informational
cascades'. According to Welch (1992), IPO prices are discounted to avoid information
cascades (or bandwagon effects) in which potential investors follow other investors'
purchasing habits. An investor may decide not to buy if other investors are not buying
the shares. In order to avoid such behaviour, an issuer may underprice the IPO share to
influence the first few investors to buy, thereby inducing others to follow suit.
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In summary, as argued by Ljungqvist (2005), most of empirical evidence supports the
asymmetric information-based model's explanation of underpricing. He suggests that
the evidence supporting the institutional theories are mixed due to the fact that
underpricing can stil be observed in countries which have no litigation and no price
stabilisation role in the IPO market. On the other hand, he argues that the ownership
and control, as well as the behavioural theories are relatively new,and the least explored
explanations of IPO underpricing. In addition, Ritter (2003) argues that the relative
importance of different theories of underpricing has changed over time and varies,
depending upon the institutional setup.
3.3 Theories of IPO underperformance
Another pattern associated with IPOs is that IPOs generally underperform in the long
run (Ritter, 2003). A number of theories have betfll proposed to provide explanations
for the phenomenon of the long run underperformance ofIPOs. However, Jakobsen and
Sorensen (2001) note that there exists no convincing theory that explains the long run
underperformance of IPOs. The theories of underperformance (either stock returns or
operating performance) that are discussed in this section are classified under three broad
categories: (i) long run performance in theories of underpricing (e.g., asymmetric
information-signalling); (ii) behavioural explanations of long run underperformance;
and (iii) measurement problems.
3.3.1 Long run performance in theories of underpricing
Two main theories of underpricing that may explain the long run performance are
signalling and agency cost.
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3.3.1.1 Signalling
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1.4, underpricing may be used as a tool to signal the
quality of issuers to the market (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989;
Welch, 1989). Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch
(1989) use the initial offering price to represent a signal of high quality issuers.
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) also indicate a low fraction of equity being floated to
represent this. A signalling model assumes that high quality issuers whose quality is not
otherwise known by the market tend to underprice their shares at the time of IPOs. The
'high quality' issuers then conduct a seasoned equity offering when the market price is
established after their quality is 'discovered' by investors, to recoup opportunity losses
at the time of the IPO. Meanwhile, Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) assume that high
quality issuers float a low fraction of equity at the time of IPO at a lower offering price
and sell the remaining stake at a higher price later. Therefore, according to the
signalling theory, companies with larger underpricing and those that issue a smaller
equity stake at the time of IPO should experience better post-IPO stock market and
operating performance in comparison to other IPO companies.
3.3.1.2 Agency cost: separation of ownership and control
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, when a company makes an IPO, it is typically
accompanied by a reduction in management ownership, with an associated increase in
agency costs. The agency hypothesis posits that lower ownership retention by managers
reduces their incentive to embark on value maximising projects and increases their
incentive to engage in behaviour that benefits them at the expense of shareholders.
These agency costs may explain declines in long run operating performance if
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managers' equity stakes are reduced at flotation. On the other hand, when managerial
equity stakes after flotation are greater, the company may perform better in the long run.
Therefore, this hypothesis predicts that the long run operating performance of IPO
companies is relatively lower (higher) for companies that have lower (higher)
managerial ownership. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that in a semi-strong
efficient market, long run stock market performance cannot be explained by agency
costs due to the fact that 'worsening agency problems should not come as a surprise
and thus should not be reflected in poor returns' (p. 148).
3.3.2 Behavioural explanations of long run underperformance
3.3.2.1 Divergence of opinion
The divergence of opinion explanation of the long run stock market underperformance
,has been presented by Miler (1977). It suggests that investors may have been too
optimistic about the future cash flows and growth potential of the companies that went
public. Investors overestimate the new public company's prospects, especially for small
and high growth companies, at the time of offering. Investors wil buy an IPO if they
are optimistic about its value. The valuations of optimistic investors wil be much
higher than the valuations of their pessimistic counterparts if there is a large amount of
uncertainty about the value of an IPO. The divergence of opinion between optimistic
and pessimistic investors wil narrow as time goes by because more information about
the IPOs is obtainable. The optimistic investors then adjust their beliefs about the value
of the company which lead to a fall in stock price (Ritter, 1998). Therefore, the initial
extent of divergence of opinion is negatively related to the long run stock market
performance.
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3.3.2.2 Fads
The fads hypothesis, introduced by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), is an extension of
Miler's (1977) divergence of opinion explanation. A fad is defined as a non-rational
temporary overvaluation, above intrinsic values, which is caused by an over-optimism
of investors that eventually bursts or causes a longer term decline in returns (Naceur and
Ghanem, 2001, note 1). In contrast, speculation is rational economic behaviour
(Camerer, 1989, cited in Mok and Hui, 1998, note 9). It argues that the market for IPOs
is subject to fads, and IPOs are underpriced by underwriters to create the appearance of
surlus demand (Ritter, 1998). After the high demand, fads begin to erode and
expectations become re-aligned again. The share price then drops, which causes the
underperformance. This hypothesis predicts that companies with the highest initial
returns should have the lowest subsequent returns.
The fads hypothesis is similar to the overreaction hypothesis (De Bondt and Thaler,
1985, 1987), which suggests that participants in the market are short-sighted and ignore
the long term trend of mean reversion of profitability. This is due to the fact that
investors put too much weight on improvements in operating performance prior to IPOs.
As a result, the first day trading prices are high. These transitory profit improvements
are regarded as permanent improvements by investors. As time goes by, the
information about the IPOs becomes available. Consequently, there is a downward
adjustment of initial estimates of the future profitability which causes the stock price to
decline in the long run.
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3.3.2.3 Window of opportunity/timing
The window of opportunity/timing hypothesis introduced by Ritter (1991) and
Loughran and Ritter (1995) is an extension of the fads hypothesis of Aggarwal and
Rivoli (1990). They suggest that the long run underperformance of IPOs can be
explained by investors' optimistic expectations upon issue and the downward
adjustment of these expectations in the aftermarket. Loughran and Ritter (1997)
advocate that most companies issue equity after large stock price increases. In addition,
managers time their IPOs to coincide with a peak of the company operating
performance, which may be temporary and unsustainable. Therefore, investors are
likely to be disappointed by the declining post-IPO operating performance, which in
turn causes the poor stock market performance. The window of opportunity hypothesis
predicts that companies going public in periods with large number of IPOs are more
likely to be overvalued than other IPOs. Therefori, the periods with large number of
IPOs should be associated with the lowest long run returns.
3.3.2.4 Earnings management
Healy and Wahlen (1999) review the earmngs management literature and its
implications for standard setting and state that companies manage earnings 'to
window-dress financial statements prior to public securities' offerings, to increase
corporate managers' compensation and job security, to avoid violating lending
contracts, or to reduce regulatory costs or to increase regulatory benefits' (p. 367).
Healy and Wahlen (1999) state that, 'earnings management occurs when managers use
judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic
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performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on
reported accounting numbers' (p. 368). Beneish (2001) notes much of the evidence of
earnings management is dependent on company performance, suggesting that, 'earnings
management is likely to be present when a company's performance is either unusually
good or unusually bad' (p. 5).
Prior to an IPO there is comparatively little information reaching investors, so they must
rely heavily on the prospectus (Chaney and Lewis, 1995). This generates a strong
motivation for managers to manage reported earnings in order to increase their offering
proceeds (e.g., Teoh, Wong and Rao, 1998; Teoh, et al., 1998a; Rangan, 1998). Teoh et
aL. (1998) argue that investors are unable to understand fully the extent to which IPO
companies engage in earnings management.
Loughran and Ritter (1997) state that companies' must plan in advance in order to
manage earnings. The action might be either to hold back current earnings to confer a
high growth rate in the future or to increase current earnings by borrowing against
future earnings. Loughran and Ritter (1997) then argue that if the companies boost
current earnings before issuing equity, this wil expose companies to the possibility of
declining stock returns post issue. In this situation, investors may overvalue new issues
because of misinterpreted high earnings reported at the time of offerings and fail to
realise that the earnings management symbolises a transitory increase in earnings (Teoh
et aL., 1998a; Rangan, 1998). Therefore, investors are likely to be disappointed by the
declining post-IPO operating performance and adjust their valuation downwards, which
in turn causes the poor stock market performance.
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3.3.3 Measurement problems
An alternative explanation of poor long run stock market performance is that the
underperformance is not genuine but is merely a function of poor research design or
measurement. The methodology employed in many of the early empirical long run
stock market performance studies has been questioned by several researchers (e.g.,
Fama, 1998; Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Lyon et at., 1999); in
particular, the choice of benchmark in defining the expected returns, the measurement
of long run returns, and the use of test statistics to assess the statistical significance of
abnormal performance.
Ritter (1991) argues that long run underperformance may be due to a failure to adjust
returns for time-varying systematic risk. Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) also argue
that the 'new equity puzzle' is explained by a failurê of the matched-company technique
to provide a proper control for risk. Many studies of the long run share price
performance of IPOs compare the returns on the IPO to the return on the market to
compute abnormal returns. This assumes that all IPO companies have a beta equal to
one. In reality, beta is not equal to one for all IPO companies and this creates a bias in
estimating long run performance. For instance, if the beta of an IPO company is greater
than one, a downward bias in performance or greater underperformance wil occur when
the market index drops (declining market) over the holding period. A similar situation
wil happen in a rising market, in which an upward bias in performance will occur.
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) argue that market-adjusted returns that have been used in
previous studies are possibly not abnormally low on a risk-adjusted basis.
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Fama (1998) identifies an issue related to the benchmark, namely that the asset pricing
models may be misspecified, referred to as the 'bad-model problem '. This issue cannot
be avoided as no benchmark model correctly prices all securities (Fama and French,
1992). Several studies employ the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model as an
alternative to matching on a company-by-company basis. This is an Arbitrage Pricing
Theory (APT) model incorporating a market factor, size and the b!Jok-to-market effect.
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) comment on the measurement
of long run returns. These studies conclude that there is misspecification of abnormal
performance for randomly chosen companies. Barber and Lyon (1997) state that there
are three possible biases that lead to this misspecification. The first is known as the
'new listing' bias, which generally creates a positive bias in test statistics (Lyon et al.,
1999). It exists due to the fact that the market benchmark portfolio includes recent IPO
companies. These IPO companies, which are kn¿wn empirically to have abnormally
low returns, tend to drive down the average market returns. The second possible bias is
a 're balancing , bias, which arises because the compound returns on the benchmark
portfolio implicitly assume periodic portfolio rebalancing, with the proceeds of a
delisted company equally allocated among the surviving members of the portfolio
(Ritter, 1991, p. 8), whereas the returns of sample companies are compounded without
rebalancing. The third possible bias is the 'skewness' bias, which refers to the positive
skewness of long run abnormal returns. Lyon et al. (1999) propose a skewness-adjusted
t-statistic, with or without bootstrapping techniques, to account for the skewness bias.
Both the rebalancing bias and the skewness bias generally create a negative bias in
abnormal returns (Lyon et aI., 1999). The appearance of IPO underperformance may be
due to both the second and third biases introduced by Barber and Lyon (1997).
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The problems associated with test statistics have been highlighted by Brav (2000) and
Mitchell and Stafford (2000). They argue that the test statistics in previous studies of
long run performance using the event-time approach suffer from cross-sectional
dependence of returns. This is because the long run performance of different companies
may be correlated due to the fact that the returns are aggregated at the firm leveL.
Problems arise in making statistical inference when the retu~s on individual IPOs
overlap due to multi-year event-time returns being employed. Mitchell and Stafford
(2000) recommend the calendar-time portfolio approach in order to account for the
cross-sectional dependence of event-time abnormal returns. Under this approach, the
return for each month is calculated based on a portfolio of IPO companies that have
undergone an IPO during the previous three or five years (i.e. returns are aggregated on
a monthly basis).
Finally, it is important to note that not all the the'ories of IPO underperformance can
explain the underperformance of both stock market and operating performance. For
example, certain behavioural explanations, such as the divergence of opinions and fads,
and the measurement problems, can explain only poor long run stock market
performance, while agency costs can explain only poor operating performance.
3.4 Summary
This chapter reviews the existing theories of IPO underpricing and underperformance.
The main theories of underpricing include the asymmetric information-based models
(e.g., the winner's curse, book-building, principal-agent models and signalling), the
institutional reasons (e.g., legal liability and price stabilisation), the ownership and
control reasons, and behavioural explanation (e.g., informational cascades). The
65
Chapter 3 - Theory
theories of underperformance, based on either stock returns or operating performance,
include signalling and agency cost explanations, behavioural explanations based on
divergence of opinion, fads, window of opportunity/timing, and earnings management,
and also the measurement problems. Following this, the next chapter provides a review
of empirical studies of stock market performance.
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Chapter 4
Review of empirical studies and research hypotheses:
Market-based performance
4.1 Introduction
Following the review of the theories of IPO performance in the previous chapter, this
chapter provides a review of empirical studies concentrating on stock market
performance. Although the focus of this study is to investigate long run stock market
performance, the first section of this chapter also reviews initial performance. The
review of the literature in this chapter is then applied to develop testable hypotheses
concerning the stock market performance of IPOs, which are explained in the
subsequent section, while the final section provides a summary of the chapter.
There are two strands of related literature on the stock market performance of IPO
companies. The first focuses on IPOs in the private sector while the second analyses
privatisation share issues (PIPOs), in which a public listing is used to transform part or
all of the governent's ownership in state-owned enterprises to private ownership.
Even though some studies are restricted to the analysis of IPOs in general and do not
differentiate between the private IPOs and PIPOs, Section 4.2 provides a review of IPOs
in general that may comprise only private IPOs or a combination of private IPOs and
PIPOs. Reviews of studies that differentiate between private IPOs and PIPOs, together
with studies that only focus on PIPOs, are also provided in Section 4.3.
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4.2 Prior studies on IPOs in general
4.2.1 Initial return performance
The underpricing (positive initial returns) of IPOs has been documented in many
countries, both in developed markets and emerging ones. While the initial underpricing
seems to be a common phenomenon in every stock market, the amount of underpricing
varies from country to country. Loughran et aL. (1994) summarise international
evidence on initial returns from 25 countries and suggest that variations in the
performance across different countries may be due to differences in regulations,
contractual mechanisms, and the characteristics of IPO companies. Ritter (2003)
updates and expands the analogous table in Loughran et aL. (1994) and lists the average
initial returns for 38 countries around the world.
Table 4.1 summarises selected empirical evidence. on the phenomenon of underpricing
in different countries, including Malaysia. The initial returns reported in the table have
been calculated in either raw or adjusted form. As can be seen from this table, the
initial return is higher in developing markets than that typically documented in
developed markets.
The degree of underpricing, measured as the difference between the subscription price
and the closing market price on the first trading day, varies from 4.5% in Israel (Kandel,
Sarig and Wohl, 1999) to 289.2% in China (Mok and Hui, 1998). Kandel et aL. (1999)
use a sample of 28 auction IPOs and argue that new information released upon
announcement of the auction may explain the observed positive initial returns. Their
finding does not support the asymmetric information hypothesis. As noted by Ritter
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(2003), in general, the use of auctions for pncmg and allocating IPOs has been
associated with low but positive initial returns. The level of underpricing is generally
lower as compared to fixed price offers or book-building.
Among earlier studies in the US are Stoll and Curley (1970) and Ibbotson (1975). Stoll
and Curley (1970) find an average underpricing of 42.4% for a sample of 205 IPOs
during the calendar years 1957, 1959 and 1963. Ibbotson (1975) studies the
risk-adjusted returns of 2,650 IPOs during the period 1960 to 1969. He reports a
positive average initial performance of 11.4%. The results of these studies and the US
evidence reported in Table 4.1 indicate that the US IPOs are underpriced.
Table 4.1 Selected empirical evidence on initial returns from IPOs
Country examined Researcher(s) Period of study Sample size Average initial returns
(%)'
Australia Lee, Taylor and WaIter (1996b) 1976-1989 266 16.4
Australia Balatbat et al. (2004) 1976-1993 , 313 15.5
China Mok and Hui (1998) 1990-1993 87 289.2A
China Mok and Hui (1998) 1990-1993 22 26.0#
China Wang (2005) 1994-1999 747 271.9
Finland Keloharju (1993) 1984-1989 80 8.7
Germany Ljungqvist (1997) 1970-1993 180 9.2
Hong Kong Dawson (1987) 1978-1983 21 13.8
Israel Kandel et at. (1999) 1993-1994 28 4.5-
Japan Cai and Wei (1997) 1971-1992 180 49.0
Japan Beckman, Garner, Marshall and 1980-1998 216 31.
Okamura (2001)
Malaysia Dawson (1987) 1978-1983 21 166.6
Malaysia Yong (1991) 1983-1988 33 167.4
Malaysia Ku Ismail, Zainal Abidin and 1980-1989 63 114.6
Zainudin (1993)
Malaysia Loughran et al. (1994) 1980-1991 132 80.3
Malaysia Mohamad et at. (1994 r 1975-1990 65 135.0
Malaysia Yong (1997) 1990-1994 224 75.0
Malaysia Paudyal et al. (1998) 1984-1995 95 61.8
Malaysia Jelic et al. (2001) 1980-1995 182 99.2
Malaysia Wan-Hussin (2005) 1996-2000 154 83.0
New Zealand Firth (1997) 1979-1987 143 25.9
continued on next page
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Table 4.1 (continued) Selected empirical evidence on initial returns from IPOs
Country examined Researcher(s) Period of study Sample size Average initial returns
(%)'
Philippines Sullivan and Unite (2001) 1987-1997 104 22.7
Singapore Dawson (1987) 1978-1983 39 39.4
Singapore Lee et al. (1996a) 1973-1992 128 31.4
Switzerland Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) 1983-1989 42 35.8
Taiwan Huang (1999) 1971-1995 311 42.4
Thailand Alien, Morkel-Kingsbury 1985-1992 151 63.5
and Piboonthanakiat
(1999)
Tunisia Naceur and Ghanem 1990-1999 16 27.8
(2001)
Turkey Kiymaz (2000) 1990-1996 163 131
Turkey Durukan (2002) 1990-1997 173 14.6
United Kingdom Levis (1990) 1985-1988 123 8.6
United Kingdom Keasey and Short 1984-1988 222 14.0
(1992)
United Kingdom Levis (1993) 1980-1988 713 14.3
United Kingdom Brennan and Franks 1986-1989 43 9.4
(1997)
United Kingdom Espenlaub and Tonks 1986-1991 428 12.2
(1998, 2000)
United Kingdom Khurshed et al. (1999) 1991-1995 228 9.74
United Kingdom Burrowers and Jones 1995-1997 125 16.9
(2004)
United States Stoll and Curley 1957,59,63 ' 205 42.4
(1970)
United State 1bbotson (1975) 1960-1969 2,650 11.4
United States Ritter (1991) 1975-1984 1,526 14.3
United States Ibbotson et al. (1994) 1960-1992 10,626 15.3
United States Rajan and Servaes 1975-1987 2,725 10.0
(1997)
United States Carter et al. (1998) 1979-1991 2,292 8.1
United States Krigman et al. (1999) 1988-1995 1,232 12.3
Note:
. Average initial returns are average (usually equally-weighted mean) returns calculated from the date of offering to aftermarket
price. Some of initial returns are raw returns and some are adjusted for the market returns.
A A-shares in Shanghai, reserved for domestic Chinese.
# B-share in Shanghai, reserved for foreign investors.
- Auction offers.
Source:
+ This figure was taken from Ariff, Mohamad and Nassir (1998). The rest of the figures were based on the papers published by the
authors.
Evidence from the UK also finds positive initial returns. Levis (1990) reports average
market adjusted returns of 8.6% for a total of 123 IPOs during the period 1985 to 1988.
The level of underpricing is lower than that found in the US market. Based on these
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results, the winner's curse hypothesis, tested by Levis (1990), has been supported.
Keasey and Short (1992), who examine 222 UK IPOs floated on the Unlisted Securities
Market (USM) in the period 1984 to 1988 via the placement48 method, find an average
underpricing of 14%. Their ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results show that
the level of ex ante uncertainty49 of a new issue does have some influence on the
underpricing, which supports the ex ante uncertainty hypothesi~ of Beatty and Ritter
(1986). U sing a larger sample size and a longer period, Levis (1993) then provides
evidence on 713 IPOs for the period 1980 to 1988, with an average initial return of
14.3%. This initial return is similar to the findings reported in Ritter (1991), even
though these studies investigate different markets. Brennan and Franks (1997),
Espenlaub and Tonks (1998, 2000), Khurshed et aL. (1999), and Burrowers and Jones
(2004) also find similar positive initial returns in the UK.
The underpricing phenomenon is not only found' in the US and the UK but also in
Malaysia, including Dawson (1987), Yong (1991), Ku Ismail et aL. (1993), Loughran et
aL. (1994), Mohamad et aL. (1994), Yong (1997), Paudyal et al. (1998), Jelic et aL.
(2001), and Wan-Hussin (2005). An early study by Dawson (1987), examines the
average initial returns for a sample of 21 IPOs in Malaysia from 1978- 1 983. Besides
analysing the Malaysian market, he also examines the Hong Kong and Singaporean
markets, using a sample of 21 IPOs and 39 IPOs, respectively. He reports positive
48 Under the placing method, the shares are 'placed' with the sponsor (issuing house or stockbroker) or
broker at a predetermined offering price who then sells them to his/her clients at the same or marginally
higher price (Keasey and Short, 1992, p. 459).
49 They use the age of the company, the percentage of equity retained by pre-offering shareholders, the
provision of earnings forecast, industry classification, the coeffcient of variation of earnings for three
years prior to flotation, the amount of net proceeds and the gross proceeds raised from an IPO as proxies
for ex ante uncertainty.
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average initial returns of 166.6%, 13.8% and 39.4% in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and
Singapore after adjustment for the market indices using the KLSE Industrial Index, the
Hong Kong Far East Stock Exchange 62 Stock Index, and the Singapore Stock
Exchange All-Share Index. He also analyses stock price trends for IPOs in these three
Asian stock markets from day one up to 12 months after listing. He finds that the price
declines about 9.3% in Hong Kong and 2.7% in Singapore from ttie closing price on the
first trading day. However, the decline in price is not significant. These results are
supportive of the efficient market hypothesis. In contrast, a different pattern is present
in Malaysia. The price increases by 18.2% in the 12 months from the closing price on
the first day trading. Dawson (1987) interprets this to mean that the Malaysian market
did not price the issue efficiently. He concludes that this may be due to the fact that the
market index benchmark (KLSE Industrial Indices) used by him does not represent the
entire market. Jelic et aL. (2001) comment that these indices may not adequately reflect
total market movements.
It would appear that the level of underpricing is higher in the Malaysian market than in
the US and UK markets. However, less underpricing appears to exist in more recent
studies. Loughran et aL. (1994) suggest that the move in recent years by most East
Asian countries to reduce regulatory interference in the setting of offering prices should
result in less underpricing in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Corhay et aL. (2002) comment
that the lower degree of underpricing is due to the fact that the Malaysian market has
become more mature and effcient. They argue that this is attributable to the efforts of
the KLSE to carry out a complete revamp of the listing requirements in order to boost
efficiency, improve corporate governance and increase transparency. A number of the
objectives of the revamp comprise: (i) the combination of the Main Board listing
requirements with the Second Board listing requirements for the purpose of aiding
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clarity; (ii) strengthening the provisions for disclosure, financial reporting and corporate
governance; (iii) rationalising the provisions of the listing requirements with the
existing laws; and (iv) codifying unwritten procedures of the KLSE relating to listed
companies (Corhay et aI., 2002, p. 63).
Overall, from the review of the literature examining the level of underpricing, positive
initial returns are found in every stock market. The level of underpricing is relatively
higher in a developing market than the developed market and varies from country to
country.
4.2.2 Long run share price performance
4.2.2.1 Non-Malaysian studies
There is a growing number of studies that analyse' the long run performance of IPOs.
Most of the research has examined returns following IPOs or listing and compared them
with returns earned by market benchmark or matching companies that have not carried
out iPOs.5o Loughran et al. (1994) review evidence from nine countries and conclude
that IPOs have a tendency to offer relatively low returns in the long run. They report
that companies that issue stock in IPOs significantly underperform relative to
non-issuing companies for up to three to five years after the offer date (e.g., Ritter,
1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995). This is the most recently identified stylised fact in
which there is a tendency for new issues to underperform in the long run (Jenkinson and
Ljungqvist,2001). However, there is no consensus concerning the evidence of long run
50 The period following IPO or listing varies. Generally, the most frequently used were three and five
years.
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underperformance as there is conflcting evidence. Ritter (2003) suggests that long run
share price performance is sensitive to the methodology employed and the sample used.
A variety of methods have been used to measure long run performance. Analysis has
focused either on event-time or calendar-time. An event-time approach is adopted when
performance is measured relative to the date of the IPO. A calendar-time approach is
adopted when, for each calendar month, the returns are obtained for each sample
company that had an IPO event in the last post-event period of interest (e.g., three or
five years). The portfolios of these companies are re-formed every month and the
portfolio retur in that month is then calculated. As a result, a time-series of portfolio
returns is available to estimate the abnormal returns by using a model such as the Fama-
French three-factor. The most widely used metrics in event-time analyses are the
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR), and the
wealth relative (WR). Since the work of Loughran' and Ritter (1995), researchers have
also undertaken calendar-time analysis by looking at the alpha of Fama-French (1993)
three-factor modeL. The review of literature in this chapter is mainly focused on the
above metrics, even though several researchers introduce alternative methods such as
using a decomposition method (e.g., Jakobsen and Sorensen, 2001) or non-parametric
tests ofstochastic dominance (e.g., Ho, 2003).
Prior to the 1990s, research into the long run IPOs stock market performance is
relatively less comprehensive, although all the studies find some evidence of negative
performance in the long run for one to five years after listing (e.g., Stigler, 1964; Stoll
and Curley, 1970; Shaw, 1971; Ibbotson, 1975). Studies in the US market in the 1990s
on long run IPOs performance are more comprehensive, including, among others,
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Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991), Loughran (1993), Loughran and Ritter
(1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), and Gompers and Lerner (2003).
The most widely cited paper on IPO long run performance is based on the work of
Ritter (1991) who examines the performance of 1,526 US IPO issued in 1975 to 1984.
He finds that US IPOs significantly underperform the benchmarks in the three years
subsequent to listings. Ritter (1991) reports that cumulative average matched
company-adjusted returns, excluding the initial returns for 36 months after going public,
are -29.1%. In his study, he uses alternative benchmark portfolios to find out whether
measurement problems (choice of benchmarks) could account for the poor long run
performance. Moreover, he tries to investigate the possible explanations for the
underperformance by categorising his sample by gross proceeds, initial returns,
industry, year of issuance, and age of the companies. He finds that subsequent
underperformance is concentrated among comp~ratively young growth companies
which went public during years of relatively high IPO activity. The patterns are
consistent with an IPO market in which investors are periodically over-optimistic about
the earnings potential of young growth companies or the future prospects of issuing
companies. Companies are also found to take advantage of 'windows of opportunity'
where they wil go public when market conditions are most favourable to them whereby
IPOs come to the market near market peaks. In sum, his findings support measurement
problems (choice of benchmarks) and the fads hypotheses.
Another study by Loughran and Ritter (1995) examines the post issue performance of
4,753 IPOs for the period 1970 to 1990. They also find poor long run performance for
investors of companies issuing IPOs. Investors received only 5.1% per year during the
five years after equity issuance on IPO companies, compared to 11.8% on size-matched
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companies. In the three years after the IPO, mean buy-and-hold returns on IPO
companies are 8.4%, while the mean buy-and-hold returns on their matched companies
are 35.3%. This indicates that the IPO companies underperform by 26.9% compared to
the matched companies. This underperformance is higher when five-year windows are
examined. Mean buy-and-hold return on IPO companies and matched are 15.7% and
66.4%, with underperformance of 50.7%. They also compute the,long run performance
using five common indices as benchmarks. The equally-weighted buy-and-hold
abnormal return and wealth relative measures show that IPO companies underperform
all the market benchmarks in different magnitudes. These results indicate that the
measurement of long run performance is sensitive to the benchmark used. Loughran
and Ritter (1995) use the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model to measure the long
run performance. They divide their sample into large and small companies, and report
that IPO companies underperform their matched companies in all sample groups when
,
both are calculated using equal- and value-weighting schemes. Their findings support
the window of opportunity hypothesis, in which companies go public when equity value
is high (overvalued).
Following the work of Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995), researchers in the
US, UK and from other markets have tried to investigate this long run return anomaly,
including Loughran (1993), Carter et aL. (1998), and Gompers and Lerner (2003) for the
US market, and Levis (1993), Khurshed et aL. (1999), and Espenlaub, Gregory and
Tonks (2000) for the UK one. Studies from other markets include those carried out by
Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993), Keloharju (1993), Hwang and Jayaraman
(1995), Cai and Wei (1997), Firth (1997), Ljungqvist (1997), Page and Reyneke (1997),
Huang (1999), Stehle, Ehrhardt and Przyborowsky (2000), Naceur and Ghanem (2001),
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Kooli and Suret (2004), and Alvarez and Gonzalez (2005). In general, these studies
find that IPO companies underperform the benchmarks in the three to five years period.
However, as mentioned earlier, the negative long run stock price performance is not
consistent across all markets or even within a single market. The evidence of long run
performance is controversial, with different researchers reporting contrasting results.
As noted by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Eckbo et aL. (2000), among others, the
results of long run performance studies may differ as a result of variations in the
methods used to measure abnormal returns.
In investigating whether the involvement of venture capitalists affects the long run
performance of IPOs, Brav and Gompers (1997) examine the effects of using different
benchmarks and methods to measure long run performance of 934 venture-backed IPOs
and 3,407 nonventure-backed IPOs in the US. Using equally-weighted returns, they
find that venture-backed IPOs overperform nonventure-backed IPOs over a five-year
period. They also find that a value-weighting return significantly reduces
underperformance relative to the benchmarks. They report that underperformance of
nonventure-backed IPOs is concentrated in small companies. However, when the Fama
and French (1993) three-factor model is adopted, the underperformance of small
nonventure-backed companies cannot be explained by this modeL. Brav and Gompers
(1997) find that equity issuers' return patterns are not a unique anomaly. The
performance of the IPO issuer is similar to the non-issuer matched by size and the
book-to-market ratio. This indicates that underperformance is a characteristic of small
companies with low book-to-market ratio, irrespective of whether they are IPO
companies or non-IPO companies.
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Brav (2000) ilustrates the use of the methodology by examining the long run returns of
IPOs. Brav (2000) finds results that are inconsistent with the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor modeL. Brav (2000) comments that the standard assumptions that abnormal
returns are independent and normally distributed fail to hold over long horizons.
According to Brav (2000), this is due to many of the sample companies overlapping in
calendar time and long-horizon returns being skewed to the right by the compounding
of single-period returns.
In a more recent study on the US market, Gompers and Lerner (2003) investigate 3,661
US IPOs from 1935 to 1972 for holding periods up to five years after listing. Their
findings demonstrate that the IPOs' performance depends on the method used to
measure returs. Their results show some evidence of underperformance when
value-weighted event-time buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used. However, the
underperformance disappears when either equally-weighted event-time buy-and-hold or
cumulative abnormal returns are employed. IPOs returns are quite similar to the market
when calendar-time analysis is undertaken. On the other hand, the results they derive
from the CAPM and the Fama and French three-factor regressions suggest no abnormal
performance.
Espenlaub et al. (2000) provide further evidence on the sensitivity of long run
performance to the choice of empirical method. In examining a new data set of 588 IPO
companies in the UK over the period from 1985 to 1992, they re-examine the evidence
of long run returns over a five-year period by comparing abnormal performance based
on five alternative benchmarks under an event-time approach and a calendar-time
approach. The alternative benchmarks are the basic Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), the simple size-adjusted model of Dimson and Marsh (1986), a multi-index
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model using the return on the HGSCI minus the return on the FT ASI, the Fama and
French (1996) three-factor model, and the Returns Across Securities and Times (RATS)
model of Ibbotson (1975). They find substantial negative abnormal returns three years
after the offerings, irrespective of the benchmark employed in their event-time
approach. However, over a five-year period the underperformance is less dramatic and
depends upon the benchmark applied. Their findings support Ritter's (1991) argument
that the long ru performance of IPOs is sensitive to the benchmark used.
Unlike those documented in previous international evidence, the results of Kim,
Krinsky and Lee (1995) reveal that 169 companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange
during the period 1985 to 1989 overperform seasoned companies with similar
characteristics. They suggest that their study does not support the existing theories of
divergence of opinion (Miler, 1977), and fads (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990) on the long
run performance. A positive long run performance is also observed by Lee et aL.
(1996a), Allen et aL. (1999) and Durukan (2002) for IPOs in Singapore, Thailand and
Turkey, respectively.
There has been conflcting evidence regarding post-offering performance of IPOs in
Australia from Lee et aL. (1996b) and Da Silva Rosa, Velayuthen and Walter (2003).
Lee et aL. (1996b) find that Australian IPOs exhibit severe underperformance in the
three-year post-IPO period whereas Da Silva Rosa et al. (2003) find no evidence of
underperformance in the two-year post-IPO period in the same market.
Table 4.2 summanses selected empirical studies of IPO long run stock price
performance in different countries, excluding Malaysia, since the early 1990s. In
summary, the general weight of evidence finds negative long run performance across
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many markets internationally. However, there are also some instances of positive long
run performance, mainly seen in recent evidence from both developed and developing
markets. In particular, results appear to be sensitive to the methods used to measure
long run share price performance.
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Chapter 4 - Literature review & hypotheses 1: Market-based performance
4.2.2.2 Malaysian studies
A limited number of studies on the long run performance of IPOs have been carried out
in Malaysia, including Wu (1993), Mohamad et al. (1994), Paudyal et aL. (1998), Jelic
et aL. (2001), and Corhay et aL. (2002). In contrast to studies in the UK and the US, an
early study by Wu (1993), from 1974 to 1989, using 70 IPOs listed on the Main Board
of KLSE, reports positive aftermarket performance. He shows that there is a positive
trend in the average adjusted monthly returns in the first 11 months, with a CAR of
12.3%, and a negative trend in average adjusted monthly returns thereafter, which
reduced the CAR to 3.7% in month 36. On the other hand, his adjusted buy-and-hold
returns show that the abnormal returns of the IPOs relative to the market diminish in the
two- and three-year periods, even though they are stil positive. However, Wu (1993)
ignores the effect of compounding when calculating the long run holding period returns.
Mohamad et aL. (1994) also find significant positive abnormal returns in the three-year
period.
Paudyal et aL. (1998) examine the long run performance of 95 Malaysian IPOs listed on
the Main Board of the KLSE during the period 1984 to 1995, using KL Composite
Index (KLCI) as a market benchmark. They find that the performance of their sample
of IPO companies is not different from the performance of market portfolios with
buy-and-hold abnormal returns of 9% in 36 months. The reputation of the underwriters
has a significant positive relationship with the long run performance of IPOs. A study
by J elic et al. (2001) uses a larger sample (182 ¡POs) and longer sample period
(1980- 1 995) than Paudyal et aL. (1998) but still examines those IPOs listed on the same
board of listing. Instead of focusing on the methodological issues on the measurement
of long run share price performance, its centre of attention is on the role of management
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earnings forecasts and underwriters in the valuation of IPOs. Surprisingly, Jelic et at.
(2001) find evidence contrary to that of Loughran and Ritter (1995) for long run returns,
where positive and statistically significant long run returns for up to three years after
listing are found in Malaysia. They report that the CAR for month 36, subsequent to the
initial offering, is significantly positive at 24.8%. Consistent with the CAR estimation,
buy-and-hold returns adjusted for the KLCI are also positive and ,statistically significant
for month 36 at 22.0%.
Corhay et at. (2002) investigate the existence of the growth-value effect by examining
258 Malaysian IPOs listed on both the Main Board and Second Board of the KLSE
during the period 1992 to 1996. Using three growth-value proxies (book-to-market
equity ratio (B/M), earnings-to-price ratio (E/P) and cash flows-to-price ratio (C/P)),
they report that growth IPOs stock underperform value IPOs stock. However, both
types of IPOs generate higher returns than the market. Based on their regression
analysis, B/M, E/P and C/P are found to have a positive but insignificant relationship
with CAR. Contrary to the general empirical findings in other countries, they find that
IPOs tend to overperform the market with a positive CAR of 41.7% over the three years
subsequent to listing.
Table 4.3 summarises the results of empirical studies of long run IPO stock price
performance for the Malaysian market. In summary, Malaysian IPO studies have
typically used relatively small samples (e.g., Wu, 1993; Mohamad et at. 1994) or have
examined only the companies listed on the Main Board of the KLSE (e.g., Wu, 1993;
Mohamad et at., 1994; Paudyal et at., 1998; Jelic et at., 2001). All the studies on the
Malaysian market employ the event-time approach and do not address the
methodological issues concerning the measurement of the long run share returns. Given
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that only the event-time approach has been used to estimate long run performance in
previous Malaysian IPO studies, it is not clear whether Malaysian IPOs produce
significantly higher positive long run returns as compared to the results observed in
developed markets that generally report underperformance. The results obtained
from prior studies of Malaysian IPOs are open to question due to the fact that the
measurement of long run returns is problematic and sensitive to ,the model of expected
returns and the method employed to calculate the long run returns. This is due to the
fact that the asset pricing models applied to predict expected returns may be insuffcient
to adjust for risk, and the method employed to calculate the long run share price
performance is exposed to various statistical biases.
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Chapter 4 - Literature review & hypotheses I: Market-based performance
4.3 Prior studies of privatisation IPOs (PIPOs)
Megginson and Netter (2001) survey the empirical studies of privatisation to identify
whether domestic and international investors who purchase PIPO shares experience
positive initial and long run returns. They argue that examining the PIPOs is of interest
since the offering terms and size are relatively larger than private IPOs. They note that
share offerings are the best method used by the government to privatise the state-owned
companies to achieve its political objective. Other reasons for PIPOs, as stated by them,
are to: (i) raise revenue for the state; (ii) promote economic efficiency; (iii) reduce
government interference in the economy; (iv) promote wider share ownership; (v)
provide the opportunity to introduce competition; (vi) subject state-owned companies to
market discipline; and (vii) develop the national capital market (p. 324).
4.3.1 Initial return performance
Several studies have empirically examined the initial return of previously state-owned
companies from single countries; including Levis (1993), Menyah, Paudyal and
Inyangete (1995) for the UK market, Paudyal et aL. (1998) for the Malaysian market, Su
and Fleisher (1999) and Chen, Firth and Kim (2004) for the Chinese market. A few
studies examine the multi-country PIPOs' initial returns, including Perotti and Guney
(1993), Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), and Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999).
The results of most of these studies are broadly similar, suggesting that PIPOs produce a
higher level of underpricing than private IPOs.
In the UK, Levis (1993) examines the performance of privatisation IPOs and
privately-owned company IPOs. Of the 712 IPOs examined by Levis (1973), 12 are
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PIPOs. However, Levis (1993) does not really test or make a comparison between these
types of offerings. Levis (1993) finds that average first day market-adjusted returns for
12 privatisation IPOs are 37.3%. Menyah et al. (1995) study subscriber returnsS1 and
issuer underpricing for 40 UK privatisation IPOs between 1981 and 1991. They report
an average underpricing, which is measured relative to the total equity market value on
the first day of trading, of 23.6%. Meanwhile, they find th~ average raw returns
available to subscribers of privatisation IPO to be 41.4%. The average estimate is
higher than earlier estimates by Levis (1993), who reports first day raw initial returns of
35.6%.
One study deals specifically with Malaysian PIPOs. In analysing the initial excess
returns of 18 privatisation IPOs and 77 private sector IPOs in Malaysia during the
period 1984 to 1995, Paudyal et aL. (1998) estimate the initial returns offered by PIPOs
and compare them with other IPOs. They find that Malaysian IPOs are underpriced with
an initial raw return and initial excess return after adjustment for KLSE Composite
Index of 61 .8% and 62.1%, respectively. They also report that PIPOs offer significantly
higher initial returns than other IPOs, with an average initial raw return of 104.7% and
an initial market-adjusted return of 103.5%. These returns are much higher than the
35.6% and 41.4% for UK PIPOs reported by Levis (1993) and Menyah et aL. (1995),
respectively. However, Paudyal et aL.'s (1998) findings are consistent with Perotti and
Guney (1993), who find an average return of 99.6% for 13 Malaysian PIPOs. Paudyal
51 They assume that the subscriber return is different from issuer underpricing. In their study, the
estimate of subscriber returns assumes that: (i) the demand for IPO subscription is equal to the number of
shares supplied; (ii) there is no time lag between the application closing day and the first day of trading;
(iii) subscribers are allocated all the shares for which they applied; and (iv) the company sells all its
shares to new investors. Meanwhile, the estimate of issuer underpricing is based upon the proportion of
shares sold and the potential interest income associated with the fund received from share applicants (p.
480).
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et al. (1998) examine the explanatory power of five variables: over-subscription, market
volatility, the proportion of shares sold, underwriter reputation, and ex ante risk on
initial premium using ordinary least square methods. These variables explain 78% of
the variation in the excess returns offered by Malaysian PIPOs, 10% of private IPOs and
36% of the whole sample.
Malaysian PIPOs also feature in three multi-country studies, by Perotti and Guney
(1993), Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), and Jones et aL. (1999). Perotti and Guney
(1993) collect the information available on the privatisation programmes of three
developed countries, namely France, the UK, and Spain, and four developing countries,
namely Nigeria, Chile, Turkey, and Malaysia. They report that there is higher
underpricing in share issue privatisations in Malaysia, with market price increasing to
an average premium approximately 80% from the offer price.
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) compare the initial offer prices in the privatisation of
state-owned and private companies. They investigate public offerings involving 109
stated-owned and privately-owned enterprises (38 in the UK, 13 in Canada, 10 in
France, 10 in Hungary, 12 in Malaysia, 3 in Japan, 19 in Poland and 4 in Thailand) and
find that initial returns are significantly higher in relatively primitive capital markets, as
well as in privatised companies in regulated industries. They find average unadjusted
one-day returns of 18% for the UK, 2.5% for Canada, 11.4% for France, 14.9% for
Hungary, 52.2% for Malaysia, 16% for Japan, 50% for Poland and 46.6% for Thailand;
the average market-adjusted one-day returns are also all positive. Based on their
comparison between the initial returns of PIPOs and private IPOs, they conclude that
their results provide little support for the view that all governments tend to underprice
initial offerings to a greater degree than private company issuers. Jones et al. (1999),
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who only focus on PIPOs (a sample of 630 companies) from 59 countries during the
period 1977 to 1997, find that governments consistently underprice share issue
privatisation offers, provide favourable share allocations to domestic investors, and
typically use fixed price methods in setting the offer price.
In summary, the results suggest that PIPOs produce an even higher level of underpricing
than private IPOs.
4.3.2 Long run share price performance
The relatively few studies that analyse the long run stock market performance of PIPOs
in single countries include Levis (1993) and Menyah et aL. (1995) for the UK market,
and Paudyal et al. (1998) and Sun and Tong (2002) for the Malaysian market. Several
studies examine the multi-country evidence on the long run returns to PIPOs, including
Boubakri and Cosset (2000), Megginson, Nash, Netter and Schwartz (2000), and
Comstock, Kish and Vasconcellos (2003). The results of most of these studies suggest
that there is a positive long run performance across many markets, although there is a
negative long run performance observed on the Malaysian market.
Among the earlier studies on the UK market, Levis (1993) finds an average of 96.9%
for three-year holding period returns for 12 PIPOs, indicating that the UK privatisation
IPOs have a superior performance relative to their benchmarks. However, he does not
compare PIPO and private IPO performances. Menyah et aL. (1995) compare the long
run performance of PIPOs and private sector IPOs in the UK, and find that UK PIPOs,
on average, are good long term investments when compared to their private sector
counterparts.
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Boubakri and Cosset (2000) examine the post-issue stock price performance of 120
PIPOs in 26 developing countries, covering the period from 1982 to 1995. They report
that PIPOs produce economically and statistically significant positive raw returns and
adjusted returns, matched by size and book-to-market. The results suggest that
investors' expectations rise over the three years after the issue, even though at the
beginning of the privatisation process they seem to be relatively pessimistic.
Additionally, in examining the long run returns to investors in 158 PIPOs from 33
countries between 1981 and 1997, Megginson et al. (2000) find similar results.
Paudyal et aL. (1998) also examine the long run performance of 18 Malaysian PIPOs
and 77 private IPOs, using daily compounded return, and compare them with market
returns proxied by the KLSE Composite Index. Further analysis of the long run
performance is carried out, based on (i) PIPOs versus IPOs; (ii) low versus high initial
return; and (iii) underwriter reputation. The ave~age holding period market-adjusted
excess return over 36 months is -7.46% for PIPOs and 12.85% for private IPOs. This
indicates that investors buying PIPOs from the first day of trading and holding the
portfolio up to three years would not, on average, receive any significant excess returns.
However, the holding period return losses generated by PIPOs are not significant and
neither PIPOs nor other IPOs significantly overperform/underperform the market over
three years.
Another study on Malaysian PIPOs, undertaken by Sun and Tong (2002), uses a sample
of only 24 PIPOs during the period 1983 to 1997. Like Paudyal et aL. (1998), they find
that PIPOs slightly underperform the benchmark, with an annual mean market-adjusted
return of -3.3% in the fourth year after privatisation (significant at the 10% level). They
argue that this might be due to benchmark errors.
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In summary, the general weight of evidence finds positive long run performance across
many markets but underperformance is also observed in several markets. For example,
several studies (e.g., Menyah et aL., 1995) indicate that PIPOs are better long term
investments than private IPOs. Surprisingly, the results observed for the Malaysian
market show the reverse.
Table 4.4 summarises the empirical studies that examine solely privatisation IPOs
and/or compare the private IPO and PIPOs performances from single countries.
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4.3.3 Prior studies of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)
While the main focus of the present study is to examine the share price performance of
IPOs, for completeness this chapter also explores related evidence on the share price
performance of companies making additional equity or seasoned equity offerings
(SEOs). Studies of the long run performance of SEOs include Loughran and Ritter
(1995), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Cai and Loughran (1998), Eckbo et aL.
(2000), Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000), Mathew (2002), and Clarke, Dunbar and
Kahle (2004).
For the US, Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that SEO compames, on average,
underperform non-issuing companies by 33.0% and 59.4% for the three- and five-year
periods after issuance. The geometric average raw returns for their sample of SEO
companies are only 7.0% per year. On the oth~r hand, the geometric average raw
returns for their size-matched companies are 15.3% per year in the same length of
period examined. This indicates that their sample of SEO companies underperform
their size-matched companies by 8.3% per year. They find that the poor performance of
their sample of SEO companies is not a result of long run return reversals and
differences in beta. Moreover, they conclude that the underperformance persists across
the sample period, offer size and age of the company. Similar to Ritter's (1991)
conclusion, they support the 'windows of opportunity' hypothesis in which managers
take advantage of company-specific information to issue equity when the company's
stock is overvalued. Similar results are observed by Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995),
and Clarke et aL. (2004) for the US SEOs. Cai and Loughran (1998) examine Japanese
SEOs between 1971 to 1992 and obtain similar results.
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By using a sample of more than 7,000 seasoned equity and debt offerings during the
period 1964 to 1995, Eckbo et aL. (2000) examine the risk characteristics of the return
differential between a portfolio of issuing and non-issuing companies matched by size
and the book-to-market ratio. They conclude that the 'new issue puzzle' is explained by
a failure of the matched-company technique to provide a proper control for risk.
Brav et al. (2000) analyse the existence of the underperformance anomaly to equity
issuer. By using a sample of 4,622 IPOs and 4,526 SEOs between 1975 to 1992, they
find that underperformance is concentrated primarily in small issuing companies with
low book-to-market ratios. Brav et aL. (2000) argue that poor long run stock returns
following equity issues are not unique. They observe that the returns to the IPO issuer
are similar to the non-issuer, matched on company size and book-to-market ratio.
However, there is some underperformance in returns to SEOs issuers relative to various
,benchmarks. Furthermore, they report that the level of underperformance of IPOs and
SEOs tends to magnify when buy-and-hold returns are used to calculate abnormal
performance.
Mathew (2002) examines 744 Japanese SEOs between 1975 and 1992, 415 Korean
SEOs between 1979 and 1992, and 313 Hong Kong SEOs between 1982 and 1992.
Consistent with the results of previous studies, Mathew (2002) observes that SEO
companies in unrestricted markets52 such as Japan and Hong Kong perform poorly in
the 36-month period subsequent to the issue. The results support the hypothesis that
52 Mathew (2002) characterises the Hong Kong market as one with few regulations. The Japanese
regulatory structure is similar to that of the US in which issuing companies are allowed to set the timing
and price of an offering with no restrictions.
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managers do take advantage of private information when issuing SEOs. This finding
also supports Ritter's (1991) hypothesis whereby companies take advantage of periods
in which investors are overly optimistic about the value of the stock. However,
insignificant negative abnormal returns are found in Korea that have some form of
regulatory or organisational restrictions. Mathew (2002) suggests that the insignificant
results observed in the Korean market is due to the restrictions p'laced on management
from raising capital in the debt market as well as set guidelines for the pricing of the
equity offerings in which the available discount is reduced from market price from 50%
in 1984 to 10% in 1988. Mathew (2002) implies that an equity issue in Korea is
therefore more likely to be an indication of future prospects rather than an attempt by
management to take advantage of an overvalued market price.
Overall, it would appear that no studies have been undertaken to examine the long run
performance of SEOs for the Malaysian market. From the review, on average,
companies issuing SEOs also experience negative abnormal returns similar to
companies making IPOs.
4.4 Research questions
The research examining the stock market performance on IPOs in general reveals that
these investments tend to underperform their benchmarks, either within the market as a
whole, or compared to a size-matched company. However, there is a debate in the IPO
literature on the methodological issues surrounding the estimation of long run stock
market performance, which centres on how to calculate the long run returns, the
benchmark used, and how to construct test statistics. The methodological problems that
exist to estimate the long run returns have not been resolved in all markets and the
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significant overperformance observed for Malaysian IPOs in general is not very
convincing without further robustness testing. Therefore, the present study re-examines
the robustness of the previous findings on the long run share price performance of
Malaysian IPOs by using several methods to measure returns, different market
benchmarks to adjust the returns, and appropriate statistical tests. The variety of
methods will enable a view to be formed as to whether the findings of the present study
are sensitive to the model and method employed.
Based on the review of prior literature, the following broad research question is
identified:
1. 'How do Malaysian IPO companies perform relative to several benchmarks in
the long run? '
Ifso,
2. 'Do both event-time and calendar-time approaches produce the same results? '
In order to test this broad research question, several hypotheses are outlined in the
following section.
4.5 Formal hypotheses
Various methods of measuring abnormal performance have been discussed in the
literature (e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Lyon et at., 1999).
As noted by Loughran and Ritter (1995), Eckbo et at. (2000) and Gompers and Lerner
(2003), among others, the results of long run performance studies may vary as a result
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of differences in the methods used to measure abnormal returns. For example, Gompers
and Lerner's (2003) findings demonstrate that IPO performance depends on the method
used to measure returns. Their results show some evidence of underperformance when
value-weighted event-time buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used. However, the
underperformance disappears when either equally-weighted event-time buy-and-hold or
cumulative abnormal returns are employed. On the other hand, the results they derive
from the calendar-time approach, such as the Fama-French three-factor model, suggest
that there is no abnormal performance. It is clear that one possible explanation for the
mixed results on the long run abnormal returns is caused by methodological errors in
the identification of long run returns.
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) find that long-horizon test
statistics are misspecified. They indicate that the direction and magnitude of bias in
long horizon studies can be sensitive to sample characteristics such as the
book-to-market ratio, size, exchange listing, and the time period studied. Parametric
test statistics are found to be subject to misspecification because they do not satisfy the
assumptions of zero mean and unit normality. They recommend nonparametric or
bootstrap procedures as a means of reducing misspecification.
The cross-sectional and time-series pattern of long run IPO performance has been
examined by several researchers. For example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) report that
the degree of underperformance by issuing companies fluctuates over time. They find
that IPOs that occur in years when there is little issuing activity exhibit no statistically
significant underperformance, whereas companies selling stock during high volume
periods severely underperform. In their analysis of Japanese IPOs, Hwang and
Jayaraman (1995) observe no differences in abnormal returns across industries for their
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IPO and non-IPO groups. However, Cai and Wei (1997) note that Japanese issuing
companies underperform size-matched non-issuing companies in most industries. Ritter
(1991) finds that US IPOs display long run underperformance, with a tendency for the
smaller offers to have the worst aftermarket performance. He also reports that
companies which have the highest mean initial returns also have the poorest long run
returns, consistent with the 'fad' hypothesis of Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) and the
'overreaction' hypothesis of De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987). Levis (1993) and
Menyah et aL. (1995) find that UK PIPOs are a superior long term investment. Page and
Reyneke (1997), and Khurshed et aL. (1999) conclude that the degree of
underperformance is greater among smaller companies.
Based on the above evidence, the hypotheses of the present study are as follows:
H1: There is a diference in the long run performance when the market indexes
and size-matched company are used as a benchmark.
H2: There is a diference in the long run performance when the event-time and
calendar-time approaches are employed.
H3: There is a diference in the level of signifcance of the long run buy-and-hold
abnormal returns when the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic is
calculated.
H4: There is a diference in mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns when the
sample is categorised by year of listing, sector, board of listing, size, type of
company - private or privatisation, gross proceeds, and initial returns.
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4.6 Summary
This chapter reviews the empirical evidence of IPO stock market performance. The
results of market-based evidence in developed and developing countries indicate that,
on average, investors who purchase the IPO at the offer price receive higher first day
returns. Studies undertaken in Malaysia also show higher initial returns than those in
the US and the UK. In examining post IPO stock market performance, the evidence
generally suggests that there is negative long run performance across many markets.
However, there is also evidence of positive long run performance in the Malaysian
market and in recent studies of both developed and developing markets. Specifically,
the results appear to be sensitive to the methods used to measure long run returns. From
the review, it is apparent that market-based studies have not been able to answer the
question of whether or not purchasing IPO shares is a good investment in the long run,
or whether performance is a result of poor benchmiaks used to measure returs. These
findings have led to the specific hypotheses relating to stock market performance for
testing on the Malaysian market in this thesis.
The next chapter describes the research design employed to investigate the stock market
performance of Malaysian IPOs.
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Chapter 5
Research design to investigate stock market performance
5.1 Introduction
Following the review of the literature and the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4, this
chapter discusses the research design employed in the current study to examine the
share price performance of Malaysian IPOs in general, and the long run performance in
particular. Section 5.2 describes the sources of data for individual companies' returns
and market returns. This is followed by an explanation of the process of data collection
and the sample selection in Section 5.3. The selection criteria for the sample and for
size-matched companies, together with market benchmarks, are also described. Section
5.4 discusses the methods adopted to measure the share price performance together with
the statistical tests employed to evaluate the significance level of the initial and long run
returns. Section 5.5 describes the variables used to assess the cross-sectional pattern of
long run stock market performance. The final section concludes the present chapter.
5.2 Data sources on stock market performance
The current study examines Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) companies from 1
January 1990 to 31 December 2000 inclusive, in order to identify Malaysian IPOs and
to examine their short and long run share price performances. Companies that were
included in the sample must be incorporated in Malaysia. The present study focuses
only on new issues involving ordinary shares, which excludes preferred shares,
debentures or loan stocks. The main justification for using a sample of listed IPOs from
1990 to 2000 is that there were fewer studies over this period, particularly from the
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period 1996 onwards. Prior published studies on IPO long run share price performance
in Malaysia have examined the period up to 1996 (e.g., Wu, 1993; Paudyal et aI., 1998;
Jelic et aI., 2001; Corhay et aI., 2002). Another reason is that more information and
databases concerning IPOs have become available since 1990. The present study
utilises a more recent sample to obtain further evidence, particularly on the long run
performance of IPOs in Malaysia. The sample period examined i,s up to 2000 since this
study examines one- to three-year post IPO performance. The need to study long run
post-IPO performance for three years after the offer requires that the sample period ends
in 2000. Therefore, the period used in the present study is from 1990 through 2003.
The number of newly listed companies on the KLSE between 1990 and 2000 is 543, of
which 537 made IPOs of equity.
The identities of IPO companies subsequently listed on the KLSE during the period
1990 to 2000 were obtained from several sources. Prior to 1998, the source of data was
the 'Listing' section of the Investors Digest,53 a monthly publication of the KLSE. The
data was hand-collected from the January issue of this publication, which summarises
IPO activity for the previous year. This publication provides details of each company
such as date of listing, subscription price, the number of shares offered, the gross
proceeds received, the types of IPOs, and the board of listing. The data for year 1998
onwards was downloaded from the KLSE website at
http://ww.klse.com.my/website/ipo.htm on 27 April, 2003. Additional information on
IPOs was obtained from the main KLSE web site located at http://ww.klse.com.my.54
53 Investors Digest comprises commentaries on the securities markets and economy of Malaysia.
54 With effect from 1 May 2004, the web 
site was changed to http://www.bursamalaysia.com.
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Further data was obtained from another secondary source, the KLSE Research Institute
of Investment Analysts of Malaysia Information System, located at
http://ww.klse-ris.com.my.
5.2.1 Individual company stock returns
The share price data for each IPO and non-IPO company were collected from the
Datastream database. Specifically, the data comprised individual IPO closing prices on
the first day of listing and the 36 monthly stock returns following listing. The total
return index (RI) was used as the measure of monthly returns. It 'shows a theoretical
growth in value of a share holding over a specifed period, assuming that dividends are
re-invested to purchase additional units of an equity at the closing price applicable on
the ex-dividend date. Gross dividends are used where available and the calculation
ignores tax and re-investment charges. Adjusted dosing prices are used throughout to
determine price index and hence return index' (Datastream database definition). The
monthly stock returns for each IPO company were then compared with the monthly
stock returns of a matched company or market index on a rolling basis for each of the
36 months following the initial listing. Non-IPO companies listed on the KLSE were
used to provide benchmarks for IPO companies. The procedure for selecting
size-matched companies is discussed in Section 5.3.2.2. Matched companies were
required to have a complete returns history over the corresponding time windows under
consideration.
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5.2.2 Market returns
Data on monthly market returns were also obtained from the Datastream database in
order to provide market benchmarks. As pointed out by Ritter (1991), alternative
benchmark portfolios were used in order to find out whether measurement problems
could account for the poor long run performance. Ritter (1991) states that, '... it is not
clear at all what constitutes the appropriate benchmark portfolio' (p. 12). Therefore,
this study utilised three market benchmarks: (i) the KL Composite Index (KLCI); (ii)
the EMAS Index (Exchange Main Board All-Share Index); and (iii) the KLSE Second
Board Index. Returns on the KL Composite Index (KLCI), the main market index in
Malaysia, were collected to provide a benchmark for the overall sample. The KLCI
comprises the 100 largest stocks and is weighted by market capitalisation.
As the samples of IPOs in the current study were' listed on two boards, a benchmark
appropriate to each board was used. The EMAS Index was used to provide a
benchmark for IPO companies listed on the Main Board of the KLSE. The EMAS
Index comprises all stocks quoted on the Main Board of the KLSE. Meanwhile, the
Second Board Index was adopted for companies listed on the Second Board of the
KLSE. The Second Board Index comprises all stocks quoted on the Second Board of
the KLSE. Both the EMAS Index and the Second Board Index are weighted by market
capitalisation. As of 20 July 2004, there were 613 and 279 companies listed on the
EMAS Index and Second Board Index, respectively. The returns of sample companies
from the Main (Second) Board were compared to the EMAS (Second Board) Index
returns.
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5.3 Sample selection
This section discusses the process of data collection by describing the criteria used to
select the IPO companies and their matched companies.
5.3.1 Process of data collection
The first step undertaken in the process of data collection was to obtain the lists of
companies that made an IPO and subsequently listed on the KLSE during the period
1990 to 2000. The lists ofIPO companies were obtained from 'Public Issue' and 'Offer
for Sale' subsections of the Investors Digest, as mentioned in Section 5.2.55 These were
then checked with the 'New Companies Listed on the KLSE' subsection in order to
confirm that the IPO companies were subsequently listed on the exchange.
,
Next, the lists of companies were cross-checked with the listing statistics available at
http://ww.klse.com.my/website/listing/listingstats.htm on 28 April, 2003. In order to
collect the data for individual companies, the possibility of a change of a company's
name was first checked. This was necessary as several companies have changed their
name a number of times and the previous names did not appear in Datastream. The lists
of changes of companies' names from 1995 onwards were available from
http://ww.klse.com.my/website/listing/lcprofs.htm. Changes of companies' names
55 As explained in Chapter 2, there are three types of IPOs in Malaysia, namely public offers, offers for
sale, and a combination of public offers and offers for sale (mixed offering). A public offer is a type of
IPO, which is offered for subscription to the public for the first time. It wil result in an increase in the
paid-up capital of the company. Meanwhile, an offer for sale is a type of IPO in which shares have
already been issued to original stockholders, who then offer their shares for sale to the public. In this
situation, the paid-up capital of the company does not change because the money received from the sale
of the stock does not go to the company.
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prior to 1995 were traced by downloading the individual company's profie from the
same website. Profies of the companies were also obtained from the Company
database available at http://ww.klse-ris.com.my/html-dir/intro1.html. As of 30 April
2003, this database provided information on individual companies since 1990. The lists
of companies were then matched with the companies together with the code available
from Datastream in order to collect the data on share price perforrance.
5.3.2 Selecting ¡PO companies and matching companies
5.3.2.1 Selecting IPO companies
Several data conditions were imposed in the current study. Specifically, IPO companies
had to satisfy the following criteria in order to remain in the final sample: (i) an offer
price of RM1 .00 per share or more; (ii) an offering involving common stock only, 56 and a
,
requirement that the listing did not result from an introduction;57 (iii) a fixed price offering,
thereby excluding tender offers; (iv) the company to be listed on the Main Board or the
Second Board ofthe KLSE; (v) the availability of returns data on the Datastream database
for up to three years after listing; finally (vi) the exclusion of companies classified as
Infrastructure Project Companies (IPCs), and companies from the Finance, Trust, or
Closed-End Funds sector. The companies that were listed as Infrastructure Project
Companies (IPCs) were excluded because they have high market capitalisation, which
56 One company (Kedah Cement Holdings Bhd, listed on 29 January 1992), made a combined debt and
common stock offering; this was excluded from the sample.
57 Five companies issued shares and listed via introductions on 28 December 1990 (one company), 6
November 1991 (one company), 18 August 1997 (one company), and 15 December 1999 (two
companies). The names of the companies are Amanah Harta Tanah PNB, Syarikat Kurnia Setia Bhd,
KUB Malaysia Bhd, APM Automative Holdings Bhd and Warisan TC Holdings Bhd, respectively.
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may unduly influence the results. Furthermore, they were new projects granted by the
State to the private sector and therefore did not have the necessary track record. The
companies that are listed under the Finance, Trust and Closed-End Funds sector were
excluded because the data were not comparable with those of non-financial companies.
They also have different statutory requirements in preparing companies' annual reports.
The final sample comprises 454 IPOs, of which 85 are public offers, 243 are offers for
sale, and 126 are a combination of public offers and offers for sale (mixed offering).
The sample of 454 IPOs comprises 91 % of the potential number of IPOs available and
covers 83.6% of newly listed companies during the period 1990 to 2000. Of the 454
IPOs, 435 are private IPOs and 19 are privatisation IPOs. The number of companies in
the sample varies from year to year in accordance with the type of analysis undertaken
and the time windows under consideration. Table 5.1 summarises the impact of data
screening and the time distribution of the final sample.
5.3.2.2 Selecting matching companies
A control sample was created by matching each IPO company with a comparable
company that did not make an IPO. The control group was used to provide information
on how comparable companies, not involved in IPOs, differ from the test sample. The
matching companies were chosen from KLSE-listed securities. Following Loughran
and Ritter (1995), companies in the control sample were individually matched to
companies in the IPO sample based on size, proxied by market capitalisation. In order
to choose the matching company, on 31 December of each year (from 1990-2000), all
KLSE common stocks listed on the Datastream database that had not made an IPO
within the last three years were ranked by their market capitalisation. All companies for
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their first three years after going public are excluded. A newly-listed company became
eligible to be a matching company after any three-year period during which it has not
issued equity. The company with the market capitalisation closest to, but higher than,
that of the issuing company, was then chosen as the matching company. Due to a lack
of available data on the book value of common equity for most Malaysian companies
prior to 1993, it was not possible to match companies by the book-to-market ratio in the
present study.
The next section discusses the methods used to measure the share price performance,
the analysis undertaken, and the statistical tests employed to analyse the significance
levels of long run returns.
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Chapter 5 - Research design 1: Market-based performance
5.4 Methods
To evaluate the investment performance of IPOs, the present study employs standard
event study methodology, namely the event-time approach. Event-time returns are used
instead of the calendar-time returns because calendar-time returns do not precisely
measure investor experience (Barber and Lyon, 1997), are generally misspecified in
random samples (Lyon et aL., 1999), and have low power (Loughran and Ritter, 2000).
However, event-time returns suffer from a cross-sectional dependence problem (Fama,
1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). As a robustness test, the present study also
employed calendar-time returns.
In accordance with Ritter (1991), abnormal returns are calculated for two periods. The
first of these is the initial return period, defined as the return obtained from purchasing
the shares on the offering date, as disclosed in the prospectus, to the end of the first day
of trading. The second period is the aftermarket or long run phase, defined as the three
years (36 event months) afer the first day of listing, excluding the initial return period.
A three-year window is used to ease comparisons with other studies. Following Ritter
(1991), the initial return period is defined to be month 0, and the aftermarket period
includes the following 36 event months after listing. The event month is defined as the
one-month period following the listing date. The method of calculating the initial and
aftermarket returns, and the analysis undertaken together with the statistical test used
are discussed next.
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5.4.1 Measure of stock market performance, the analysis undertaken and test
statistics used
5.4. 1. 1 Initial return
While the focus of the present study is to examine long run stock market performance,
the initial return is also examined. The present study measu,es both the raw and
market-adjusted initial returns. Raw initial return is calculated as:
Ri( = (J~t - S¡o) / Sio (5.1)
where:
Ri( = the initial return of company i 's share,'
Pit = the closing price on the first day of listing,'
S¡O = the subscription price on the offering date.
The abnormal initial return is the market-adjusted initial return (MAIR), calculated as:
MAIR = Ri( - Rmt (5.2)
where:
Rmt = the return on the market portfolio proxied by the KL Composite Index, the main
market index in Malaysia, calculated as:
Rmt = (It - Io)/ Io (5.3)
where:
It and I~ = the corresponding index levels.
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Both Rit and Rmt do not account for dividends as no dividend payments occurred in the
short run. It is also assumed that beta is unity since there is no return history for IPOs to
estimate systematic risk (Uhlir, 1989). Therefore, the Market Model and the Capital
Asset Pricing Model are not employed in the current study.
To test whether the mean market-adjusted initial return equals zero, the associated
t-statistic is calculated as follow:
t = (MAIR * ¡;) / sd (5.4)
where:
sd = the standard deviation of MAIR across the companies,'
n = the number of IPO companies in the sample.
5.4.1.2 Long run return
In order to identify abnormal stock returns for each IPO, 36 monthly returns were
computed. In order to do so, 37 event return indices (RI) were obtained for each IPO
following listing, along with size-matched companies and market indices. These returns
excluded the initial returns by treating the RI on the first day of listing as a purchase
price. 
58 Following the argument of Loughran and Ritter (1995), investors frequently
have difficulties in purchasing shares at the offering price due to over-subscription
(Page and Reyneke, 1997). Therefore, they normally purchase shares in the
aftermarket, in which the market price represents a price available to carry out a
58 This return index is based on the first day closing price rather than the opening price, thus excluding
the initial returns. A similar procedure is also employed by Firth (1997) and Page and Reyneke (1997),
among others.
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portfolio strategy. To evaluate the long run abnormal performance of IPOs, 36-month
returns for both the IPOs and benchmarks were compared. Three benchmarks were
employed: (i) a matching company approach (whereby a single IPO company is
matched with a non-IPO company by market value); (ii) a reference portfolio consisting
of the Malaysian main market index (the KL Composite Index); and (iii) a reference
portfolio consisting of the alternative market indices in Malays,ia (the EMAS/Second
Board Index). The returns of sample companies from the Main Board were compared
to the EMAS Index returns. In addition, the returns of sample companies from the
Second Board were compared to the Second Board Index.
The present study uses three alternative measures to compute abnormal returns under
the event-time approach and one measure under the calendar-time approach. For the
event-time analysis three measures were used: (i) Cumulative mean abnormal return
(CAR), calculated with monthly portfolio rebalan¿ing, where the adjusted returns are
computed using several different benchmarks identified earlier; (ii) Buy-and-hold
abnormal returns (BHAR); and (iii) Wealth relative (WR), defined as the mean total
return on IPOs divided by the mean total return on the benchmarks. For the
calendar-time approach, the alpha value derived from the Fama-French (1993)
three-factor model was used. Detailed measurement procedures are discussed next.
Event-time approach
There are several metrics used to measure long run abnormal stock market performance
as reported by Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997) and Lyon et al.
(1999). However, there is a consensus among all of these authors that no single method
is dominant. Fama (1998), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Gompers and Lerner
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(2003) argue that the CAR might be a better and less biased method for calculating long
run returns. Even though the CAR stil suffers from cross-sectional correlation, the
effect of compounding a negative return, which may occur only in a single period, is
eliminated. Furthermore, they argue that the distributional properties and the test
statistics are better understood. As noted by Lyon et aL. (1999), the CAR approach to
measuring abnormal returns is warranted in order to answer t1le following question:
'Do sample (IPO companies J persistently earn abnormal monthly returns? '(p. 192).
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et aL. (1999) recommend applying the buy-and-hold
abnormal return measure to evaluate long run performance, arguing that the use of
'independent' monthly rebalancing may introduce a downward bias in the long run
CARs. Buy-and-hold return measures may also reduce the statistical bias59 in the
measurement of cumulative performance (Conrad and Kaul, 1993). As noted by
Lyon et aL. (1999), the buy-and-hold return m~asure is warranted if researchers
wish to discover whether or not IPO companies earned abnormal stock return over
a specific horizon of analysis. Fama (1998) argues that buy-and-hold returns
accurately measure the return to an investor who holds a security for a long
post-event period by compounding short run returns to obtain long run returns.
Due to the fact that both methods have pro and cons, the present study employed
both approaches, to test the robustness of the results.
59 For all k-period returs, the buy-and-hold return measure contains only a constant bias (the bias in the
single period's retur). However, in the cumulative k-period measure, k times the single-period return's
bias may exist (Conrad and Kaul, 1993, p. 40).
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(1) Cumulative mean abnormal returns (CARs)
The monthly raw return for the event months is calculated as follows:
lft = (Pit - pit-J/ P¡t-l (5.5)
where:
rit = raw return for company i in the event month t following listing,'
P¡t = the last traded total return index of company i in event month t "
P¡t-i = the last traded total return index in event month t - 1.
The monthly benchmark-adjusted return for company i in event month t is calculated
by subtracting the monthly benchmark return from the monthly raw return.
a'it = r¡t - rmt
(5.6)
where:
arit = the market-adjusted return or matched company-adjusted return for company i
in event month t;
rit = the return on company i in event month t;
rmt = the market index or matched company return in month t.
The market index used to obtain the abnormal return depends on the board with which
the IPO company is originally listed. The present study utilises value-weighted market
indices, as in Ritter (1991), and matching companies based on market capitalisation, the
approach employed by Loughran and Ritter (1995). As mentioned in Section 5.3.2.2,
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matching companies based on book-to-market ratios cannot be implemented because of
a lack of data on book values of equity prior to 1993.
The mean benchmark-adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for event month t, A~,
is the equally-weighted and value-weighted arithmetic mean of the benchmark-adjusted
returns.
lI
A~ = Lúltalft
i=l
(5.7)
where:
OJu = the weight, 1/ ni is used when abnormal returns are equally-weighted and
MY / ¿MY is employed when abnormal returns are value-weighted, and
where:
,
MV¡ = the IPO company's stock market value (in constant 2002 RM to adjust for
inflation6o) on the first trading day.
As noted by Fama (1998), the choice of weighting scheme depends on the hypothesis of
interest to the researcher. According to Loughran and Ritter (2000), 'if one is trying to
measure the abnormal returns on the average companies undergoing some event, then
each company should be weighted equally... (this J wil produce point estimates that are
relevant from the point of view of a manager, investor, or researcher attempting to
predict the abnormal returns associated with a random event' (p. 363, note 2).
60 The formula to adjust for inflation (i.e. convert data year, nominal RM into base year, real RM) is: RM
base year = RM data year * Consumer Price Index base year / Consumer Price Index data year' The Malaysian
Consumer Price Index (CPI) was obtained from Global Market Information Database. The year 2002 was
used as the constant because this is the latest year for which CPI information was available at the time the
analysis was carried out.
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However, Brav et aL. (2000) argue that the value-weighted scheme should be employed
if the goal of researchers is to quantify the average wealth change of investors
subsequent to an event. Therefore, the present study applies both weighting schemes.
The CAR from event month q to event month s is calculated by cumulating the mean
benchmark-adjusted returns over various intervals during the 36-month aftermarket
period, q to s (by summing monthly abnormal returns for 36 months) as follows:
s
CARq,s = ¿ARi
I=q
(5.8)
If a company in portfolio p drops out due to lack of data, the portfolio return for the next
month is an equally-weighted average of the remaining companies in the portfolio. The
cumulative mean benchmark-adjusted return for months 1 to 36, CARl,36' thus involves
monthly rebalancing to achieve equal-weighting eàch month (Ritter, 1991, p. 8). This
implies that the investors liquidate their portfolio at the end of each event month.
The statistical significance of the mean benchmark-adjusted return (AR) is determined
by using the conventional t-statistic, which is computed for each period as:
t(AR) = ARi * ¡; / sdi (5.9)
where:
ARi = the mean benchmark-adjusted returnfor month t "
ni = the number of observations in month t,.
sdi = the cross-sectional standard deviations of the adjusted returns for month t.
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The statistical significance of the CAR is also determined by usmg the t-statistic
employed by Ritter (1991). The t-statistic for the CAR in month t, CARi,1 is computed
as:
t( CAR) = CARi,1 * F: / csdi (5.10)
where:
nt = the number of companies trading in each month, and csdi is computed as:
( )112csdt = t * var+ 2 * (t - 1) * cov (5.11)
where:
t = the event month,'
var = the mean cross-sectional variance over 36 months,'
cov = the first-order autocovariance of the ARt series.
,
(2) Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs)
The three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used in this study as an alternative to
cumulative mean benchmark-adjusted returns. Adopting the calculation used by
Loughran and Ritter (1995), the three-year holding period return for company i is
defined as the geometrically compounded return in time t as:
BHR" ~l U(I +r"i-il 100% (5.12)
where:
rit = the monthly raw return on company i in event month t "
121
Chapter 5 - Research design 1: Market-based performance
This measures the total return from a buy-and-hold strategy where a stock is purchased
at the closing market price on the day of listing and held until the earlier of its one-,
two-, or three-year anniversary.
The mean buy-and-hold return for both the IPO companies and benchmarks BHRr is
calculated as:
n
BHRr = ¿OJ¡BHR¡r
1=1
(5.13)
where:
Wit = the weight, 1/ n is used when abnormal returns are equally-weighted and
MT /IMT is employed when abnormal returns are value-weighted, and
where:
MV = the IPO company's stock market value (in 2rJ02 RM) on the first trading day.
The buy-and-hold abnormal returns for each company are calculated by:
BHAR" ~ iD (I +r,,)-IJ-i D (I+r.,)-IJ (5.14)
where:
BHARit = the buy-and-hold abnormal return of company i in event month t "
rit = the company's monthly raw return in event month t;
rmt = the relevant monthly benchmark return in event month t.
A positive (negative) value of BHAR indicates that IPOs overperform (underperform) a
portfolio of benchmarks.
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The mean buy-and-hold abnormal return for a period t is defined as:
n¡
BHARi = ¿OJ1BHAR¡¡
1=1
(5.15)
This study calculates the statistical significance of the mean buy-and-hold abnormal
returns using two different procedures as a robustness test. The first procedure is using
the conventional t-statistic when a matched company benchmark is employed. Barber
and Lyon (1997) report that '...matching sample companies to control companies of
similar size and book-to-market ratios yield well specifed test statistics in virtually all
sampling situations...f and) alleviate the new listing bias... the rebalancing bias... and
the skewness bias... '(p. 370). These three biases have been discussed in Chapter 3.
While the use of the buy-and-hold approach does not assume portfolio rebalancing, the
approach increases the likelihood that the long rui1 return distributions wil be skewed
(Limmack,2003). Therefore, the second procedure is the calculation of a bootstrapped
skewness-adjusted t-statistic,6l as suggested by Lyon et aL. (1999), when a reference
portfolio or market index is used.62 According to Lyon et aL. (1999) this statistical
method yields 'well-specifed test statistics in random samples, and in combination with
carefully constructed reference portfolios, ...controlfs) well for the new listing,
re balancing, and skewness biases' (p. 166). The bootstrapped skewness-adjusted
t-statistic is computed as:
61 This test statistics has been used by Gompers and Lerner (2003).
62 Jakobsen and Sorensen (2001) proposed a decomposition method which uses a data transformation that
enables the cross-sectional long run returns to become log-normally distributed. However, this method is
not widely used. Therefore, the present study used skewness-adjusted t-statistics as suggested by Lyon et
al. (1999).
123
Chapter 5 - Research design 1: Market-based performance
tsa = '¡(S + -! f S2 + J. f))3 6n (5.16)
where:
n
I (BHARif - BHAR()3
S = BHAR( . and A = 1=1
a(BHAR() , r na(BHAR()3 (5.17)
where:
f = the estimate of the coeffcient of skewness,'
'¡s = the conventional t-statistic.
The critical values applied to conventional t-statistics are not appropriate when the
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics are used. Thus, the procedure for obtaining
an appropriate critical value when using the bootstrapping approach (Lyon et aI., 1999,
p. 174- 1 75) and testing the abnormal returns of IPO. companies is as follows:
(i) Draw 1,000 bootstrapped resamples63 of size nb = n/ 4 from the original sample
of IPO companies.
(ii) In each resample b, calculate the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic:
Iw' ~",( S' + ~f' Sb2 + 6~. f') J (518)
where:
n
b I (BHARif b - BHAR(b)3
sb = BHAR( - BHAR( and Ab = (=1
ab (BHAR( )' r nb ab (BHAR( ) 3 (5.19)
63 The random numbers were generated using the Bemoull random number generating function.
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(iii) All of the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics (tsab) are then ranked
from the smallest to the largest. From the 1,000 resamples, the lower-and
upper-bound critical values x; and x: are calculated for the transformed
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic (ts/)' Given the a significance
level, the critical values are obtained by solving the following equation:
r b, *J- r b,? *J_a
Pr~sa - Xi - Pr~,w - Xu - 2 (520)
(iv) The decision rule is as follows: Reject the null hypothesis that the mean long run
abnormal return is zero if tsa 'x; or tsa '? x: .
(3) Wealth relatives (WR)
The three-year total buy-and-hold returns are then converted into wealth relatives to
provide an overall indicator of long run relative performance. Similar to Ritter (1991),
,
wealth relatives are defined as the ratio of the end-of-period wealth from holding a
portfolio of issuers to the end-of-period wealth from holding a portfolio of matched
companies, or benchmarks, as follows:
WR = 1 + mean three year total return on IPOs
1 + mean three year total return on benchmarks (521)
A wealth relative of greater than 1.00 can be interpreted as meaning that IPOs have
overperformed a portfolio of matched companies or market benchmarks. On the other
hand, a wealth relative of less than 1.00 indicates that IPOs underperform their
matched companies or benchmarks.
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Calendar-time approach
This approach was recommended by Fama (1998), and Mitchell and Stafford (2000).
Under this approach, the abnormal returns of the IPO portfolio are calculated in
calendar time and each month is weighted equally. Therefore, the problem of
cross-sectional dependence among sample IPO companies is eliminated because their
returns are aggregated in a single portfolio. The most widely used return-generating
model in recent literature is the Fama-French (1993) three-factor modeL.
(1) Fama and French (1993) three-factor model
The use of event-time returns may overstate the statistical significance of mean
abnormal returns because of the cross-sectional dependence of observations (Mitchell
and Stafford, 2000). The Fama and French (1993) thee-factor model is used to control
for event clustering and cross-correlation in IPO returns. This model is employed rather
than the Capital Aset Pricing Model (CAPM) because of the well-known failure of the
CAPM to describe the cross-section of expected returns (Fama and French, 1993).
Fama and French's model contains three factors, which are an overall market factor and
factors related to company size and book-to-market equity. As reported by Drew and
Veeraraghavan (2002), the factors identified by Fama and French (1992) appear to
explain the variation in stock returns in Malaysia. This procedure has also been used
by Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), Espenlaub et al. (2000),
Gompers and Lerner (2003) and Da Silva Rosa et al. (2003), among others.
In order to run a time-series regression using the Fama and French three-factor model
with monthly returns, for each calendar month t, the dependent variable consisted of
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both equally-weighted and value-weighted returns on a portfolio with surviving IPO
companies from the prior 36 months. For example, the January 1994 portfolio would be
composed of companies that went public in January 1991 through December 1993. The
February 1994 portfolio would be composed of companies that went public in February
1991 through January 1994.64 Following Lyon et aL. (1999), the weight for the
equally-weighted analysis is calculated as lint, while the weight for the value-weighted
analysis is calculated as À1t /I~~iÀ1I' The three Fama-French factors were
regressed on excess returns on the IPO company portfolios, as follows:
Rpi - Rfl = a + ß(Rml - Rfl) + rSMBi + 5HMLi + cl (5.22)
where:
Rpt the IPO portfolio's return65 in month t "
Rfl the one-month Malaysian Base Lending Rate, 66 observed at the beginning of
,
the month;
Rmt monthly market return of the KL Composite Index, the main market indice in
Malaysia,'
5MBt = the monthly return on the zero investment portfolio for the size factor in the
stock returns, namely the diference between the equal-weight mean of the
64 This was confirmed in private correspondence with Ritter on 22 July, 2003.
65 This retun is only on a portfolio of IPO companies, not on individual IPO companies.
66 Due to the absence of data on the return of short term Malaysian Government Bonds prior to February
1994 to proxy for risk free rate, the Malaysian Base Lending Rate was used instead. A similar rate was
used by Drew and Veeraraghavan (2002) in their examination of size and value premia for Malaysian
market.
127
Chapter 5 - Research design 1: Market-based performance
returns on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks, constructed
independently from the book-to-market value portfolio,'
HMLt = the monthly return on the zero investment portfolio for the book-to-market
equity factor in stock returns, namely the diference between the return on a
portfolio of high book-to-market ratio stocks and the return on a portfolio of
low book-to-market ratio stocks, constructed independently from the size
portfolios.
In order to construct the mimicking portfolios for the size and book-to-market equity
factors, the present study followed the procedure used in Fama and French (1993). Size
was calculated as the share price times the number of shares, while the book-to-market
ratio was calculated as book common equity (Datastream item 305) for the fiscal year
ending in calendar year t- 1, divided by market equity at the end of December of year
t- 1. In June of each year, t, from 1992 to 2000, 'all KLSE stocks on the Datastream
database were ranked by size. The median size value was then used to split the KLSE
stocks into two groups, 'small' and 'big' (S and B). The present study also breaks the
KLSE stocks into three book-to-market equity (BE/ME) groups, based on the bottom
30% (low), middle 40% (Medium), and top 30% (High) of the ranked values of BE/ME.
During portfolio formation, companies that had negative book value were excluded
because they lack meaningful explanations (Drew and Veeraraghavan, 2002). The
present study then forms six value-weighted portfolios, (SIL, SIM, SIR, BIL, BIM, BIH)
as the intersections of the size and book-to-market ratio groups. This indicates that
companies that are included in the portfolio are companies that have both market
capitalisation and book-to-market ratio figures. For example, BIH is the
value-weighted return on the portfolio of stocks that are above the KLSE median in size
and in the top 30% of book- to-market ratio.
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The monthly value-weighted returns on the six portfolios were calculated from July of
year t to June of year t+ 1. Due to lack of data on book to market value for years 1990
and 1991 the portfolio could only be formed in 1992. On the first porfolio formation
date, June 1992, size and book-to-market value data were available for 41 KLSE
companies and, by June, 2000, for 671 KLSE companies. Then 5MB is calculated as
5MB = (S / L + S / M + S / H) / 3 - (B / L + B / M + B / H) / 3, and HML is calculated as
HML = (S / H + B / H) / 2 - (S / L + B / L) /2. The intercept a was then used to
measure the mean monthly abnormal return of the calendar-time portfolios of IPO
companies, and should be equal to zero under the null hypothesis of no abnormal
performance.
5.4.1.3 Cross-sectional analysis oflong run stock market performance
Besides examining the long run stock market per(ormance using several benchmarks,
the present study also investigates the cross-sectional pattern of this performance by
categorising the sample of IPO companies based on the year of listing, the industrial
sector classification, the board of listing, the size measured by market capitalisation, the
type of companies - either private or privatisation, the gross proceeds raised, and the
initial returns. Since the buy-and-hold returns measures are more relevant for investors
(Fama, 1998; Teoh et aI, 1998a), the cross-sectional analysis is based only on this
measure.
A paired sample Hest was used to determine whether there is a significant difference
between the mean values of the buy-and-hold returns between IPO companies and
benchmarks within each category. The binomial proportionality test statistic was also
employed to test whether the percentage (P) of IPO companies underperforming their
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benchmark is different from what would be expected by chance (i.e. 50%). The test
statistic z (assumed to be normally distributed) is calculated as:
z = (Po - 0.5) * (n + 0.25)X (5.23)
where:
Po = percentage of underperformance;
n = number of paired IPO-benchmark comparisons
The critical z values are 2.575, 1.960, and 1.645 at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, using a
two-tailed test.
5.5 Summary
This chapter explains the research design employed to examme the share pnce
performance of Malaysian IPOs. Data sources and sample selection for individual
companies, together with size-matched companies and market benchmarks, are
explained. The distribution of the final sample is then described based on the year of
listing. It has been argued (e.g., Fama, 1998; Ritter, 2003; Gompers and Lerner, 2003)
that the conflicting results found in prior studies may have been caused by
methodological differences in the identification of long run returns. Consequently, the
present study uses several methods for measuring returns, different benchmarks to
adjust the returns, and appropriate statistical tests to test the significance of the
abnormal returns. The variety of methods provides a robustness test for the findings
and is also motivated by the ongoing discovery of biases in event studies involving long
horizon returns. The variables employed to investigate the cross-sectional pattern of
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long run performance are also identified. The following chapter provides the results of
the stock market performance.
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Chapter 6
Results on stock market performance
6.1 Introduction
The present chapter provides evidence on the share price performance of Malaysian
IPOs and is divided into four sections. The first presents a description of the
composition of the sample by year and board of listing, sector, type of IPOs, and gross
proceeds raised. The descriptive statistics of the market value and gross proceeds raised
are also provided. The second presents the initial returns to shareholders, while the
third provides evidence on the long run share price performance of IPO companies
based on two approaches: event-time and calendar-time. The third section also presents
the cross-sectional pattern in the long-run performance of IPOs based on the
buy-and-hold return measure. The long run performance is analysed by categorising
the sample of IPO companies by year of listing, sector, board of listing, size, type of
companies - private or privatisation, gross proceeds, and initial returns. The final
section concludes the current chapter.
6.2 Composition of companies
6.2.1 Composition by year and board of listing
Figure 6.1 displays the annual number of listed IPOs used as a sample in the current
study for each calendar year during 1990 to 2000 by board of listing. As seen from
Figure 6.1, most IPOs occurred during the period from 1993 to mid-1997, which
coincided with an economic boom in Malaysia prior to the East Asian crisis. A high
volume of IPOs occurred in the years 1996 and 1997 and a low volume occurred in the
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year 1999. Heavy issuance activity in 1996 and 1997 was associated with a bull market
while small issuance activity in 1999 was associated with a bear market.
As shown in Figure 6.1, most IPO companies sought a listing on the Second Board of
the KLSE. There has been an increasing trend in the number of newly listed companies
on the Second Board since 1990, which peaked at 62 in 1997. However, there was a
sharp decline after 1997, corresponding to the period of the economic crisis that hit
Asian countries from mid 1997 to the third quarter of 1999. Of the final sample, 139
IPOs are listed on the Main Board, while 315 are from smaller companies listed on the
Second Board.
Figure 6.1 The composition of IPO companies by year and board of listing
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6.2.2 Composition by KLSE sector
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of IPOs by sector based on the KLSE industrial
classification. The distribution was relatively concentrated on the Industrial Products
sector, the Trading/Services sector and the Consumer Products sector with 182 IPOs, 99
IPOs and 82 IPOs, respectively. The lowest number of IPOs occurred in the Hotel
sector.
Table 6.1 Distribution of IPOs by KLSE sector classification
Number
Main Board Second Board Total 0/0
Construction 13 35 48 10.6
Consumer Products 15 67 82 18.1
Hotel 2 0 2 0.4
Industrial Products 42 140 182 40.1
Plantations 8 2 10 2.2
Properties 24 4 28 6.2
Technology 2 3 0.7
Trading/Services 34 65 99 21.8
Number of companies 139 315 454 100.0
6.2.3 Composition by types of IPOs
Figure 6.2 shows the sample distribution of IPOs by types across time between 1990
and 2000. Prior to 1997, the most frequent types ofIPO were offers for sale, while the
mixed offerings became more popular in 1996 and 1997. Public offers were less
popular prior to 1996, but become more common in later years.
134
Chapter 6 - Results I: Market-based performance
Figure 6.2 The composition of IPO companies by types of IPOs
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6.2.4 Composition by gross proceeds
Table 6.2 reports the gross proceeds raised from IPOs. The gross proceeds raised by the
sample ofIPO companies during the period 1990 to 2000 was RM16,916 milion, with
RM4,713 millon, RM7,644 millon, and RM4,559 milion raised from public offerings,
offers for sale and mixed offerings respectively. The highest total gross proceeds was
RM3,590 milion in 1992 while the lowest was RM526 milion in 1991. However,
there were no gross proceeds raised from public offers in 1991 and 1993, or from offers
for sale in 2000. Among the sample of IPO companies, Tenaga Nasional Berhad (a
utilties industry privatisation IPO) raised the largest amount (RM2,813 milion) while
Len Brothers (a private IPO from the basic industry sector) the lowest (RM3.3 milion).
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Table 6.2 Gross proceeds raised by types of IPOs, 1990-2000
Year Public offers Offers for sale Mixed offerings Total
(in mìlion RM) (in mìlion RM) (in mìlion RM) (in mìlion RM)
1990 144.3 2,807.4 776 3,029.3
1991 0.0 488.1 38.0 526.1
1992 2,828.8 508.1 253.3 3,590.2
1993 0.0 536.5 123.9 660.5
1994 52.7 1,046.1 97.2 1,96.0
1995 151. 461.5 184.1 796.6
1996 279.0 1,082.5 628.0 1,989.6
1997 461. 581. 1,389.8 2,432.8
1998 41.0 125.1 645.0 811.0
1999 229.4 6.9 726.8 963.2
2000 525.1 0.0 395.6 920.7
Total 4,712.7 7,643.9 4,559.3 16,916.0
Note:
The gross proceeds data are in nominal values, without adjustment for inflation.
6.2.5 Descriptive statistics
Table 6.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the market value at the time of listing and
gross proceeds. The data is expressed in constant 2002 RM, adjusted using the
Consumer Price Index. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C of Table 6.3 report the
descriptive statistics for all 454 IPOs, 139 IPOs listed on the Main Board, and 315 IPOs
listed on the Second Board, respectively.
The mean market value for 454 IPOs is RM384.72 milion. The lowest and highest
market value at the time of listing for 454 IPOs are RMO.ii milion (a private IPO
company named Suiwah Corporation Bhd) and RM36,166.1 1 million (a privatisation
IPO company named Tenaga Nasional Bhd), respectively. On average, IPO companies
listed on the Main Board have a higher market value of RM907.24 milion, within the
range of RM82.89 milion to RM36,166.1 1 milion. On the other hand, compared to
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IPOs listed on the Main Board, IPO companies listed on the Second Board have a lower
mean market value of RM1 54. 1 5 milion, with the highest and lowest market values
being RMO.ii milion and RM1,112.67 milion, respectively. The highest gross
proceeds of RM3,875.23 million were raised by the same privatisation company,
Tenaga Nasional Bhd, while the lowest gross proceeds of RM4.28 milion were raised
by Comsa Farms Bhd, a private company listed on the Second Bo~rd.
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics of market value and gross proceeds
Variable Mean StDev Minimum Median Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A: All IPOs (n=454)
Real market value at the time of 384.72 1,907.93 0.1 1 165.83 36,166.1 1 16.34 289.29
listing (in milion RM)
Real gross proceeds (in milion 47.45 246.07 4.28 18.90 3,875.23 14.42 213.20
RM)
Panel B: Main Board (n=139)
Real market value at the time of 907.24 3,394.50 82.89 387.99 36,166.1 1 9.15 89.69
listing (in milion RM)
Real gross proceeds (in million 113.43 438.20 6.38 42.49 3,875.23 8.00 64.58
RM)
Panel C: Second Board (n=315)
Real market value at the time of 154.15 115.51 0.11 116.64 1,112.67 2.99 16.40
listing (in million RM)
Real gross proceeds (in milion 18.34 1378 4.28 14.99 121.9 3.31 15.94
RM)
Note:
Real value is expressed in constant 2002 RM, adjusted using the Consumer Price Index.
6.3 Initial returns
Panel A of Table 6.4 presents the descriptive statistics of raw initial returns and
market-adjusted initial returns for the sample of 454 Malaysian IPO companies listed
from January 1990 to December 2000. The initial returns for each board oflisting are
also reported. The overall raw initial returns to shareholders range from a low of
-53.85% to a high of 400%. The minimum initial return is reported in 1998 by a
company called Waste Water Engineering (M) Bhd, which was listed on the Second
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Board of the KLSE on 12 January, 1998. The offer price for this company was RM3.90
and its closing price on the first day of listing was RM1 .80, which generated a negative
initial return of -53.85%. The maximum initial raw return of 400% was reported in
1996 and 1997 by two companies named Transocean Holdings Bhd and Magna Prima
Berhad, which were both listed on the Second Board of the KLSE on 28 March, 1996
and 16 January, 1997. The offer price for Transocean Holdings ,Bhd was RM2.10 and
its closing price on the first day of listing was RM10.50. Meanwhile, the offer price for
Magna Prima Berhad was RM2.50 and its closing price on the first day of listing was
RM12.50, which both produced positive initial returns of 400%.
During the period 1990 to 2000, the overall mean raw initial returns and mean abnormal
initial returns were 95.16% and 95.97%, which are consistent with previous findings on
the high level of underpricing in Malaysia. For example, 166.67% is reported by
Dawson (1987), 167.4% by Yong (1991), 80.3% by Loughran et aL. (1994), 61.8% by
Paudyal et aL. (1998), and 99.04% by Jelic et al. (2001). As estimated by the market
adjusted returns model, the mean abnormal initial return is statistically significant at the
1 % level with a t-statistic of 23.58, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no
abnormal return to IPO companies shareholders who purchase the shares on the offering
date and sell them on the first day of trading. Both raw initial returns and
KLCI-adjusted initial returns are 'positively skewed'.
Since the sample of companies consists of both private and privatisation IPOs (PIPOs),
Panels Band C of Table 6.4 report the results for private and PIPOs, respectively. PIPO
companies produce slightly higher initial returns than the private IPO companies (both
raw and abnormal) but the difference is not statistically significant. The higher initial
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Table 6.4 Raw and abnormal initial returns' for 454 Malaysian IPOs, listed in 1990-2000
Raw inital returns Market-adjusted initial returns
Main Second All Main Second All
Board Board Board Board
Panel A: All IPOs
Mean 88.48' 98.11' 95.16' 88.99' 99.04' 95.97'
Standard deviation 78.77 91.0 88.04 76.22 90.92 86.72
Minimum -37.20 -53.85 -53.85 -16.36 -3708 -3708
Median 78.46' 74.78' 76.49' 78.81' 76.34' 7739'
Maximum 386.84 400.00 400.00 390.90 400.10 400.10
Skewness 1.0 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.22 1.25
Kurtosis 1.46 1.21 1.6 1.80 1.25 1.47
Number of companies 139 315 454 139 315 454
Panel B: Private IPOs
Mean 85.07' 98.11' 94.51' 85.58' 99.04' 95.33'
Standard deviation 76.87 91.80 88.04 74.04 90.92 86.71
Minimum
-37.20 -53.85 -53.85 - 1 6.36 -3708 -3708
Median 7143' 74.78' 74.29' 74.81' 76.34' 76.23'
Maximum 386.84 400.00 400.00 390.90 400.10 400.10
Skewness 1.21 1.9 1.22 1.4 1.22 1.28
Kurtosis 1.93 1.1 1.44 2.34 1.25 1.56
Number of companies 120 315 435 120 315 435
Panel C: Privatisation IPOs
Mean 1l0.00' na 1l0.00' 110.50' na 1l0.50'
Standard deviation 89.00 na 89.00 87.90 na 87.90
Minimum 0.00 na 0.00 4.00 na 4.00
Median 114.50' na 114.50' II LOO' na II LOO'
Maximum 325.00 na 325.00 323.90 na 323.90
Skewness 0.61 na 0.61 0.72 na 0.72
Kurtosis 0.26 na 0.26 0.36 na 0.36
Number of companies 19 na 19 19 na 19
t-stat for private IPa and
-1.287 na -0.752 -1.29 na -0.748PIPO difference
z-stat for private IPa and
- 1.80 na -0.877 -1.34 na -0.830PIPO difference
Note:
, Significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level, using a two-tailed test. The parametric I-test is used for means and the
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is used for the medians. The difference in mean and median initial returns between private lPOs and
privatisation IPOs is based on the independent I-test and the Mann- Whitney U test.
. The initial return is defined as the return from the offering price to the closing price on the first day of listing. The
market-adjusted initial return is defined as the initial raw return minus the return on the KL Composite Index (KLCI) during the
corresponding period.
A
na = not applicable as all PIPOs listed on the Main Board.
returns to PIPO shareholders are consistent with the result observed by Paudyal et al.
(1998). However, they found the difference between 18 PIPOs and 77 private IPOs
listed during 1984 to 1995 was statistically significant at the 5% leveL. The insignificant
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result observed in the present study may be due to the different time period examined
and the small number of PIPOs relative to private IPOs.
The long run returns are discussed next.
6.4 Long run returns
This section presents the results of the analyses of the stock market performance of
Malaysian IPOs in the three-year period following listing. It is interesting to investigate
the long run performance of IPOs for investors who purchase the shares on the first day
of listing, as few investors are able to purchase shares at the subscription price because
of the high over-subscription rate. The results are presented in two parts. The first
provides the results from the event-time approach, while the second presents those from
the calendar-time approach.
6.4.1 Event-time approach
6.4.1.1 Cumulative mean abnormal returns (CARs)
Matched company benchmark
Table 6.5 reports the cumulative mean matched company-adjusted returns (CAR1,D for
the first 12 months, and for months 18, 24, 30 and 36 after the listing date for 452 IPOs
occurring between 1990-2000, with the number of IPOs reported in Column 2. For
completeness, the mean monthly abnormal return (ARD is also reported. Two
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companies were excluded from the original sample of 454 as these companies67 had
extremely high market capitalisations, which made it impractical to match them with
other companies with similar characteristics. The share price data was last collected on
7 July, 2003. As a result, the number of companies having the full 36 months of returns
is less than the total number of companies in the sample. Column 5 reports the CARs
calculated by equal-weighting, with the associated t-statistics in Column 6. Column 9
presents the CARs obtained from the value-weighting scheme, with the t-statistic in
Column 10.
Table 6.5 Cumulative equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) mean
abnormal returns adjusted for a size-matched company
Month of Nnmber of Equally-weighted Value-weighted
seasoning companies t-stattrading
i 452 -0.52 -0.43
-1.07
2 452 1.65 1.62 1.49
3 452 -0.59 -0.57
-1.47
4 452 1.63c 1.0 0.40
5 452 0.40 0.47 0.13
6 452 1.60 1.58
-0.29
7 452 2.13b 2.00 1.29
8 452 1.83 1.55 2.19
9 452 0.06 0.07
-0.36 -0.39
io 452 -0.47 -0.44 0.25 0.24
11 452 -1.44 -1.55
_2.iob -2.25
12 452 -0.84 -0.87
-0.64 -0.66
18 452 -2.41'
-0.91
-4.58'c -1.3
24 452 -1.48 -0.59
-1.24 -0.50
30 452 -3.96c -1.67
-2.56 -1.02
36 433 2.84 1.09 0.18 0.07
Note:
a, b, andc
Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
, This is the CAR with the associated t-statistics over the 6 month period.
67 The two companies are Syarikat Telekom Malaysia Bhd, listed on 7 November, 1990 with a market
capitalisation of RM13,793.5 milion and Tenaga Nasional Bhd, listed on 28 May, 1992 with a market
capitalisation of RM29,850 millon. Both companies were government-owned companies which were
privatised by means of an IPO.
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It is evident that the equally-weighted CARs are significant from months 6 to 11. The
highest CAR, of 8.20%, occurs in the ninth month of seasoning (t-stat = 2.67). The
CARs fall to 0.43% by the end of month 36, although this slight overperformance is not
statistically significant (t-stat = 0.07). The null hypothesis that the cumulative mean
abnormal return over the 36-month interval is equal to zero is thus accepted. The results
from the equally-weighted CARs indicate that while the Malay,sian IPOs temporarily
overperform their matched companies in the first year of seasoning, on average they do
not display any abnormal performance over the three-year horizon.68 This finding is
consistent with the results reported by Jelic et aL. (2001) concerning the long run
performance of Malaysian IPOs, using matched companies as a benchmark with
equally-weighted returns.
When value-weighted abnormal returns are calculated, the reported CARs are much
lower, falling to -8.16% by the end of month 36. these lower CARs indicate that large
IPO companies perform less well than smaller IPO companies. However, these CARs
are not statistically significant (t-stat = - 1.30).
The results of the CARs by using market benchmarks are discussed next.
68 As a robustness check, the present study also calculates the cumulative abnormal return for each
company at months 12,24 and 36. The minimum cumulative abnormal returns for individual companies
at months 12,24, and 36 are found to be -279.87%, -301.8%, and -246.14%, respectively. On the other
hand, the maximum cumulative abnormal returns for individual companies at months 12, 24, and 36 are
found to be 241.80%,291.87%, and 389.12%, respectively. The median, mean, and 5% trimmean value
of cumulative abnormal returns for companies that have a full set of 36 monthly returns are all similar
(1.35%, -0.11 %, and -1.12%, respectively), indicating that the results are not driven by outliers.
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Market benchmark
(1) KL Composite Index (KLCI)
Table 6.6 presents the long run stock market performance of Malaysian IPOs estimated
by the market adjusted returns modeL. It reports the CARs adjusted for the KL
Composite Index for the 36 months after the listing date for the full sample of 454 IPOs.
As observed in Column 5, there is a steady increase in the equally-weighted CARs
Table 6.6 Cumulative equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) mean abnormal
returns adjusted for the main market benchmark (KL Composite Index)
Month of Number of Value-weighted
seasoning companies I-stattrading
1 454 -0.81 -0.73
-0.51
2 454 2.69" 3.13 3.14" 3.65
3 454 1.01 1.9 2.10" 2.91
4 454 1.68b 2.02 0.84 1.01
5 454 -0.86 -1.25
-2.36" -3.45
6 454 2.07b 2.55 0.99 1.21
7 454 1.41 1.50 2.37b 2.52
8 454 2.85" 3.26 1.40 1.60
9 454 1.02 1. 1
-2.44" -3.14
10 454 1.53b 2.10 0.78 1.07
11 454 -1.0 -1.57
-2.39" -3.1
12 454 0.46 0.64
-2.67" -3.66
18 454 6.40'" 3.22 6.07'" 3.05
24 454 3.54c 1.82
-2.46 -1.27
30 454 3.58c 2.00
-3.9ib -2.19
36 435 7.1 5a 3.28
-0.14 -0.07
Nole:
a, b, and c
Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
. This is the CAR with the associated I-statistics over the 6 month period.
when the main market index is used as the benchmark. After a slight decrease in the
first month of seasoning, the CARs turn positive in the second month with a value of
1.88% (t-stat = 1.64) and increase gradually to 32.63% (t-stat = 6.58) by the end of
month 36. This overperformance is lower than that reported by Corhay et aL. (2002),
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who found a cumulative equally-weighted mean market-adjusted return of 41.71 % over
the three years from the listing day for a sample of 258 Malaysian IPOs during the
period 1992 to 1996. However, the overperformance found in the present study is
higher than that reported by Jelic et al. (2001) who found a three-year cumulative
equally-weighted mean market-adjusted return of 24.83% for 182 Malaysian IPOs
between 1980 and 1995. These differences reflect the number of companies employed
in the present study that comprises a large number of Second Board listed companies
(315 IPOs) as compared to 184 IPOs and no Second Board IPOs, used by Corhay et aL.
(2002) and Jelic et aL. (2001), respectively.
It is of interest to note that when the value-weighted scheme is used to produce the
abnormal returns for the present study, the CARs drop to 0.75% by the end of month 36.
However, this slight overperformance is not statistically significant, which indicates that
there is no significant difference between the pertormance of IPO companies and the
market benchmarks in the three years after the IPOs. The results clearly show that the
long run performance measure is sensitive to the weighting scheme employed to
calculate abnormal returns. The lower reported CARs when the value-weighting is used
supports the initial view of the present study that large IPO companies perform less well
than small IPO companies, as discussed in Section 6.5 below. The next section
discusses the long run performance when the EMAS/Second Board Index is used as the
market benchmark.
(2) EMAS/Second Board Index
As a final check on the robustness of the results using a market benchmark, the results
using the alternative market benchmarks are now reported. Due to the fact that IPO
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companies are listed either on the Main Board or the Second Board of the KLSE, the
appropriate board indices are now used as the benchmark portfolio, i.e. each Main
(Second) Board IPO is compared with the EMAS (Second Board) index return.
Table 6.7 reports the cumulative mean EMAS/Second Board Index-adjusted returns for
the 36 months after the listing date for 454 Malaysian IPOs in the period 1990-2000. It
is evident from Column 5, following a small negative return in the first month, the
equally-weighted CAR turns positive and, by the end of 36 months of seasoning, reaches
a value of 31.15%, which is statistically significant at the 1 % leveL. This is consistent
with the reported value for the equally-weighted CAR when the KL Composite Index is
used as a benchmark. The value-weighted CAR using the alternative market benchmark
(board indices) is lower and insignificant, reaching 4.05% by the end of month 36, again
consistent with the results in Table 6.6.
Overall, the results of the present study are in agreement with the results concerning
Malaysian IPOs reported in Jelic et aL. (2001) as well as in Kim et aL. (1995) for IPOs in
Korea. However, the results differ from those emanating from the US reported by
Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Gompers and Lerner (2003) and the UK
results reported by Levis (1993), Khurshed et aL. (1999), among others. These
comparisons are based on the equally-weighted analysis, which is mainly adopted in
prior studies. From inspection of the data, all of the sample IPOs of the present study
survived three years after listing, in contrast to the finding of Gompers and Lerner
(2003), who report that around 29% of their IPOs were delisted prior to the third
anniversary. Therefore, the results of the present study are free from any 'survivorship
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bias' .69 The difference in the percentage of surviving compames after listing may
provide a reason for the different findings for Malaysia compared to other markets.
This suggests that the performance of Malaysian IPOs might be better because they
survive for up to three years without being suspended, liquidated or taken over. In
contrast, Bhabra and Pettway (2003) report that their sample of failed US IPO
companies, which were delisted due to financial distress, showed significant
Table 6.7 Cumulative equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) mean
abnormal returns adjusted for the alternative market benchmark
(EMAS or Second Board Index)
Month of Number of Equally-weighted Value-weighted
seasoning companies
ARt t-stat ARt t-stattrading
(%) (%)
1 454 -0.21 -0.20
-0.26 -0.25
2 454 2.79' 3.62 3.22' 4.17
3 454 0.90 1.43 2.27' 3.60
4 454 1.90" 2.67 0.84 1.8
5 454 0.66 1.06
-1.2b -2.44
6 454 2.51' 3.32 0.67 0.89
7 454 2.35" 2.93 3.19' 3.97
8 454 2.46' 3.30 1.49b 1.99
9 454 0.58 0.91
-2.33'
-3.63
10 454 1.28b 2.00 1.20' 1.88
11 454
-1.4' -1.84
-2.36" -3.80
12 454 0.20 0.34
-2.87" -4.86
18 454 3.93'b 2.26 6.88" 3.94
24 454 4.64" 2.83
-0.95 -0.58
30 454 2.31 1.52
-4.67' -3.09
36 435 5.98' 3.12
-0.74 -0.39
underperformance compared to non-failed companies.
a, b, and c
Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
. This is the CAR with the associated I-statistics over the 6 month period.
69 Survivorship bias results from the exclusion of failed companies and those absorbed into other
companies by acquisition.
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The CARs figures in Table 6.5, Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 are plotted in Figure 6.3 and
Figure 6.4. Figure 6.3 plots the equally-weighted CARs, while Figure 6.4 plots the
value-weighted CARs of 454 Malaysian IPOs listed in 1990-2000, with monthly
rebalancing. Three series are plotted for the 36 months after the listing date: (i)
Matched company-adjusted; (ii) KLCI-adjusted; and (iii) EMAS/Second Board
Index-adjusted. The matched company-adjusted series is constrllcted from the sample
of 452 IPOs after excluding two outliers.
Figure 6.3 Cumulative equally-weighted mean abnormal returns
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Focusing first on Figure 6.3, it can be observed that the two market-adjusted CARs
display similar patterns, which can be attributed to similar performances by the two
indices. The matched company-adjusted CARs have a quite different pattern to those
derived from the other benchmarks, peaking at 8.20% in month nine and hovering
around zero from months 20 to 36. This result indicates that IPO companies do not
significantly underperform or overperform non-IPO companies of similar size in the
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long run. The results displayed in Figure 6.3 are consistent with other long horizon
returns studies in that long run performance is sensitive to the benchmark employed.
Figure 6.4 plots the same returns as those shown in Figure 6.3, but uses the
value-weighting scheme. It is noticeable that the CARs for all benchmarks show a
decline in performance over the three years after listing. Both of the cumulative mean
market-adjusted returns show a parallel pattern of increasing and decreasing values over
time. The CARs using the KLCI is lower than the CARs using the EMAS/Second Board
Index, but both remain above zero at month 36. The matched company-adjusted CARs
exhibit a decreasing value over time and fall to below zero at month 36. Overall, when
the value-weighting scheme is employed, IPO companies insignificantly overperform
relative to their market benchmarks, but also insignificantly underperform relative to
size-matched companies for the entire 36 month window.
Figure 6.4 Cumulative value-weighted mean abnormal returns
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Gompers and Lerner (2003, p. 1358) point out that the CAR method tends to
misrepresent performance when returns are highly volatile. Therefore, further evidence
on the long run performance of Malaysian IPOs is presented in the next section using
buy-and-hold abnormal returns and wealth relative measures.
6.4.1.2 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and wealth relatives
This section reports the second and third measures of long run performance using
matched company benchmark and market benchmarks.
Further evidence on the long run stock market performance of Malaysian IPOs is
presented in Tables 6.8 and 6.9. These tables report the equally-weighted and
value-weighted mean one-, two-, and three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHARs) and wealth relatives for the 454 compani~s that went public during the period
1990 to 2000, using size-matched companies, the KL Composite Index and the
EMAS/Second Board Index, respectively.
Matched company benchmark
Table 6.8 reports the long run stock market performance using matched companies as a
benchmark. The number of sample companies is less than 452 in the third year because
the returns data were last collected from Datastream on 7 July, 2003. Therefore, those
companies that have full 36 monthly returns is only 433. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C
report the mean raw returns, abnormal returns and wealth relatives, respectively.
The equally-weighted mean raw IPO returns for one-, two-, and three-year holding
period are 12.36%, 33.30%, and 34.32%, respectively. Meanwhile, the mean raw
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size-matched company returns for one-, two-, and three-year holding periods are
13.48%, 32.08%, and 36.33%, respectively. Therefore, the size-matched
company-adjusted benchmarks produce equally-weighted mean BHARs of -1.12%,
1.22%, and -2.01 % for one-, two-, and three-year holding periods, respectively. The
mean one-year BHARs underperformance is insignificant (t-statistic = -0.22), which is
also true of the corresponding one-year wealth relative C?f 0.99. The small
underperformance in year one does not continue in year two. Over a two-year window,
the mean BHARs are positive but not statistically significant (t-statistic = 0.16), while
the wealth relative increases to 1.01. However, the overall three-year wealth relative
presented in the table decreases to 0.99, which is also reflected in the negative three
year mean BHARs of -2.01. This slight underperformance ofIPO companies relative to
a matching company, matched by market capitalisation, is, however, not statistically
significant (t-statistic = -0.27). This indicates that, on average, investors buying IPO
,
shares on the first day of listing and holding them for a three-year period cannot
generate significant abnormal returns. This result is consistent with that of Jelic et aL.
(2001), who found that their sample of 182 Malaysian IPO companies between 1980
and 1995 on average seem to insignificantly underperform their matched companies
after three years.
The value-weighted mean BHARs for one-, two-, and three-years are all negative but not
statistically significant. This result is consistent with that obtained using the
value-weighted CAR measure, which produces a greater fall in returns, indicating that
the performance of large IPO companies is inferior to that of small IPO companies.
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Table 6.8 Mean one-, two- and three-year raw returns, buy-and-hold abnormal
returns and wealth relatives using size-matched companies
Equally-weighted Value-weighted
I-year 2-year 3-year 1 -year 2-year 3-year
Panel A: Mean raw buy-and-hold returns (%)
LPO company 12.36 33.30 34.32 -3.96 -4.60 -3.0
Matched company 13.48 32.08 36.33 -1.5 -2.28 6.81
Panel B: Mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns (%)
Matched company-adjusted
-1.2 1.2 -2.01 -2.82 -2.32
-10.21
t-statistic
-0.22 0.16 -0.27 -0.56 -0.30 -1.6
Panel C: Wealth relatives
Matched company-adjusted 0.99 LOI 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.90
Number of companies 452 452 433 452 452 433
Market benchmarks: KL Composite Index and EM AS/Second Board Index
This section reports the long run return when market benchmarks are used. Results
using the main market indices are reported first and are followed by the results using the
board indices.
It has been confirmed by prior studies (e.g., Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995;
Gompers and Lerner, 2003) that the long run performance measure is sensitive to the
benchmark employed. Apart from reporting the returns on IPO companies relative to
the returns on matching companies of the same market capitalisation, the present study
also reports mean raw returns, buy-and-hold abnormal returns and wealth relatives
using the Malaysian main market indices (KL Composite Index) and board indices
(EMAS/Second Board Index).
With regard to the alternative market benchmarks, Table 6.9 reveals the absence of any
underperformance over the three year period, irrespective of the market benchmarks
employed when BHARs are calculated using the equally-weighted weighting scheme.
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Rather, Panel B shows overperformance with equally-weighted mean one-, two-, and
three-year BHARs when the KL Composite Index is used as the market benchmark of
11.61%,21.10%, and 17.86%, respectively, statistically significant at the 1% leveL.
However, when the value-weighted scheme is employed, the three-year mean BHARs
are significantly negative.
Table 6.9 Mean one-, two-, and three-year raw returns, buy-and-hold abnormal
returns and wealth relatives using alternative market benchmarks
Equal-weighted Value-weighted
I-year 2-year 3-year I-year 2-year 3-year
Panel A: Mean raw buy-and-hold returns (%)
IPO company 12.50 33.59 34.74 5.36 23.17 25.64
KL Composite Index 0.89 12.49 16.88 3.61 19.9 39.87
EMAS/Second Board Index 3.63 17.84 19.88 5.11 19.86 39.60
Panel B: Mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns (%)
KL Composite Index-adjusted 11.61 21.0 17.86 1.4 3.88 -14.23
I-statistics 3.88a 3.64a 2.88a 0.59 0.67 -2.30b
Bootstrapped skewness-adjusted I-statistics 4.57a 4.93a 3.60a 0.63 0.76 -1. 76'
EMAS/Second Board Index-adjusted 8.87 15.75 14.86 0.25 3.30 -13.96
I-statistics 3.43a 3.0'7a 2.78a 0.10 0.65 -2.61"
Bootstrapped skewness-adjusted I-statistics 3.98a 4.17a 3.54a 0.12 0.75 -1.84'
Panel C: Wealth relatives
KL Composite Index-adjusted 1. 1 1.9 1.5 1.02 1.03 0.90
EMAS/Second Board Index-adjusted 1.09 1.3 1.2 1.00 1.03 0.90
Number of companies 454 454 435 454 454 435
Nole:
a, b, and, Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0,05, and 0.1 0 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
IPO companies are also found to overperform when the EMAS/Second Board Indices
are used as the market benchmarks. The equally-weighted mean one-, two-, and
three-year BHARs are found to be 8.87%, 15.75%, and 14.86% respectively, again all
statistically significant at the 1 % leveL. The BHARs increase in the second year but
decrease in the third year. Unsurprisingly, the wealth relatives all have a value greater
than 1.00 in each of the years, reflecting the fact that the IPO companies overperform
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both market benchmarks. However, consistent with the results reported for the KL
Composite Index, adjusted using the value-weighting schemes, the mean BHARs are
significantly negative after three years.
Comparing the results obtained using the CAR and BHAR methods, the reported long
run overperformance of Malaysian IPOs is much lower when BHARs are used.
Contrary to expectations, this indicates that the BHAR measure imparts a downward
bias in the long run, which does not support the arguments of Fama (1998), Mitchell
and Stafford (2000), and Gompers and Lerner (2003) that the BHAR method can
magnify under/overperformance, even if it occurs only in a single period.
Due to the severe skewness 70 of the distribution of BHARs, the bootstrapping method
suggested by Lyon et aL. (1999) was used to correct for this. The
bootstrapped-skewness adjusted t-statistics are repórted in Table 6.9 and show that the
results of equally-weighted buy-and-hold market adjusted returns are always significant
at the 1 % leveL. However, the significance level for three-year value-weighted BHARs
reduces to the 10% leveL.
Most prior studies (and the above discussion) rely on the arithmetic mean in making
inferences of long run stock market performance. However, median BHARs for one-,
two-, and three-years in the present study produce some conflicting results. The median
equally-weighted matched company-adjusted BHRs for one-, two-, and three-years are
70 The skewness of BHARs for one-, two-, and three-year holding periods when the main market index
(board indices) is used are all positive with a value of 2.84 (2.88), 6.04 (7.06), and 5.13 (5.81),
respectively.
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5.33%, 4.69%, and 1.09% respectively, but with just the one-year BHARs statistically
significant (at the 5% level). By contrast, the median BHARs for one-, two-, and
three-years for the main market index benchmark are all negative, with values of
-4.20%, - 13.46%, and - 18.61 % respectively, but with just the three-year median BHARs
statistically significant at the 10% leveL. Similarly, the median BHARs using board
indices as a benchmark are all negative with values of -1.49%, -2,.91%, and -7.06%, but
none of them are statistically significantly different.
These results based on the median suggest that IPO compames insignificantly
under! overperform the matched compames or market benchmarks in the three year
holding period. In summary, the results observed using the mean BHARs should be
viewed with the caveat that they are not only affected by the weighting scheme used to
compute the mean abnormal returns, but are also potentially affected by the distribution
of the data.71
6.4.2 Calendar-time approach
6.4.2.1 Fama-French (1993) three-factor time-series regressions
As a final robustness check, the calendar-time portfolio approach using the Fama and
French (1993) three-factor regression was also carried out. As noted by Gompers and
Lerner (2003), the three-factor regression model is 'a well-accepted method for testing
71 Confirmation the impact of outliers was also obtained by calculating the trimean value of BHARs. The
5% trimean value of the one-, two- and three-year KL Composite Index-adjusted BHRs gave the values of
6.80%, 10.03% and 7.29%, respectively. Meanwhile, the trimmean BHARs using board indices as a
benchmark gave the values of 5.25%,6.71 %,6.11 % over the same period, respectively. The significance
level of the three year BHARs reduce to 10% and 5% for KL Composite Index-adjusted and EMAS/SB
Index-adjusted, indicating that the results are driven by outlers.
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time series significance in the pattern of the long run returns' (p. 1384). Table 6.1 0
reports the results of the Fama-French (1993) three-factor time-series regressions. The
data for the dependent variable comprised monthly returns on IPO portfolios from July
1992 to December 2000, a total of 102 months. As indicated in Chapter 5, July 1992 is
the earliest month that can be analysed due to the lack of data on the book-to-market
value of equity. Monthly returns on the IPO portfolios over th~, preceding 36 months
were regressed on Rmt - Rjt, 5MB and HML. The maximum number of companies in the
IPO portfolio was 201, which occurred in September 1997. The minimum number of
companies was 73, which occurred in July 1992. The time-series regressions of
equally-weighted and value-weighted IPO portfolios were estimated using ordinary
least square (OLS) regressions (Panel A of Table 6.10) and weighted least square
(WLS) regressions (Panel B of Table 6.10).72 The intercept a from the regressions is
an indicator of the risk-adjusted performance of Malaysian IPOs. The results are
,
reported for situations where the 5MB and HML portfolios are purged, and are not
purged, of IPO companies that went public during the previous three years.
Focusing first on Panel A, when the 5MB and HML portfolios are not purged of IPO
companies that went public in the previous three years, the mean alpha for the Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model is 0.325% per month when equal-weighting is used.
This implies a three-year abnormal return of -11.70% (-0.325 x 36 months). However,
the t-statistic of -0.68 indicates that the mean monthly abnormal return is not
statistically significant. When the IPO portfolios are value-weighted (Column 3 of
72 White's heteroscedasticity tests have been performed for all regressions. All of 
the regressions are free
from the heteroscedasticity problem except when purged 8MB and HML portfolio are used under
equally-weighted IPO portfolios. Therefore, the reported t-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity
(White's correction).
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Panel A) they overperform by 32.7 basis points per month, implying a positive
three-year excess return of 11.78% (0.327 x 36 months). Once again, however, the
t-statistic of 0.81 indicates that this abnormal return is not statistically significant. In
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6.10, the results of similar regressions are reported, where the
5MB and HML portfolios were constructed after the deletion of all companies that had
made IPOs during the prior three years. The alphas for the ,equally-weighted and
value-weighted portfolios are -0.431% and 0.239%, respectively. As before, the low
reported t-statistics indicate that the alphas are not statistically significant.
Table 6.10 Fama-French (1993) three-factor time-series regressions
Rpt - Rft = a + ß(Rmt - Rft) + rSMBt + 5HMLt + &t
HML and 5MB portfolios are not purged ofIPO HML and 5MB portfolios are purged of ¡PO
companies companies
Equally-weighted Value-weighted Equally-weighted Value-weighted
Panel A: Ordinary least squares regression
a -0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.002
(-0.68) (0.81) (-0.79) (0.52)
ß 0.784 0.772 0.808 0.794(13.34)" (15.44)" (10.79)" (13.71)"
r 0.886 0.683 0.831 0.638
(13.30)" (13.0)" (8.46)" (9.53)"
5 0.093 -0.015 0.187 0.054
(0.93) (-0.1 5) (1.64) (0.51)
. R2 0.889 0.892 0.859 0.860Adjusted
Panel B: Weighted least squares regression
a -0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.004
(-1.04) (1.0) (-1.08) (0.76)
ß 0.802 0.768 0.836 0.794(15.92)" (15.32)" (12.86)" (14.14)"
r 0.945 0.715 0.919 0.690
(16.04)" (16.1 7)" (10.93)" (12.23)"
5 0.049 -0.002 0.123 0.061
(0.57) (-0.01) (1.33) (0.67)
. R2 0.919 0.910 0.890 0.882Adjusted
Note:
" Significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level, using a two-tailed test.
The i-statistics given in brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White's correction).
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Due to the fact that the Fama-French approach weights each month equally, any
underperformance wil be reduced if it is correlated with the number of IPOs in the
portfolios (Gompers and Lerner, 2003). Following the approach adopted by Gompers
and Lerner (2003), the present study also ran weighted least squares regressions, the
results of which are reported in Panel B of Table 6.10. The square root of the number
of IPOs in the IPO portfolios in each month was used as the weig1lt. Consistent with the
OLS regression results, the intercepts are negative when equally-weighted IPO
portfolios are used in both unpurged and purged regressions. On the other hand, the
intercepts are positive when value-weighted IPO portfolios are used in both unpurged
and purged regressions. However, the low t-statistics of the intercepts reported in all of
the regressions indicate that they are not significantly different from zero. These results
are in contrast with those obtained using the value-weighting scheme employed in the
event-time approach. One of the reasons for this is that, under the event-time approach
,
the weight is calculated using the market value at the time of listing, whereas under the
calendar-time approach the weight is based on the market value in each calendar month.
In summary, it can be concluded that the use of calendar-time analysis does not permit
the conclusion that Malaysian IPOs produce significant (either positive or negative)
abnormal returns.
6.5 Cross-sectional pattern of long run stock market performance
This section presents the cross-sectional pattern of long run stock market performance
by categorising the sample companies based on their year of listing on the KLSE,
industrial sector classification, board of listing, market capitalisation, type of company
(either private or PIPO), gross proceeds raised from the IPO, and initial returns. By
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breaking down the sample in this way, the source of variation in the underperformance
of IPOs due to a company's specific characteristics and broad economic characteristics
may be traced (Page and Reyneke, 1997). Due to the fact that the results of
equally-weighted and value-weighted BHARs usmg size-matched companies do not
differ very much, the present study reports only the results of the cross-sectional
analyses, based on equally-weighted BHARs.
6.5.1 Long run performance categorised by calendar year
Table 6.11 reports the equally-weighted mean three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHARs) for Malaysian IPO companies listed over the period 1990-2000, categorised
by year of listing. Column 2 of Table 6.11 provides the number of IPOs taking place
each year. Column 3 and Column 4 report the raw buy-and-hold returns on the IPO
companies and their matched companies, respect\vely. The BHARs are reported in
Column 5, calculated as the difference between the raw returns on the IPO companies
and the raw returns on the matched companies. The paired t-est is used to test for any
significant difference between the mean buy-and-hold returns of IPO companies and
their matched companies for each category. The table also reports the corresponding
wealth relatives in Column 7, and the fraction of IPO companies underperforming their
matched companies in Column 8. The binomial proportionality test statistic in Colunm
9 is used to test whether the fraction of IPO companies underperforming is significantly
different from 0.5.
It is evident from Table 6.11 that poor abnormal performance occurred for IPOs taking
place in the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1996, 1998, and 2000. Conversely, companies
listed in the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, and 1999 produced positive abnormal
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returns. However, the poor performance of companies listed in the years 1991, 1992
and 1998 are only weakly significant at the 10% leveL. Interestingly, companies listed
in the years 1994 and 1995 produce statistically significant overperformance at the 5%
level, which corresponds to an economic boom period in Malaysia. The two years also
produce high wealth relatives, of 1.39 and 1.49, respectively. The fraction of companies
underperforming in each of these two years is very low ar,d both fractions are
significantly different from 0.5 at the 1 % level, as shown by the z-statistics produced by
the binomial proportionality test. Furher analysis based on an ANOV A test shows that
at least one of the years is significantly different from the rest (p-value = 0.011).
Table 6.11 Long run performance categorised by calendar year
Year Number IPO Matched BHARs' Paired (- Wealth Fraction z-stat
ofIPOs BHRs (%) company (%) test stat relatives underBHRs (%) performing
1990 25 133.69 135.93 -2.24
-0.05 0.99 0.36
-1.40
1991 27 183.17 270.29
-87.12 -1.5 0.76 0.63 1.5
f1992 33 139.75 212.38
-7263 ~1.83 0.77 0.67 1.95
1993 37 209.16 185.83 23.33 0.46 1.08 0.43
-0.85
b d1994 54 54.30 11.07 43.23 2.43 1.9 0.26
-3.53
b d1995 41 -29.95
-52.89 22.94 1.81 1.49 0.29 -2.69
f1996 76 -63.59 -61.4
-2.05
-0.71 0.95 0.61 1.92
1997 77 -27.98
-37.28 9.30 1.7 1.5 0.48
-0.35
c f1998 27 -0.64 31.7
-32.01 -1.84 0.76 0.67 1.77
1999 19 13.13 1.60 11.3 0.72 1. 1 0.53 0.26
2000 17 -42.80
-35.71 -7.09 -0.37 0.89 0.53 0.25
All 433 34.32 36.33 -2.01
-0.27 0.99 0.48 0.83
Note:
a. b,andc Significant difference in returns between IPO and matching companies at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using
a two-tailed test.
d,e.andf Significantly different from 0.5 at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
. Oneway ANOVA test for mean differences for all years (F = 2.34, p-value = 0.01 i).
Overall, the results show that underperformance is not concentrated in years when there
are large numbers of IPOs, in contrast to the finding of Loughran and Ritter (1995), who
found that high underperformance existed in 'hot issue' periods. On the other hand, the
years when there are smaller numbers of IPOs tend to produce underperformance, and
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vice versa. Although Table 6.11 reports significant over/underperformance in particular
years, there is no significant over/underperformance for the overall sample period.
6.5.2 Long run performance categorised by company characteristics
Panel A of Table 6.12 categorises IPO companies at the time of listing by 'sector'
groups based on the KLSE sectoral classification. Inspection of Table 6.12 reveals a
wide variation in the long run performance of IPOs across sectors. IPO companies
classified under the Construction sector produced a mean three-year BHAR of 36.28%.
With a paired t-statistic of 1.78, the overperformance is weakly significant at the 10%
leveL. The overperformance in this sector is reflected in the high wealth relative of 1.25,
and also in the low fraction of IPO companies' returns which underperformed their
matched companies' returns, reported at only 27%. This fraction is significantly
different from 0.5 at the 1% leveL. The Consuiner Products sector, the Industrial
Products sector, and the Properties sector all show underperformance in the long run,
but the degree of underperformance is not statistically significant. The evidence from
Panel A of Table 6.12 indicates that the long run underperformance is not entirely
concentrated in particular sectors. The results are confirmed by performing an ANOVA
test, which indicates that none of the sectors has a statistically significant mean BHAR
from the others (F = 903, p-value = 0.493).
The long run performance of Malaysian IPOs is also categorised by their board of
listing at the time of issue. As exhibited in Panel B of Table 6.12, the IPO companies
that are listed on the Main Board of the KLSE slightly underperformed their matched
companies by 7.54%. However, the difference between the three-year BHRs of IPO
companies and their matched companies is not statistically significant. The
160
Chapter 6 - Results 1: Market-based performance
underperformance of IPO companies listed on the Main Board is confirmed by the
wealth relative measure of 0.94, indicating that the IPO companies listed on the Main
Board of the KLSE underperformed their matched company benchmarks.
Table 6.12 Long run performance categorised by company characteristics (sector,
board of listing, size, and type of company)
SectorlBoard of Number IPO Matched BHARs Paired t- Wealth Fraction z-stat
listing/Size ofIPOs BHRs company (%) test stat relatiyes under
(%) BHRs (%) performing
Panel A: Sector
Construction 48 83.92 47.64 36.28 l.78c 1.25 0.27 -3.l9d
Consumer 78 16.23 24.10
-7.87 -0.60 0.94 0.47
-0.53
Products
Industrial Products 173 12.76 25.86 -13.10 -1.6 0.90 0.53 0.79
Properties 28 32.34 40.44 -8.10 -0.23 0.94 0.57 0.74
Trading/Services 94 55.56 55.75 -0.19 -0.01 1.00 0.47
-0.58
All Other Sectors 12 102.65 59.93 42.72 1.9 1.27 0.50 0.00
Panel B: Board of listing 
Main Board 13 26.28 33.82 -7.54 -0.63 0.94 0.47
-0.61
Second Board 302 37.81 37.42 0.39 0.04 1.00 0.48
-0.69
Panel C: Size
Small 130 110.51 108.1 1 2.40 0.12 1.01 0.45 -1.4
Medium 173 21.8 17.99 3.39 0.35 1.03 0.43 -1.84f
Large 130 -24.65 -11.04
-13.61 -1.56 0.85 0.56 1.7
Panel D: Type of company
Private 416 35.92 38.55 -2.64 -0.34 0.98 0.48 -0.98
Privatisation 17 -4.76 -18.02 13.26 1.02 1.6 0.53 0.24
All 433 34.32 36.33 -2.01 -0.27 0.99 0.48 0.83
Note:
a, b, and c
Significant difference in returns between IPa and matching companies atthe 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using
a two-tailed test.
d, e, and f
Significantly different from 0.5 at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. The binomial
proportionality test statistic is used to test whether the fraction underperforming is significantly different from 0.5.
The IPO companies listed on the Second Board of the KLSE produced a slight
overperformance (0.39%), indicating that large IPO companies perform less well than
small IPO companies, which is consistent with the results observed when the
value-weighting scheme is employed for calculating both CARs and BHARs. The
wealth relative is 1.00, indicating that both IPO companies and their matched
companies produced similar returns in the long run. The insignificant results reported
for the paired t-est statistics and the binomial proportionality test statistics indicate that
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there is no difference in mean BHARs between IPO companies and their matched
companies for each board of listing. The p-value of 0.630 (t-stat = -0.483) obtained
from the two independent sample test indicates that there is an insignificant difference
between the mean BHARs for the two groups.
Panel C of Table 6.12 presents the long run performance categorised by company size,
measured by market value on the first day of listing. The samples were classified into
three sizes groups: small, medium, and large. To allocate companies into groups, the
market values were first sorted from low to high. Thirty percent of the sample
companies from the bottom were grouped as the small size set, 40% in the middle were
considered to be the medium size group, while the top 30% were considered to be the
large size one. The small size group comprised those IPO companies with a market
value of less than RM102.55 milion. The medium size consisted of those IPO
companies with a market value between RM10t55 million and RM260.85 milion,
while the large size comprised those IPO companies with a market value in excess of
RM264.85 milion.
As seen in Panel C of Table 6.12, the buy-and-hold return for IPO companies in the
small size group was 110.51 % and for matched companies was 108.11 %. On the other
hand, the buy-and-hold returns for IPOs and their matched companies in the large size
groups were -24.65% and - 11.04%, respectively. The low paired t-statistic for each size
group indicates that there are no significant differences in mean BHRs between issuing
companies and matched companies. Further analysis based on an ANOV A test shows
insignificant differences (F = 0.509, p-value = 0.602) among the three size groups. The
wealth relatives of 1.01 and 1.03 for the small and medium size groups indicates that the
IPO companies overperformed their matched companies in both groups, while the
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wealth relative of 0.85 in the large size one indicates that these IPO companies
underperformed their matched companies. The proportion underperforming is not
statistically significant for the small and large size groups but is weakly significant
(10% level) for the medium size one. These results confirm the earlier findings of low
CARs and BHARs when the value-weighting scheme is employed, indicating that small
companies perform better than large companies. However, the results of the present
study are in contrast to the results observed by Khurshed et al. (1999) on the UK
market. As can be seen in Table 6.12, the number of IPOs contained in the large size
group category (130) and in the Main Board listing category (131) are almost identicaL.
However, only 92 of the companies in the large size group are listed on the Main Board
of the KLSE, while 38 of these companies are listed on the Second Board. The mean
buy-and-hold returns for companies listed on the Main Board are thus different from the
returns of companies in the large size group.
Panel D of Table 6.12 reports the long run performance classified according to types of
IPO company, either private or privatisation IPOs. As shown in Panel D, the private
IPO companies slightly underperform their matched companies but the privatisation
IPO companies overperform their matched companies, with three-year BHARs of
-2.64% and 13.26%, respectively. However, the difference between the three-year
BHRs of IPO companies and their matched companies in each group is not statistically
significant. Further analysis based on a two sample t-est shows an insignificant
difference (t-stat = -0.41) between the three-year mean BHARs of private IPOs and
privatisation IPOs. The results of the present study contrast with those observed by
Paudyal et aL. (1998), who reported that Malaysian PIPOs generate an insignificant loss
of 7.46% over a three-year period after adjusting for the market benchmark. On the
other hand, they reported that Malaysian private IPOs generate an insignificant gain of
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12.85% over the same period. However, the difference between PIPOs and private
IPOs was statistically insignificant, consistent with the present study.
6.5.3 Long run performance categorised by issue characteristics
In Panel A of Table 6.13, companies are segmented by the gross proceeds raised by the
,.
offers, expressed in constant 2002 RM, by adjusting for the Consumer Price Index. In
Column 1 the gross proceeds are broken down into six categories, five of which display
long run underperformance. IPOs in the lowest gross proceeds category overperform,
with a statistically significant mean BHAR of 57.73%. The wealth relative of 1.41
reported in Column 7 indicates that these IPO companies overperform their matched
companies by 41%. The fraction of IPOs underperforming in the lowest gross proceeds
category is 39%, which is significantly different from 0.5 at the 10% leveL.
Examination of Panel A of Table 6.13 also revealSi'that the long run underperformance
is concentrated among those IPOs which raise higher gross proceeds. This is also
confirmed by the ANOVA test (F = 3.382, p-value = 0.005), indicating that at least one
of the gross proceeds groups has a significantly different mean BHAR from the others.
Finally, the results are categorised by the magnitude of the raw initial returns. The
initial returns are divided into three groups: low, medium and high. To create the
groups, the initial raw returns are ranked from lowest to highest. The lowest 30% of the
sample companies are categorised as the 'low' initial returns group, the 40% in the
middle are categorised as the 'medium' initial returns group, while the top 30% are
classified as the 'high' initial returns group. The low initial returs group comprised
those IPO companies with a raw initial return of less than 41%. The medium initial
returns group consisted of those IPO companies with a raw initial return of between
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41 % and 125%. The high initial returns group consisted of those IPO companies with a
raw initial return in excess of 125%.
Table 6.13 Long run performance categorised by issue characteristics (gross
proceeds and initial returns)
Number IPO Matched BHARs Paired t- Wealth Fraction z-stat
oflPOs BHRs company (%) test stat relatives under
(%) BHRs (%) performing
P~d A: Gro~ procæ~ ~n milwn RM)
4.3 - 9.9 79 100.04 42.31 57.73 2.42b 1.41 0.39 -1.96f
10.0 - 19.9 154 24.07 32.51 -8.44 -0.90 0.94 0.46 -0.99
20.0-29.9 80 37.75 75.18 -37.43 -1.6' 0.79 0.53 0.54
30.0- 49.9 62 11.8 12.66 -1.48 -0.08 0.99 0.47
-0.47
50.0 - 99.9 37 - 10.53 10.57 -21.0 -1.9 0.81 0.57 0.85
100.0 - 523.8 21 -3.44 9.16 -12.60 -0.68 0.88 0.62 1.0
Panel B: Initial returns (%)
Low 130 81.87 11 1.23 -29.36 -1.90' 0.86 0.52 0.46
Medium 173 44.40 37.36 7.04 0.60 1.05 0.46
-1.05
High 130 -26.65 -39.93 1328 1. 1 1.2 0.45 -1.4
All 433 34.32 36.33 -2.01 -0.27 0.99 0.48 0.83
Note:abandc ~
, , Significant difference in returns between IPO and matching companiep at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using
a two-tailed test.
de andf
, , Significantly different from 0.5 at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
The results in Column 5 of Panel B show an inverse relationship between initial returns
and subsequent raw returns, but a positive relationship with buy-and-hold abnormal
returns. The low initial return group has a negative mean BHAR of29.36%, whereas the
high initial return group has a positive mean BHAR of 13.28%. This evidence does not
support the fad hypothesis of Ritter (1991) or the overreaction hypothesis of De Bondt
and Thaler (1985, 1987), who suggest a negative relationship between past returns and
subsequent abnormal returns. 
73 The poor long run performance of the low initial
73 However, unreported results based on market, rather than matched company, benchmarks show that
IPO companies in the higher initial returns group actually underperform, while those in low initial returns
group overperform; this result is consistent with the findings of Paudyal et aL. (1998) for the Malaysian
market.
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returns group is reflected in a low wealth relative measure (0.86). The fraction of these
IPO companies that had BHARs less than their matched companies is 52%. However,
the number of companies underperforming in all three of the initial returns group is not
statistically significant. Furher analysis based on the ANOV A test shows that at least
one of the initial return groups has significantly different (at the 10% level) mean
BHARs from the rest of the initial return groups.
6.6 Summary
This chapter reports the results of the analyses of stock market performance. Two types
of analyses on long run share price performance were carried out, based on the
event-time and calendar-time approaches. Cross-sectional analyses of long run
performance were also carried out. Long run performance is broken down by year of
listing, sector, board of listing, size, private or priýatisation IPOs, gross proceeds, and
initial returns.
The results of the initial returns are consistent with existing international evidence and
also consistent with prior results found in Malaysia. However, the results concerning
long run returns are contrary to the results typically found in developed markets and are
dependent upon the methods used. The present study finds significant overperformance
when event-time CARs and BHRs are calculated using both market benchmarks and the
equal-weighting scheme, except when matched companies are used as the benchmark.
However, the significant overperformance disappears when the value-weighting scheme
is employed for both of the return measures. In addition, the significant abnormal
performance also disappears when the Fama-French (1993) three-factor regressions are
used, confirming the argument of Gompers and Lerner (2003) that the relative
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performance of an IPO sample depends on the method used to examine performance.
Ritter and Welch (2002) and Ritter (2003) argue that the characteristics of an IPO
sample, in terms of the time period and the selection criteria, also contribute to the
observed differences in the findings of studies on the long run performance of IPOs. In
a nutshell, the results of the present study suggest that investors who measure their
investment in IPO companies using the event-time approach ~j1 conclude that they
earn positive returns in the long run, but if they employed the calendar-time approach
they would conclude that do not gain any abnormal returns.
Segmenting the sample by year of listing and comparing long run performance using
size-matched companies reveals that the IPO performance varies from year to year, and
does not appear to be related in any systematic fashion to years when there were large
numbers of IPOs. The long run performance does not significantly differ across sectors,
and there is also no significant difference between the performance of IPOs listed on the
Main Board and the Second Board of the KLSE. Private IPOs produce insignificant
underperformance, while privatisations IPOs produce insignificant overperformance
over the three-year period. An investment of large IPO companies produces greater
negative returns compared to matching companies of a similar size. In addition, while
IPOs with low initial returns provide high raw returns in the long run, they
underperform their matched companies. Finally, IPOs with the smallest gross proceeds
achieve significant overperformance over the three-year horizon.
The following chapter provides a review of the empirical evidence concerning
accounting-based IPO operating performance.
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Chapter 7
Review of empirical studies and research hypotheses:
Accounting-based operating performance
7.1 Introduction
The empirical evidence on the stock market performance of new equity issues was
reviewed in Chapter 4. In general, the evidence reveals that the stock market
performance is poor in the post-IPO period. Studies using accounting data have been
employed to ascertain if there is also a deterioration in operating performance following
IPOs. This chapter provides a review of empirical studies which focus on pre- and
post-IPO accounting performance, and then proceeds to develop testable hypotheses
concerning accounting-based operating performance of IPOs.
While the focus of this study is to investigate the accounting performance of IPO
companies, the first part of this chapter also reviews empirical evidence on companies
making seasoned equity offerings (SEO). Since the SEO occurs after the IPO to raise
additional equity capital, a similar trend of long run performance may be expected for
companies conducting SEOs. The second part of this chapter provides the hypotheses
related to accounting performance.
7.2 Review of empirical studies on accounting-based operating
performance
Similar to the stock market performance literature, there are two strands of related
literature on accounting-based operating performance of IPO companies. The first
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focuses on IPOs in the private sector and the second on privatisation share issues
(PIPOs).
7.2.1 Prior studies on IPOs in general
Relatively few studies have focused on the accounting-based operating performance of
IPOs. The long run underperformance results found in stock price (market-based)
studies have been confirmed by several studies on the long run operating
(accounting-based) performance; including Jain and Kini (1994, 1995), Cai and Wei
(1997), Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997), Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998),
Kutsuna, Okamura and Cowling (2002), Chan, Wang and Wei (2003), Khurshed,
Paleari and Vismara (2003), Balatbat et aL. (2004), Coakley, Hadass and Wood (2004),
Kim et al. (2004), and Wang (2005).
The first study that exammes the operating performance of IPO compames is
undertaken by Jain and Kini (1994). They analyse the change in operating performance
of 682 IPOs in the US for the period 1976 to 1988. They measure performance
primarily by operating returns on assets (accrual-based) and operating cash flow
deflated by assets (cash flow-based). They find a significant decline in both operating
performance measures for a period of three to five years subsequent to the IPO relative
to the one-year pre-IPO level performance, both before and after industry adjustment.
However, operating cash flow is calculated as operating income minus capital
expenditure, which has been argued to be a poor proxy (Bowen et al., 1986).74 They
74 Bowen et al. (1986) define five measure of cash flows (CF): (ì) NIDPR = net income before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (NIB El) + depreciation and amortization (DPR); (ii)
WCFO = NIDPR + adjustments for 'other' elements of NIB El not affecting working capital; (iii) CFO =
WCFO - change in noncash current assets from operations + change in current liabilities from operations;
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argue that the declining operating performance in the post-IPO period cannot be
attributed to a decline in business activity such as lack of growth in sales or cutbacks in
post-IPO capital expenditure. This is because they also find that their sample of IPO
companies displayed strong growth in sales and capital expenditure following the IPOs.
Similar results are also found by Chan et aL. (2003) for Chinese IPOs.
Jain and Kini (1994) also analyse the relationship between underpricing and long run
operating performance to test whether, consistent with the signalling model of
underpricing, companies with larger underpricing provide superior post-IPO operating
performance; however, they find no evidence of this. Finally, they investigate the
relationship between retained ownership at the time of the IPOs and long run post-IPO
performance to see whether equity retention by original shareholders can act as a signal
of company value, the idea being that owners wil retain high ownership if they expect
high future cash flow relative to present company value. Using a dichotomous split
between low and high ownership, they find a positive relationship between post-IPO
operating performance and equity retention, both before and after adjustment for
industry effects. This supports the agency cost hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling
(1976), in which high managerial retained ownership reduces incentives to undertake
non-value maximising projects.
Jain and Kini (1994) then examine market expectations and earnings performance to
discover if investors valued the IPO company based on an expectation that earnings
(iv) CFAI = CFO + proceeds from the sale of propert, plant, and equipment + proceed from sale of
investments + amount of capital expenditures during the period + increase in investments in other
corporations during the period; (v) CC = CFAI + net financing activity for the period. They suggest that
the traditional measures of CF (i) and (H) are inferior proxies to the alternative measures of CF
incorporating additional adjustments (p. 715-719).
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growth wil continue. The three measures (the market-to-book ratio, the price/earnings
(P/E) ratio and earnings per share) all decline after the IPOs. The high pre-IPO values
implied that investors have expectations of high earnings growth in the future, but the
lower post-IPO values show that the expectations are not realised. They suggest several
possible explanations: (i) the agency problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976);
(ii) window-dressing of pre- IPO performance; and (iii) manager~ timing their issues to
follow periods of extraordinarily good performance.
Jain and Kini (1995) have undertaken a similar study but focus on potential differentials
between venture-backed and nonventure-backed IPOs. They also find a significant
decline for both groups relative to the pre-IPO levels but the decline is significantly
higher for nonventure-backed IPOs. Their study has been replicated using UK data by a
working paper of Coakley et aL. (2004). Contrary to the Jain and Kini (1995) findings,
they demonstrate that the operating performance 'differential between venture-backed
and nonventure backed IPOs is not significant for a UK sample.
Another study by Mikkelson et aL. (1997) examines the operating performance up to ten
years after going public of 283 US IPOs in the years 1980 to 1983. They matched IPO
companies with non-issuing companies based on industry, industry and size (book value
of assets), and industry and performance (level of operating return on asset or return on
sales). They find that operating performance of IPOs is higher than that of the matched
companies pre-IPO but lower post-IPO. However, significant changes in operating
performance are confined to the period surrounding the offerings (from year - 1 to year
+ 1). There is no further significant decline in relative performance of the IPO
companies through the following ten years of public trading. In contrast to Jain and
Kini (1994), Mikkelson et aL. (1997) do not find a relationship between operating
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performance and various measures of ownership interest. However, secondary sales by
current shareholders, and the size and age of IPO companies, do help to explain the
variation in operating performance.
Cai and Wei (1997) study the long run operating performance for -5 and +5 year
windows for 180 IPOs listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange during the period 1971 to
1992. They find a significant pre-issue rise and post-issue decline in operating
performance of Japanese IPO companies after adjustment for industry and
mean-reversion trends. Like Jain and Kini (1994), they also use a poor proxy to
measure cash flows, as argued by Bowen et al. (1986). In contrast to the evidence
observed by Jain and Kini (1994) for the US market, they find that the post issue
deterioration in operating performance is not related to changes in the ownership
structure. However, Kutsuna et aL. (2002), who examine the same market, find
contrasting evidence to that reported by Cai and Wei (1997), supporting the hypothesis
that the post-IPO deterioration in operating performance is partly attributable to reduced
managerial ownership.
Teoh et aL. (1998a), while mainly focusing on earnings management and long run share
price performance in the US, also provide evidence on the time-series distribution of
accounting performance measured by net income and cash flow from operations divided
by lagged total assets. They find that the median return on assets is significantly
positive in year 0 but then declines, to be significantly negative, by year four. In
contrast to the accrual measure, cash flow return on assets began poorly in the issuance
year and monotonically improved through year six. In a similar study of 64 Dutch
IPOs, Roosenboom et aL. (2003) find that the decline in cash flow return on assets from
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year - 1 to 0 is much higher than the decline in return on assets. Their results seem to
contradict the results observed by Teoh et aL. (1998a).
Shelor and Anderson (1998) study changes in operating performance among real estate
investment trusts (REITs) during the year immediately before and two years following
an IPO. Using operating return on assets and other performance measures (net return on
total assets, asset turnover ratio, and operating return on sales), they find that post-IPO
performance measures increase significantly, in contrast to prior results for
non-financial companies. However, Shelor and Anderson (1998) do not compare the
performance to other benchmarks such as seasoned REITs companies. Therefore, their
results could be influenced by a common factor which improves profitability in the
REIT industry rather than by REITs companies which engaged in IPOs.
It would appear that the first study examining ¡the operating performance of IPO
companies for the UK market is a working paper by Khurshed et aL. (2003), covering
the period 1995 to 1999. Their study basically replicates the analysis of Jain and Kini
(1994) using data from the UK market. They examine the median level and changes
from the year before the IPO to the year of the IPO and for each of the subsequent three
years. They find evidence of a significant decline in operating performance of UK IPO
companies in the three years following IPOs, both before and after industry adjustment.
However, the companies show a strong growth in the level of assets, earnings and net
cash flows following the IPOs. The authors suggest that the UK corporate culture may
be too focused on growth.
Consistent with Jain and Kini (1994), Khurshed et aL. (2003) do not find any
relationship between initial underpricing and long run operating performance, a result
173
Chapter 7 - Literature review & hypotheses 11: Accounting-based performance
which does not support the signalling theory of underpricing. They also investigate the
level of market ratios and find some evidence of decline in their levels subsequent to the
IPOs, suggesting that investors may have had systematically biased expectations of
earnings growth in the post-IPO period.
In a more recent study, Kim et aL. (2004) examine the operating performance of 133
IPOs in Thailand during the period 1987 to 1993. They find that both accrual- and cash
flow-based performance measures decline after the companies have gone public, both
before and after industry adjustments. The cash flow measure is computed as earnings
before interest and tax plus depreciation, which is also argued to be a poor proxy by
Bowen et aL. (1986). Like Jain and Kini (1994) and Chan et aL. (2003), Kim et aL.
(2004) investigate the source of IPO underperformance by looking at the sales growth,
asset turnover, and capital expenditure measures. They find that sales significantly
increase over the four years after the IPOs. However, both asset turnover and capital
expenditure appear to decline during the post-IPO period. They suggest that the
changes in sales and capital expenditure levels do not fully explain the inferior post-IPO
operating performance.
Kim et aL. (2004) further examine the relationship between managerial ownership and
operating performance. Using regression analysis, they find a curvilinear relationship
between managerial ownership and the post IPO change in performance. In particular,
there is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the change in
performance for companies with 'low' and 'high' levels of managerial ownership,
which supports the alignment of interests hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976).
However, they find a negative relationship for 'intermediate' levels, consistent with the
entrenchment hypothesis of Fama and Jensen (1983), which argues that managers may
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not maximise shareholders' wealth when they retain more shares after the IPO. They
note that this nonlinear relationship may explain the conflct between the findings of
Jain and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson et aL. (1997). Contrary to Jain and Kini (1994),
Kim et aL.'s (2004) results are consistent with Mikkelson et aL. (1997), who also fail to
find any relationship between managerial ownership and company performance when
Kim et al. (2004) use both the level of ownership variable and,an ownership-squared
variable as an explanatory variable for the change in performance. However, the
relationship is only captured when Kim et al. (2004) allow for three levels of inside
ownership.
In summary, all of the studies find that both operating performance measures (accrual
and cash flow) decline in the post-IPO period. However, the degree of deterioration in
performance based on accrual- and cash flow-based measures is variable. For example,
Cai and Wei (1997) find a significantly higher decline in accrual than in cash flow but
Chan et al. (2003) find similar falls in both measures. This empirical evidence is
largely based upon studies of companies in developed markets. There is no published
study to date that has examined the accounting-based operating performance of
Malaysian IPOs using both approaches. The cash flow-based measure used by Jain and
Kini (1994), Cai and Wei (1997), Chan et aL. (2003), Coakley et al. (2004), and Kim et
aL. (2004) is proxied by operating income minus capital expenditure, or by EBIT plus
depreciation. Even though these studies test the robustness of their results using the
cash flow-based approach, which is less vulnerable to accounting manipulation, they do
not use an 'improved' measure of cash flows that incorporates additional adjustments as
suggested by Bowen et al. (1986).
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Table 7.1 summarises the previous empirical studies on accounting-based operating
performance employing accrual- and cash flow-based approaches. The table also
identifies the performance measure and benchmark used in each study.
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7.2.2 Prior studies olprivatisation /POs (P/POs)
In the early 1980s, Britain's Thatcher government introduced a privatisation programme
which has now been embraced by governments of more than 100 countries (Megginson
and Netter, 2001). Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) argue that public enterprises
are inefficient because they pursue strategies that satisfy political objectives rather than
maximising profit. Consistent with post-PIPO effciency improvements, studies of
PIPOs generally find that companies' performance improves following public listing.
Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994) argue that the newly private companies are
exposed to a real threat of bankuptcy due to the government no longer guaranteeing
debt and covering the operating losses of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, PIPO
companies are likely to pay more attention to company profitability.
Megginson and Netter (2001) survey the empirical research of 38 privatisation studies
that used accounting and/or real output data to assess the effects of privatisation on
operating efficiency, ownership structure, and/or financial performance. Nine out of 38
studies focus on privatisation through public share offerings. 75 They report that all of
these studies offer at least limited support for the proposition that privatisation is
associated with significant performance improvement of state-owned enterprises
divested through public share offering.
75 There are four methods of privatisation defined by Brada (1996) as quoted by Megginson and N etter
(2001), which are: (i) privatisation through restituion; (ii) privatisation through sale of state propert
either in the form of direct sales or share issue privatisations; (iii) mass or voucher privatisation; and (iv)
privatisation from below. Megginson and Netter (2001) provide detailed explanations of these methods
on pages 339-340.
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Several papers have empirically examined the operating performance of newly
privatised companies, including Megginson et aL. (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998),
D'Souza and Megginson (1999), Aharony, Lee and Wong (2000), Bortolotti, D'Souza,
Fantini and Megginson (2002), Sun and Tong (2002), Wei, Varela, D'Souza and Hassan
(2003), Huang and Song (2005) and Wang (2005). The results of most of these studies
are broadly similar, suggesting that performance improves follovying PIPOs. The three
exceptions are all studies of Chinese privatisations which find profitability decline (e.g.,
Aharony et al., 2000; Wei et aL., 2003; Huang and Song, 2005).
The first study on PIPOs is undertaken by Megginson et aL. (1994). They compare the
pre-and post-privatisation financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18
countries during the period 1961 to 1990. They suggest that privatised companies
perform better than their pre-privatisation counterparts. Bortolotti et al. (2002) report
that a significant fraction of the observed improvements revealed from their own study
are due to regulatory changes alone, or in combination with ownership changes, rather
than from privatisation alone.
In Malaysia, the first operating performance study that focuses on PIPOs is carried out
by Sun and Tong (2002), using a sample of just 24 privatised companies that listed on
the KLSE during the period 1983 to 1997. In line with multi-country studies (e.g.,
Megginson et aL., 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D'Souza and Megginson, 1999),
they find that profitability, output levels, and dividend payouts improve following
privatisation, but that leverage reduce. They report that the total profits of Malaysian
PIPOs increase threefold, together with a doubling in real sales, increase dividend
payouts and significant reductions in leverage. They argue that the privatisation
programme in Malaysia is successful, but to a lesser extent than in other countries. Sun
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and Tong's (2002) study is inconclusive, however, since it examines only a small
sample, which is not representative of the overall population of IPOs consisting of both
private and previously state-owned companies.
It is apparent that all studies examining the operating performance of privatisation IPOs
have employed an accrual-based performance measure. Furthermore, most of the
results (except for Boubakri and Cosset, 1999 and Huang and Song, 2005) are not
robust because no adjustment was made to the privatisation sample to include matching
(control) companies with similar characteristics (e.g., state-owned enterprise, similar
industry, size or pre-event performance) when comparing pre- and post-PIPO
performance. This control is necessary to ensure that the operating performance is
related to privatisation and not to other factors apart from privatisation. For example,
the results could be driven by a common decline, or by improvements, in profitability
that occur within the industries to which the PIPO companies belong. Following the
arguments of Megginson and Netter (2001), there is a likelihood of sample selection
bias, whereby governents may tend to make their privatisations 'appear good' by
privatising the healthiest companies early. In addition, several papers (e.g., Megginson
et al., 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D'Souza and Megginson, 1999; Bortolotti et
aL., 2002) which investigate privatisation for several countries may be criticised for
introducing another sample selection problem. The availability of data tends to be
greater in the countries which are more developed, and possibly also for companies that
are performing better within developed countries. Thus, both these types of companies
may be over-represented in the empirical analyses.
Table 7.2 summarises the empirical studies that examine solely privatisation IPOs. All
of the studies investigate how privatisation affects company performance by comparing
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pre-and post-privatisation data. The operating performance reported in the table focuses
only on profitability.
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7.2.3 Prior studies ofseasoned equity offerings (SEOs)
Studies of the long run performance of seasoned equity offerings include Hansen and
Crutchley (1990), Healy and Palepu (1990), Patel, Emery and Lee (1993), McLaughlin,
Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996), Loughran and Ritter (1997), Cai and Loughran
(1998), and Kabir and Roosenboom (2003). Among the earlier studies, Hansen and
,
Crutchley (1990) examine the long term behaviour of corporate earnings (return on
assets) around three financing events: sales of common stocks, sales of convertible
bonds, and sales of straight bonds. They report that, in general, earnings decline after
corporate financings.
McLaughlin et aL. (1996) examine changes in operating performance (operating cash
flows scaled by the book value of assets) for a sample of 1,296 SEOs of industrial
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and
NASDAQ during the period from 1980 to 1991. They find that SEO companies display
significant operating performance improvements prior to the issue, but experience a
significant decline following the issue, compared to the median industry performance.
They interpret their findings as support for Myers and Majluts (1984) asymmetric
information theory, which argues that if managers possess superior information about a
company's future prospects, they are more likely to issue equity when the company's
shares are overpriced. They also find that the decline in the operating performance is
greater for companies that have higher 'free cash flows'. This is consistent with
Jensen's (1986) 'free cash flow' theory, which argues that due to a divergence of
interests between managers and shareholders, managers prefer to retain excess cash
flow in the company and may waste funds by taking up negative NPV projects. By
issuing equity, the cash flow available for managers wil increase, possibly inducing
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managers to use the cash for value reducing investment activities that lead to poor
post-issue performance.
Loughran and Ritter (1997) examine the operating performance for a window from year
-4 and +4 for 1,338 SEOs in the US for the period 1979 to1989. They provide evidence
that there is considerable improvement in the profitability of issuing companies before
the offerings, with a peak at about the time of the offerings. However, there is a
deterioration in profitability afterwards. All six operating performance measures
decline significantly in the following four years relative to non-issuing companies
matched by asset size, industry, and operating performance. These patterns are present
for both large and small issuers, but the post-issue deterioration is more severe for
smaller issuers.
Cai and Loughran (1998) investigate a comprehensive sample of 1,389 Japanese SEOs
during the period 1971 to 1992. Similar to the evidence found for Japanese IPOs (Cai
and Wei, 1997), they find a significant post-issue decline in operating performance
following SEOs. In addition, they examine whether the 'agency' or 'timing' hypotheses
can better explain the performance deterioration of Japanese SEOs. Their results
support Cai and Wei' s (1997) study in which the cross-sectional variation of post issue
performance changes is not related to the level of agency costs prior to the issue. They
also find that neither keiretsu affiliation nor ownership structure can explain the poor
performance by issuing companies. Both of these studies, based on Japanese financial
markets, are inconsistent with agency theory, suggesting that the results may be
explained by the 'window of opportunity' or 'timing' hypothesis.
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Kabir and Roosenboom (2003) examine whether the stock market valuation impact
observed during the announcement of equity rights offerings in the Netherlands is
correlated with subsequent operating performance. They find that a statistically
significant stock price decline takes place during the announcement and subscription
periods. Consistent with the announcement period decline in stock price, they also
observe a statistically significant deterioration in operating perf~rmance76 from one up
to five years after the offerings. They conclude that the stock market has the ability to
correctly anticipate the future operating performance of companies. Several
explanations for the observed decline in operating performance are examined. They
find that companies with larger offer price discounts, exhibit larger declines in
performance, providing full support for the 'information asymmetry' hypothesis, which
argues that managers possess superior information about their companies compared to
outside investors. Their study provides only partial support for the 'free cash flow,77
,
hypothesis, which argues that managers have incentives to invest cash flows to increase
company size and perquisites. Further, they find no evidence to support the 'window of
opportunity,78 hypothesis, which argues that managers make a decision to issue equity
depending on favourable economic conditions. However, the proxies used for both
'free cash flow' and 'window of opportunity' are relatively weak.
76 Abnormal or excess operating performance is calculated as the difference in performance between
issuing companies and median non-issuing company. The operating performance is measured by four
measures of return on assets and four measures of return on sales.
77 They use the ratio of 
market- to-book value of total assets as a proxy for free cash flows.
78 The annual growth rate of gross domestic product is used to proxy for window of opportnity.
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Overall, the evidence suggests that the long run operating performance of SEOs follows
a similar pattern to that of IPOs, in which performance declines following the share
offering.
7.3 Research questions
Studies investigating the performance of companies involved in new equity issues
hypothesise that the market should impound anticipated future operating performance in
the share price of the IPO companies on the first day of trading. The results reported in
Chapter 6, together with the empirical evidence on the Malaysian market, reveal that the
IPO companies' shareholders gain very high positive initial returns (e.g., Dawson, 1987;
Ku Ismail et aI., 1993, Loughran et aI., 1994; Yong, 1997). However, assessment of the
long run stock market performance tends to produce conflicting results, possibly
affected by the methods used to calculate long ruil abnormal returns. Thus, it may be
useful to investigate the performance of the IPO companies using accounting-based
measures as well as market-based ones. Such investigations may offer insights into the
widely debated question of whether the abnormal stock returns reported in Chapter 6 are
valid or whether they are caused by measurement errors (as argued by Fama, 1998).
Consistent results across the market-based and the accounting-based approaches would
suggest that the results are not likely to be driven by measurement errors or
misspecification.
In general, all studies have found that both accrual- and cash flow-based operating
performance measures decline in the post-IPO period, but with variations between the
two measures. It can be argued that both the accrual and cash flow conclusions revealed
from these studies have some limitations. The accrual accounting profits measure is
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more subject to accounting manipulation by managers, such as through working capital
adjustments. Even though cash flow-based measures are less sensitive to accrual
manipulation, companies may stil be able to make operating cash flows appear to be
greater than they really are by misclassifying the cash flows among the operating,
investing, and financing sections of the statement of cash flows. For instance, certain
cash outfows that should be offset directly against operating cash inflows may be
classified as investing cash outflows (Broome, 2004, p. 19). However, not all studies
have employed the cash flow approach in measuring operating performance following
IPOs. Furthermore, the operating cash flow measure adopted has not always been
'properly' calculated, thereby resulting in a poor proxy (Bowen et at., 1986). Using
'proper' measures of cash flows to examine IPO companies' operating performance wil
cast light on the extent of the impact of working capital manipulation on profitability. If
the observed operating performance using the cash flow-based performance measure
,
declines, then it can be stated that there is a deterioration in the post-IPO operating
performance, which is not due to accounting manipulation. Therefore, the present study
uses both accrual and 'good' cash flow-based performance measures with additional
adjustment, as suggested by Bowen et al. (1986). Based on the review of prior
literature, the following two broad research questions are identified:
1. 'Are accounting-based performance measures consistent with market-based
performance measures?'
2. 'Do the accrual- and cash flow-based performance measures improve or
deteriorate following IPOs in the long run? '
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In order to test these broad research questions, several hypotheses are outlined in the
following sections.
7.4 Formal hypotheses
As reviewed in the previous section, Jain and Kini (1994), Cai and Wei (1997), and
Kim et aL. (2004), among others, find significant declines in post-IPO operating
performance in both accrual and cash flow performance measures, both before and after
adjustment for their benchmarks. The observed decline in operating performance may
not be too surprising. As pointed out by Jain and Kini (1994), managers may time their
issues to follow periods of extraordinarily good performance. Investors may be overly
optimistic about their companies' future performance based on the performance
observed at the time of the IPO. Managers take advantage of this overvaluation by
issuing equity when their equity is 'overvalued', thereby reducing their overall cost of
equity. In addition, they may engage in 'window dressing' their corporate accounts at
the time of going public, which leads to the pre-IPO performance being overstated and
the post-IPO performance being understated. As a result of the 'over-optimism' and
'window-dressing' hypotheses, Jain and Kini (1994) argue that IPOs are followed by
significant declines in operating performance.
Jain and Kini (1994), Cai and Wei (1997), Chan et al. (2003), and Kim et aL. (2004)
provide further explanation for the post-IPO operating performance by examining
changes in other accounting measures, such sales, asset turnover, and capital
expenditure. Kim et aL. (2004) argue that the decline in post-IPO operating
performance can be expected if the companies cannot generate the same positive NPV
projects as they did in the pre-IPO periods or ifthe required level of capital expenditure
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cannot be maintained by managers. Jain and Kini (1994) and Kim et aL. (2004) find that
although IPO companies show high post-issue growth in sales and capital expenditure,
their measures of operating performance decline. This suggests that the reductions in
operating performance are not related to a decline in business activity as indicated by
lack of sales growth or post-IPO cutbacks in capital expenditure.
Loughran and Ritter (1995) point out that IPO companies typically experience pre-IPO
improvements in their operating performance. They suggest that 'the market appears to
overweight this recent (pre-IPO) improvement and underweight long term, mean
reverting tendencies in operating performance measures... (and)... is systematically
misestimating the auto correlation of earnings growth' (p. 49). The literature from the
United States clearly shows that companies typically go public after strong operating
performance. However, companies fail to uphold the growth rates attained in the year
or two before flotation. This may be as a result of 'market-timing' or deliberate
overstatement of pre-issue performance by managers. Consequently, the present study
hypothesises a decline in the level of 'market expectation' measures in the post-IPO
period due to misevaluations by investors at the time of going public.
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) and Kim et aL. (2004) both suggest that
ownership structure plays a vital role in corporate finance for emerging market
countries. It would appear that the relationship between the ownership structures of
IPO companies and post-IPO operating performance has not been tested for the
Malaysian market. It is interesting to investigate this relationship since many Malaysian
IPO companies are family owned. Due to the fact that managers and owners are usually
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the same persons, they may exert influence and control over the companies that they
own.79 As argued by Demsetz (1983), such owners may choose non-pecuniary
consumption, perhaps, extracting scarce resources from profitable projects. Anderson
and Reeb (2003) argue that if executive management positions are limited to family
members, such companies may not have sufficiently qualified or talented management.
Therefore, companies that are owned and managed by family m~mbers may experience
poor performance. Alternatively, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the costs of
monitoring80 are less for family owned companies, an argument supported by
McConaughy, Matthews and Fialko (2001), who suggest that family ownership and
control are advantageous in minimising the agency problems or conflcts that may exist
in companies run by professional managers. Evidence from McConaughy, Walker,
Henderson, and Mishra (1998) indicate that family relationships improve monitoring
and offer incentives that were associated with better company performance. Given
,
these conflcting arguments, the net effect of family ownership on post-IPO operating
performance is diffcult to predict.
Leland and Pyle (1977) and Downes and Heinkel (1982) use the fraction of equity
retention by insiders as a signal of company value. The argument is that insiders wil
hold a significant ownership interest only if they anticipate that future cash flows wil
be high relative to the present company value. Therefore, high retained ownership may
be reflected in high post-IPO operating performance.
79 This is evident in the work of Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), whose investigate the corporate
ownership for East Asian companies.
80 Monitoring occurs when professional managers are hired (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003).
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, underpricing may be used as a tool to signal the quality of
issuers to the market (All en and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989, and
Welch, 1989). Welch (1989) presents a signalling model which assumes that 'high
quality' issuers whose quality is not otherwise known by the market tend to underprice
their shares at the time of IPOs. The 'high quality' issuers then conduct a seasoned
equity offering8l when the market price is established after their ,quality is 'discovered'
by investors, to recoup opportunity losses at the time of the IPO. Therefore, according
to the signalling theory of underpricing, companies that underprice should experience
better post-IPO performance in comparison to companies that do not. Thus, the present
study expects to observe a positive relationship between underpricing and post-IPO
operating performance.
Based on the above explanations, the hypotheses of the current study are as follows:
H 1: There is a diference in the level of operating performance of IPO companies
as compared to their benchmarks in each year.
H2: There is a diference in the percentage (P) of IPO companies outperforming
their matched companies than would be expected by chance (which is
typically tested by assuming p = 50%) in each year.
81 Wan Hussin (2001) reported that 14% of companies listed during the period 1990 to 1997 made at
least one SEa within three years of the IPa year.
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H3: There is a diference between the change in operating performance for IPO
companies and their benchmarks, when change is measured against pre-IPO
level
H4: There is a diference between the change in operating performance for IPO
companies and their benchmarks, when change is measured against the
previous year's performance.
H5: There is a diference between the sources of operating performance changes
for IPO companies and their benchmarks, when change is measured against
pre-IPO level
H6: There is a diference between the sources of operating performance changes
for IPO companies and their benchmarks, when change is measured against
the previous year's performance.
H7: There is a diference between the change in market expectations variables
for IPO companies and their benchmarks, when change is measured against
pre-IPO leveL.
H8: There is a diference between the change in market expectations variables of
IPO companies and their benchmarks, when change is measured against the
previous year's performance.
H9: There is a diference between the change in leverage for IPO companies and
their benchmarks, when change is measured against pre-IPO level
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H10: There is a diference between the change in leverage for IPO companies and
their benchmarks, when change is measured against the previous year's
performance.
H11: There is a diference between the 'family relationships' group and
'non-family relationships' group pre- and post-IPO performance.
H12: There is a diference between the 'high ownership retention' group and 'low
ownership retention' group pre- and post-IPO performance.
H13: There is a diference between the 'high underpricing' groups and 'low
underpricing' group pre- and post-IPO performance.
7.5 Summary
This chapter provides a review on the accounting-based operating performance of IPOs,
covering both private IPOs and privatisation IPOs. It presents evidence that operating
performance declines after IPOs for private non-financial companies but shows an
improvement for privatisation IPOs. The hypotheses on the pre- and post-IPO operating
performance, source of operating performance changes, market expectations and
earnings performance are outlined. The possible impact of ownership variables and
underpricing on post-IPO operating performance are also described.
The next chapter describes the research design used to investigate the accounting-based
operating performance of Malaysian IPOs.
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Chapter 8
Research design to investigate accounting-based operating
performance
8.1 Introduction
Having reviewed the relevant literature and developed testable hypotheses in Chapter 7,
this chapter discusses the research design employed to examine whether there is a
change in accounting performance following an IPO. The remainder of this chapter is
structured as follows: the first section describes the sources of the accounting data while
the second discusses the criteria used to select the IPO sample and the matching
compames. The third section discusses the methods used to measure accounting-based
operating performance. The pre-and post-IPO performance are analysed with reference
to a variety of measures: accruals-based, cash' flow-based, and other accounting
measures, such as sources of operating performance changes, market expectations and
leverage. The family relationships, retained ownership and underpricing are also
described. The final section summarises this chapter.
8.2 Data sources on accounting performance
The examination of accounting performance adopts the same time-frame as that used in
Chapter 5 to study stock market performance. The sample period is selected to give
attention to recent IPOs and to have sufficient data on post-IPO accounting
performance. The IPO selection period ends in December 2000 to make sure that at
least three years of post-IPO data is available for the sample companies. The choice of
a three-year post-IPO period is to enable the long term impact ofthe IPO to be observed
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and is consistent with the period used to examme the long run stock market
performance. Extension beyond the three years further increases the likelihood of
intervening events 'contaminating' the relationship between the IPO and performance.
If a period greater than three years was used, it would also be necessary either to end the
IPO selection period earlier, thereby reducing the relevance of the results, or to reduce
the sample size, thereby reducing the reliability of the study.
Ideally, it would have been useful to compare the level and change in the performance
of each IPO company from three years prior to an IPO. However, the lack of data for
two and three years before the IPOs prevented this. Most of the incomplete data are
balance sheet and cash flow statement items. Datastream does not carry researchable
historic profit and loss accounts, balance sheets and cash flow information for all
Malaysian companies. Furthermore, an inspection of the IPO prospectuses reveals that
most companies do not report their historical consolidated balance sheets. In addition, it
was not compulsory for Malaysian IPO companies to report their statement of cash
flows in their prospectuses. Instead, these companies typically include only the
individual balance sheets for the company and for its subsidiaries. Where consolidated
group accounts were provided, details of the current assets and liabilities, which are
required to determine cash flow-based measures, typically were not reported.
One of the reasons why companies do not report consolidated accounts is that the
financial year-ends of the companies were not the same as their subsidiaries. Typically,
such companies only recently acquired subsidiaries and were involved in financial
restructuring, such as bonus or rights issues, at the same time as public listing. In
addition, several companies do not have comparative figures in their first public annual
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reports smce they were incorporated immediately prior to the IPOs. These are a
common feature of Malaysian IPOs.
Given the difficulty in obtaining earlier data, it was necessary to use a one-year period
prior to the IPOs as the pre-IPO measure of accounting performance. Performance in
the IPO year, and each of the three post-IPOs years, are compared with pre-IPO
,-
performance; year-to-year performance changes are also measured and reported. Due to
this, five years of data on each proxy variable for each company and matched company
were collected for the purpose of examining the pre- and post-operating performance of
Malaysian IPOs; thus, five years of data had to be available for each of the sample
companies.
Data was collected from various sources. Income statement items (turnover, profit
before tax, and earnings per share) prior to the' IPO were hand-collected from the
offering prospectuses from the 'summary of information' section under the heading
'fnancial highlights'. The data were then cross-checked with the first published annual
reports of the newly-listed company, which shows comparative figures for the pre-IPO
year and the IPO year (immediately before and after listing). If the prospectuses were
not available, the pre-IPO income statement data were collected from the first published
annual reports. Several balance sheet and cash flow statement data items prior to the
IPOs were also collected from the first published annual reports: (i) total assets; (ii)
current assets; (iii) cash and equivalents; (iv) current liabilities; (v) short term
borrowings; (vi) long term borrowings; (vii) equity capital and reserves; (viii) cash flow
generated from operations; and (ix) cash paid on purchase of fixed assets. Since the
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cash flow statement was adopted in Malaysia only in 1996, following the International
Accounting Standard (IAS) 7,82 the cash flow from operations for each IPO and
matching company were manually calculated, as in Table 8.1. Notes payable, and the
current portion of long term debt were excluded from the definition of changes in
working capital because these relate more to financing activities than to operations
(Bowen et at., 1986).
Table 8.1 Operating cash flow calculation
Profit before taxation
Add: Adjustments for items not involving the movement of funds (e. 
g. , Depreciation,
amortisation of intangible assets, investment written off deferred expenditure written off
intangible assets written off (gain)/loss on disposal of fixed assets, interest
expense/(income), provision for doubtful debts, provision for diminution in investment)
= Cash flow generatedfrom operations before working capital changes
Add: Decrease/(increase) in current assets (e.g., trade receivables, stocks, prepayments, and
other receivables)
Add: (Decrease)/increase in current liabilties (e. 
g. , trade creditors, interest accrued, and
other creditors)
= Cash flow generatedfrom operations
Post-IPO data items were collected from different sources, including Datastream.
Initially, the financial data were downloaded from Datastream for every company for a
four-year period, which is from the IPO year to three years after. Financial data are not
available from Datastream for non-listed companies so data were only available staring
from the IPO year (defined as year 0). However, initial data collection revealed that
82 The IAS 7 was replaced by Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) 5 in 1999.
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most of the accounting data were not available from Datastream, especially for fiscal
years prior to 1993.
The second source of data was the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) database,
which provides capital markets data for countries in the Pacific Basin region. However,
the financial information available on this database stops at 31 December 1996. Where
there is no data available, or where data is missing from the Datastream and P ACAP
databases, the annual report of the company was obtained from one of two sources. The
first of these is the KLSE website at ww.klse.com.my. which, as at 14 March 2004,
had annual reports for the 31 December 1999 fiscal year end onwards. The remaining
financial data for IPO companies and matched companies were extracted from the
annual reports obtained from the Public Information Centre, 83 Bursa Malaysia,
necessitating a visit to Malaysia from 24 April to 16 June 2004. The following section
provides an explanation of the process of selecting the sample of IPO companies and
their benchmarks.
8.3 Sample selection
8.3.1 Selecting ¡PO companies
This section describes a slightly similar procedure for selecting the IPO companies and
their benchmarks to that described in Section 5.3.2 of Chapter 5. There were 543 new
83 As of 1 May 2004, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was renamed Bursa Malaysia with a
new domain name of www.bursamalaysia.com. The Public Information Centre (PlC), which was set up
in 1986 as the corporate library of Bursa Malaysia, and a centre of knowledge to the industry. It
comprises books, reports, CDs and videos on Technical and Fund Analysis, Investment basics, Equity
Derivatives, etc.
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companies listed on the KLSE during the period 1990 to 2000. The Datastream Code
(DSCODE) for IPO companies and their benchmarks must have been present on
Datastream in order to collect the data on accounting performance. Similar to the
selection criteria and reasoning discussed in Chapter 5, companies that are listed under
Infrastructure Project Companies, Finance, Trust and Closed-End Funds sectors are
excluded. However, the Properties sector was included in the sample because it is not
classified as a financial sector by the KLSE. Sector exclusions reduced the population
to 504 companies. Another six companies were excluded because they are not strictly
IPO companies as they were listed via 'introduction'; they also made a combination
offering of debt together with equity, so were excluded to avoid any confounding effects
of the debt issue. This left 498 IPO companies available for analysis.
Table 8.2 shows the detail screening process in obtaining the final sample, including the
availability of the first84 and subsequent pub1Ìshed public annual reports,85 the
companies' fies, and no change in fiscal year end. 
86
84 Companies that have no comparative figures in the first public annual reports were excluded because
comparison ofpre- and post performance cannot be made and a time-series of variables is required for the
cash flow analysis.
85 Companies that have missing annual reports for certain years (even when the company fie is in
existence) or the annual reports have not yet been prepared (for companies having a Dec 2004 fiscal year
end at the time when the analysis was undertaken) were excluded.
86 The change of fiscal year end results in no accounting data being available for a particular year. In
addition, the data were reported inconsistently due to the fact that the financial statements were presented
for periods with varying time-spans, which limits the comparability of the accounting measures.
However, if this occurred to the matched company, the matched company was replaced and the process of
finding a matching company was repeated.
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The final sample comprised 508 compames, 254 IPOs and their 254 matching
companies. More than half ofthe data were hand-collected. Furthermore, the cash flow
data for the fiscal period prior to 1996 have to be calculated individually for each
company and their matched companies. Although just half of the potential numbers of
Malaysian IPO companies remain, the large sample size suggests that it is likely to be
representative. The only previous study investigating the ope,rating performance of
Malaysian IPOs used a sample of just 24 privatisation IPOs (Sun and Tong, 2002). The
current study comprises 239 private IPOs and 15 privatisation IPOs.
8.3.2 Selecting matching companies
A proper benchmark is required to compare the performance of IPO companies to
ensure that the performance change is not a manifestation of the IPO companies'
characteristics or industry-specific factors. There are two possible benchmarks that
could be adopted to compare the performance of each sample company: (i) the industry
median; or (ii) a single non-IPO matching company in the same industry with similar
pre-IPO performance and size.
As summarised.in Table 7.1 in the previous chapter, Jain and Kini (1994), Cai and Wei
(1997), Teoh et aL. (1998a), Kutsuna et al. (2002), Khurshed et aL. (2003), and Kim et
al. (2004) have adopted the industry median benchmark to control for variation in
normal operating performance measures across different lines of business (Mikkelson et
al., 1997) and to minimise the change in operating performance (Jain and Kini, 1994).
The lack of a suitable number of available companies in a particular industry to compute
the industry median may introduce bias in the benchmark's calculation.
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Cai and Wei (1997) and Mikkelson et al. (1997) use individual matching companies as
a benchmark, selecting matching companies based on pre-event performance as a
control for the change in performance that is expected or normal, and unrelated to going
public. Barber and Lyon (1996) argue that matching on pre-IPO performance could
control for potential mean reversion in earnings and other operating ratios over time.
They conclude that tests using matching companies that ,are not matched on
pre-operating performance are misspecified if the event companies have either
especially good or especially poor prior operating performance. In other words,
matching the IPO companies with pre-event performance enabled control for the IPO
company's performance history, in which companies are likely to issue equity when
their performance is usually high. There may also be a temporary component to the
companies' operating income due to manipulation of accounting numbers, accounting
changes, or nonrecurring expense or income. This may lead to a conclusion of
,
performance change, when in fact the accounting measure is merely reverting to its
mean. Mikkelson et aL. (1997) also select their matching companies based on total
assets to account for the effect of company size, though other variables can be used,
such as turover or market value.
This study does not employ the median industry performance benchmark since the
industry cash flow operating performance measures were not available and the small
number of companies in certain Malaysian industries may introduce bias in the industry
median computation. Instead, a matching company matched by industry (to control for
industry), pre-operating performance (to control for a continuation of company specific
performance before the IPOs), and total assets (to control for size effects) is used in the
present study. Barber and Lyon (1996) state that the use of a matching company as a
benchmark yields test statistics that are well specified. As argued by Perry and William
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(1994), companies in the same industry, with similar pre-IPO performance and similar
size, are assumed to have similar economic and competitive factors, and thus to have
comparable operating, investing, and financing opportunity sets.
For this part of the study, it was necessary to select a new set of sample companies from
those listed on the Main Board and the Second Board of the KLSE during the period
1990 to 2000. Companies in the control sample were individually matched to
companies in the IPO sample based on the above three criteria. The matching process
stared with a group of potential matching companies that had not been involved in an
IPO in the previous three years, in line with prior studies examining accounting
performance (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). Companies were
matched first by industry, then by comparable pre-IPO performance and total assets.
The Datastream Level 3 industry sub-sector was used to classify the industry for all
companies except the Property sector, for which the Level 6 industry sub-sector was
employed. The pre-IPO performance matching was based on operating profit before tax
divided by total sales. From this initial screen, the matched company was required to
have pre-IPO operating performance within the range of 90% to 110% of sample IPO
companies; and beginning total assets within 70% to 130% of sample IPO company
total assets in year _1.87 If a matched company could not be found based on all three
measures, the size criterion was relaxed and matching was based on industry and
pre-IPO performance. Failure to match led to relaxation of the pre-IPO performance
criteria, and matching was just based on industry. However, there are certain industry
groups, such as 'Information Technology', which do not have enough potential
87 The same pre-operating performance and size fiters were used by Barber and Lyon (1996).
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matching companies. In this case, IPO companies were matched based on pre- IPO
performance and total assets, regardless of industry. Finally, a small number of
companies were matched on pre- IPO performance regardless of industry and total
assets.
Of the 254 usable companies for the accounting performance analysis, 36 were matched
on the basis of industry, pre-IPO performance, and total assets, 138 were matched on
the basis of industry and pre- IPO performance, while 69 were matched on the basis of
industry only. Of the remaining 11 companies, four were matched on the basis of
pre-IPO performance and total assets, and seven were matched only on the basis of
pre-IPO performance regardless of industry. The difficulty of applying the
comprehensive three measure matching process arose from the small number of
Malaysian listed companies in various industries.
8.4 Methods
According to Barber and Lyon (1996), three steps must be undertaken in designing a
study that uses accounting-based operating performance. The first step is to select a
measure of accounting performance. The second step is to develop a model of expected
performance, a benchmark against which to judge actual performance. The third step is
to select an appropriate statistical test. These are discussed in turn.
8.4.1 Measure of accounting-based operating performance
There does not appear to be a preferred indicator of operating performance, and prior
studies use different measures to estimate abnormal operating performance. Financial
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ratios are usually used, allowing the operating performance of IPOs to be compared
over a point in time and across companies. This study examines various measures of
operating performance and employs two different approaches to check the robustness of
the results on long run operating performance. The first approach is based on accrual
accounting profit and the second on cash flow.
8.4.1.1 Accrual-based measure
Operating performance has traditionally been measured in terms of profit. The present
study employs five accrual-based operating profit variables. The first two relate
operating profit to assets, and calculate the average profit that a company generates for
each dollar of assets. They measure the efficiency of the manager in running the
business. They also provide a measure of the productivity of assets used to generate
operating profit from a company's operations ,that incorporates profitability and
efficiency. The operating profit variables are all measured before taxes (except for the
measure of per share basis) to avoid the effect of tax rate changes imposed by the
Malaysian government during the period of the analysis. 88
The choice of denominator is contentious. Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest that total
assets reflect both operating and non-operating assets, so they may understate the true
productivity of operating assets. However, they also recognise that IPO companies
could experience large increases in cash balances at the time of IPOs but may not
immediately invest those funds. Therefore, focusing on operating assets (deducting
88 The corporate tax rate was 35%, 34%, 32%, 30%, and 28% in the years 1990-1992, 1993, 1994,
1995-1997, and 1998-2003 respectively (The Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 2005).
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cash balances from total assets) wil influence the results, especially when the cash
balance in sample IPO companies and matched companies are significantly different. In
the present study, both total assets and operating assets are used as denominators to
check the robustness of results. The definitions are:
Operating return on total assets (OI/TA)
Operating profit before tax
=
Total assets (8.1)
Operating return on operating assets (OI/OA)
Operating profit before tax
=
Total assets - (Cash and equivalents) (8.2)
If a company does not disclose total assets in ,'the balance sheet, total assets are
calculated by taking the sum of tangible and intangible fixed assets, other long term
assets and investments, and current assets. The present study does not use the market
value of assets because the data are not available prior to going public.
Barber and Lyon (1996) also caution against the use of assets as the denominator when
companies have recently issued securities. Such companies can have a large increase in
book value of assets, but no immediate increase in operating profit. As noted by
Mikkelson et aL. (1997), accounting profitability scaled by assets might be downwardly
biased after IPOs. To reduce such bias, the present study also deflates the operating
profit by total sales since these are unaffected by the change in the assets base (Barber
and Lyon, 1996). The operating return on sales calculates the profit that a company
generates for every dollar of sales. The definition is:
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Operating return on sales (OI/Sales)
Operating profit before tax
Total sales
(8.3)
The operating return on equity is also employed smce it is more relevant to
. shareholders. To ensure consistency of the numerator, the operating profit used is also
before tax. The definition is:
Operating profit before tax
=
Equity capital and reserves (8.4)
The final accrual-based operating performance measure is earnings per share, which is
defined as:
Published earnings for ordinary,
Average number of shares in issue during'the period (8.5)
The average number of shares in issue during the period is adjusted for subsequent
rights and scrip issues.
There is a problem associated with an accrual-based profit measure, in that it is open to
manipulation by managers. Evidence from previous research (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a)
indicates that IPO companies may use accruals to overstate their reported earnings. In
addition, the accounting accruals process tends to smooth reported earnings relative to
cash flows (Holthausen and Larcker, 1996). Thus, an alternative performance measure
based on cash flows may be preferable.
211
Chapter 8 - Research design 11: Accounting-based performance
8.4.1.2 Cash flow-based measure
Kaplan (1989), Jain and Kini (1994) and Kim et al. (2004), among others, argue that
operating cash flows are a useful measure of operating performance because they are a
primary component in the calculation of net present value (NPV) in determining the
company value. The cash flow-based performance measure should be less sensitive to
manipulation by managers and show more variability'than the accrual-based measure.
A further advantage of the cash-flow based performance measure is that it is not directly
affected by non-cash items, such as depreciation, goodwil, or changes in working
capital management.
Several previous studies compute operating cash flow by deducting capital expenditure
from operating income (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994; Cai and Wei, 1997; Chan et al., 2003)
or adding back depreciation to earnings before inteirest and taxes (e.g., Kim et al., 2004).
The cash flow proxies employed by these studies do not equate to operating cash flow
and have been criticised as poor proxies (Bowen et aL., 1986). Consequently, the
present study uses an improved cash flow measure which eliminates the accounting
accruals that can be manipulated by managers. This calculation (shown previously in
Table 8.1) is similar to that employed by Roosenboom et aL. (2003). As with the
accrual profit measure, three cash flow variables are used on a before tax basis. The
reasons for using such denominators are also similar. The definitions are:
Operating cash flows return on operating assets (OCF/TA)
Cash flow generated from operations
=
Total assets (8.6)
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Operating cash flows return on operating assets (OCF/OA)
Cash flow generated from operations
=
Total assets - (Cash and equivalents) (8.7)
Operating cash flow return on sales (OCF/Sales)
Cash flow generated from operations
=
Total sales
(8.8)
8.4.2 Other measures of accounting performance
While the main focus of this study is on accrual-based and cash flow-based measures of
operating performance, it also investigates the potential sources that might offer an
explanation for changes in the operating performance.
8.4.2.1 Sources of operating performance changes
//-
(In line with prior research (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994;-Cai and Wei, 1997; Chan et at.,
2003; Kim et at., 2004), three measures were used: (i) sales; (ii) capital expenditure; and
(iii) asset turnover. Sales are usually employed to measure output, and asset turnover is
used to measure efficiency. Asset turnover is the ratio of sales to total assets. It
measures how efficiently a company uses its assets to generate sales. The definition is:
Asset turnover
Total sales
=
Total assets (8.9)
213
Chapter 8 - Research design 11: Accounting-based performance
The percentage change in sales, capital expenditure and asset turnover in each year from
the pre-IPO year, or the previous year, was calculated as the first difference in the data
series deflated by the previous year's value for the data series:
Source of operating performance change (t)
h I if Lsource measure¡(t) - Source measure¡( - 1 or t - l)J= t e va ue 0
Source measure¡ ( - 1 or t - 1) (8.10)
where:
= IPO company or benchmark;
- 1 the fiscal year prior to the IPO, which is year -1,'
t a post-IPO fiscal year end, which is year 0, year + 1, year +2 and year +3,'
,
Since five years of data are available for sample companies, each time-series has four
observations for each company, after differencing. The median or mean source of
operating performance changes is expressed relative to year - 1, or the previous year, by
considering only companies with positive values of capital expenditure and asset
turnover.
8.4.2.2 Market expectations
The market expectations variables are also considered to assess whether investors have
high expectations at the time of IPOs for their companies' future performance. Changes
in market expectations are measured relative to the IPO year (year 0) since share price
data are not available prior to the IPOs. Following Jain and Kini (1994), two market
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expectations proxies are used: (i) the market-to-book ratio of assets; and (ii) the
market-to-book ratio of equity. The definitions are:
Market-to-book ratio of assets (MTBA)
Market value of equity + Market value of debt
Book value of equity and reserves + Book value of debt (8.11)
Market-to-book ratio of equity (MTBE)
Market value of equity
Book value of equity capital and reserve (8.12)
The market value of equity is the number of shares outstanding times the share price.
This study assumes that the market value of debt is equivalent to the book value of debt,
as used by Jain and Kini (1994). Debt consist~' of total long term and short term
borrowings.
8.4.2.3 Leverage
The leverage ratios are utilised to look at the financing decision of the IPO companies'
pre- and post-IPOs. Two measures of leverage are employed to provide a robustness
test on this measure: (i) total debt over total assets; and (ii) total debt over equity. The
definitions are:
Total debt over total assets (TD/TA)
Total of long and short term borrowings
=
Total assets (8.13)
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Total of long and short term borrowings
Book value of equity capital and reserves (8.14)
Table 8.3 provides a summary definition of all of the accounting performance proxies.
Table 8.3 Definitions of the accounting performance measurés
Panel A: Proxies for accounting-based operating performance measures
(i) Accrual-based measures
OIT A Operating return on total
assets.
Operating return on
operating assets.
Operating return on sales.
Operating return on equity.
OI/OA
OI/Sales
ROE
EPS Earnings per share.
(ii) Cash flow-based measures
OCF/TA Operating cash flow return
on assets.
OCF/OA
OCF/Sales
PanelB:
SG
CEG
ATG
Operating cash flow return
on operating assets.
Operating cash flow return
on sales.
Operating profit before tax divided by total assets.
Operating profit before tax divided by total assets minus cash
and equivalents.
Operating profit before tax divided by total sales.
Operating profit before tax divided by book value of equity
capital and reserves.
Published earnings for ordinary divided by average number of
shares in issue during the period.
Cash flows generated from operation divided by total assets.
Cash flows generated from operation divided by total assets
minus cash and equivalents.
Cash flows generated from operation divided by total sales.
Proxies for sources of operating performance changes
Sales. Total sales.
Capital expenditure. Cash paid on purchase of fixed assets.
Asset turnover. Total sales divided by total assets.
Panel C: Proxies for market expectations
MTB assets Market-to-book ratio of
assets.
MTB equity
PanelD:
TD/TA
TD/Equity
Market-to-book ratio of
equity.
Proxies for leverage
Total debt to total assets.
Total debt to total equity.
Market value of equity plus market value of debt divided by
book value of equity capital and reserves plus book value of
debt.
Market value of equity divided by book value of equity capital
and reserves.
Total debt divided by total assets.
Total debt divided by total equity.
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The model of expected performance, which is the second step in designing the study
using accounting performance, is discussed next.
8.4.3 Model of expected performance
This study has adopted a matched-company adjusted performance modeL. Two test
variables are used to examine the pre- and post-accounting performance of IPOs. The
first is the unadjusted, or raw value of IPO companies (APi and AP2). The second test
variable is the matched-company adjusted variable or adjusted value, which is the IPO
company's raw accounting performance minus its matched company's accounting
performance (APi-AP3 and AP2-AP4).
Figure 8.1 Design for computation of pre- and post-IPO adjusted variables
~ ~ ~
,
o
IPa
company minus
Matched
company
IPa
company minus
Matched
company
1 1
Pre-IPO adjusted value
(A)
Post-IPa adjusted value
(B)
I
t= -1 t=O
I
t=1
I
t=2
I
t=3
)
As illustrated in Figure 8.1, in order to derive the pre-IPO adjusted value (A) or
abnormal accounting performance in year - 1, the matching company value (AP3) at year
-1 is subtracted from the IPO value (APi) at year -1. In the post-IPO period t (t = 0, 1,
2, and 3), the matched company value (AP4) in that year t is subtracted from the post-
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IPO value (AP2) during the same period t to derive the post-IPO adjusted value (B) in
period t. In order to compare pre-and post-IPO performances, the post-IPO adjusted
value is compared to the pre-IPO adjusted value to ascertain whether the IPO resulted in
an improved or a declined accounting performance.
8.4.4 Analysis undertaken and test statistics used
Two types of analyses have been undertaken. The first is to test the level of accounting
performance over time from year - 1 to year +3. The second is to test the change in the
accounting performance from the year immediately prior the IPO (year - 1 to 0, year - 1
to +1, year -1 to +2, year -1 to +3). To identify when changes (if any) took place, this
study also tests the year-to-year change from the previous year (year - 1 to 0, year 0 to
+ 1, year + 1 to +2, year +2 to +3) . Year - 1 is the fiscal year prior to the IPO year, year 0
is the fiscal year of the IPO, year + 1 is fiscal year after the IPO and so forth.
While year 0 is defined as the fiscal year in which the IPO occurs, the timing of the IPO
within the year wil vary. Thus, for some IPO companies, year 0 financial results wil
relate mainly to when it is private, while for others the results wil be based largely on a
period when the company is public. The same convention has been used in prior studies
(e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a). Thus, the performance a year after the IPO is referred to as
the performance over a 'fiscal' year since the company went public.
Figure 8.2 ilustrates the timing conventions employed in this study in situations where
the fiscal year of the IPO companies is similar to the calendar year. For each IPO
company, the fiscal year before the IPO year is labelled as event year - 1. The rest of
the years are similarly indexed relative to the IPO year (year 0). However, not all IPO
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compames have a fiscal year end coincident with the calendar year-end. Several
companies prepare their financial results for the period ending April, June or September,
rather than December. To avoid confusion on the timing convention, Figure 8.3
ilustrates the time line in a situation where the fiscal year of the IPO companies is
different from the calendar year.
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8.4.4.1 Analysis of the level of accounting performance
In order to assess the pre and post-IPO accounting performance, all ratios are computed
annually at five different points in time, i.e. at the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPO
(t = - 1), the IPO year (t = 0) and three fiscal years subsequent to the IPOs (t = 1, 2, and
3), respectively. The analysis focuses on the median level of the accounting
performance measures instead of the mean leveL. This study uses the median as a
measure of central tendency throughout the thesis because accounting performance
measures may be skewed and the mean is particularly sensitive to outliers (Kaplan,
1989; Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). The Wilcoxon matched pairs
signed-ranks test is used to test whether the medians are significantly different from
zero, and the paired sample t-tests for mean value.
The binomial proportionality test statistic is also employed to test whether the
percentage (p) of IPO companies overperforming their matched companies is different
from what would be expected by chance (i.e. 50%). The test statistic z (assumed to be
normally distributed) is calculated as:
z = (Po - 0.5) * (n -T 0.25/~ (8.15)
where:
Po = percentage of overperformance,'
n = number of paired IPO-matched companies comparisons
The critical z values are 2.575, 1.960, and 1.645 at the 1, 5, and 10% level, using a
two-tailed test.
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8.4.4.2 Analysis of the change of accounting performance
The accounting performance measure for the last fiscal year before the IPO year (year
- 1) is compared to the accounting performance measure at the time of the IPO (year 0),
and for the first three full fiscal years after the IPOs (year + 1, year +2, year +3), as used
in prior studies (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997 and Kim et at., 2004).
However, these comparisons focus on the cumulative effect of performance change.
Yet investors are also interested in changes in operating performance when assessing
the value of companies (Jain and Kini, 1994). Therefore, this study also examines the
year-to-year post-IPO changes and a one sample Wi1coxon signed-ranks test is used to
test whether the median changes in performance are significantly different from zero.
Following the method used by Jain and Kini (1994), the change in operating
performance is measured as the median (mean) change in levels or absolute change. 89
Change!
= the median (or mean) value of (operating return¡ (t) - operating return¡ (-1)
or (t-1)) (8.16)
where:
= IPO company or benchmark;
-1 the fiscal year prior to the IPO, which is year -1,'
89 A similar method to measure change has been used by Kaplan (1989), Smith (1990), Muscarella and
Vetsuypens (1990), Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) on leverage buyouts (LBOs), by Jain and Kini
(1994) on IPOs and by Powell and Stark (2005) on takeovers.
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t a post-IPO fiscal year end, which is year 0, year + 1, year +2 and year +3,'
t-1 the fiscal year prior a post-IPO fiscal year end, which is year -1, year 0, year
+ 1, and year +2.
The present study uses the change model rather than the percentage change modeL. One
of the reasons for not using the percentage change model is the negative denominator
problem, whereby companies with poor performance (negative value) need to be
removed from the calculation of percentage change.9o Barber and Lyon (1996)
comment that if the negative value is included in the sample, 'the result is nonsensical'
(p. 394). As argued by them, having to remove poor performing companies wil reduce
the power of statistical tests and lead to biases in test statistics.
The matched company-adjusted change for the IPO is the difference between the change
in accounting performance for the IPO and its maitched company. Again, the median
(mean) change in matched company-adjusted performance is measured for year + 1, +2
and +3 relative to year - 1 or each previous year.
8.4.4.3 Analysis of the association between ownership structure, underpricing and
post-IPO operating performance
The association between post-IPO operating performance and company ownership
(family relationship and retained ownership) and IPO underpricing has also been
investigated.
90 Using the percentage change's calculation, the first difference of the data series is deflated by the
previous data series value.
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Family relationships
For the family relationships, '1' is used to denote a company that has a family
relationship, and '0' is used to denote company that has no family relationship.9l
Retained ownership
With regard to retained ownership, the sample is split into two groups based on median
alpha.92 Following Downes and Heinkel (1982), the retained ownership a value is
calculated as:
(N -Np -NJa=
N (8.17)
where:
a the proportionate ownership retained by the 'insiders (original owners),'
N = the total number of shares outstanding afer the initial offer,'
Np = the number ofprimary shares in the initial offer (public issue),'
Ns = the number of secondary shares offered by the insiders for resale (offer for sale).
91 Data on family relationships was obtained from the offering prospectuses. The family relationships
information available from the prospectuses stated whether any of the directors and senior management
have family relationships with other directors and senior managers, such as brother, son, spouse etc.
92 Data to calculate the retained ownership was also obtained from the offering prospectus. The above
median alpha subsample wil be referred as to the 'high retained ownership' group and the below median
alpha subsample as the 'low retained ownership' group.
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Underpricing
The sample is also split into two groups based on median underpricing.93 The above
median underpricing sub-sample wil be referred as to the 'high underpricing' group and
the below median underpricing sub-sample as the 'low underpricing' group. The same
analysis was undertaken by Jain and Kini (1994), and Khurshed et aL. (2003). The
significance test for comparisons between the groups is based on the one sample
Mann- Whitney U test, which tests whether the difference between group medians is
significantly different from zero.
8.5 Summary
This chapter provides the research design employed to investigate the accounting
performance of Malaysian IPOs. The research design based on the level of accounting
,
performance and changes in accounting performance is discussed. In addition, the
accrual-based and cash-flow based measures are used to investigate accounting-based
operating performance. The sources of improvement or deterioration in performance
were also examined. Since prior studies noted that investors have high expectations of
the future earnings growth of companies, this study examines market expectations.
Two leverage ratios are used to measure the financing behaviour of those companies
around the offerings. The procedure for the analysis of the relationship between
company ownership, underpricing and post-IPO operating performance has also been
discussed.
93 The underpricing is raw underpricing and was calculated in a fashion similar to the formula described
in Chapter 5.
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The following chapter presents the results of the analyses of accounting-based operating
performance.
227
Chapter 9 - Results 11: Accounting-based performance
Chapter 9
Results on post-IPO accounting-based operating performance
9.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the results of the empirical analysis of the accounting-based
operating performance of Malaysian IPOs and is divided into four parts. The first
presents descriptive statistics of IPO and matched companies' performance. The second
part provides an analysis of changes in accounting-based operating performance,
including both accrual- and cash flow-based approaches (first section), the sources of
operating performance (second section), market expectations (third section), and
leverage (fourth section). The third part of the chapter concentrates on univariate
analysis of post-IPO operating performance for subsamples based on family
relationships (first section), retained ownership (se¿ond section) and underpricing (third
section). Finally, an overall summary of accounting-based operating performance is
provided.
Part 1 Descriptive statistics
9.2 Descriptive statistics of IPO and matched companies performance
Table 9.1 presents the descriptive statistics for 254 IPOs and 254 matched companies.
The information is pre-IPO, with market value measured on the flotation date; market
value data was unobtainable for 4 IPO companies. The descriptive statistics indicate
that the median (mean) operating return on sales (OI/Sales) for the sample of IPO and
matched companies is 13.9% (16.3%) and 13.6% (15.3%), respectively. These are
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expected to be similar since the IPO compames have been matched primarily on
OI/Sales. While the difference between medians is not statistically significant, the
difference between means OI/Sales is statistically significant at the 5% leveL. There is a
wide variation in this operating margin; IPO companies range between -24% and 63%
and the matched companies between -26% and 52%. The skewness (and kurtosis) is
typical for company size measures generally, but also suggest a ~arger positive tail with
greater central clustering for IPO companies.
The absolute figures of operating profit before tax, total sales, total assets, equity capital
and reserves, market value, and total debt show some differences between IPO and
matched companies. There are significant differences in both median and mean values
at the 1% leveL. For example, the median (mean) total sales for IPO companies are
RM65 milion (RM125 million) compared with RM137 milion (RM784 millon) for
,
matched companies. The difference is partly a function of the process used in size
matching, since IPOs were usually matched with the closest larger non-IPO company,
even though the size range between 70% and 130% of IPO was used. Similar
observations occur for the other size measures. The highest market value of RM26,250
milion for IPO companies is observed for the company Tenaga Nasional Berhad.
Meanwhile, the lowest market value of RM24 milion is observed for the company
Carpet International Malaysia Berhad.
While the total debt of IPO companies is also smaller than for their matched companies,
the gearing levels are significantly higher at the 1 % (10%) level for medians (means).
The median (mean) debt/equity ratio is 40% (64%) for IPOs compared with 24% (49%)
for matched companies. This is not surprising given the desire to raise new equity
finance expressed in the IPOs.
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Table 9.2 shows the crosstabulation between industry groups for IPO and matched
companies. Industry matching seems to be very successfuL. Four industry groups
(NCYCG, NCYSR, RESOR and RLDEV) are found to be perfectly matched (100%),
and another four industry groups (BASIC, CYCGD, CYSER AND GENIN) are well
matched (:; 75% in the same industry). Two industries (ITECH and UTILS) are less
well matched due to the relatively small number of potential matching companies in
these industries.
Overall the statistics suggest that a good match between IPOs and matched companies is
achieved for the primary variable (operating profit margin) and for the industry group.
However, size matching is less good, demonstrating the difficulty of finding close
matches from a relatively small population. In view of this, performance ratios (rather
than absolute values) are employed in cross-sectional and time-series analyses in order
to minimise potential bias.
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Part 2 Changes in accounting-based operating performance
9.3 Accrual-based operating performance
Prior to investigating the changes in the operating performance of the Malaysian IPOs,
it is useful to consider the level of operating performance of IPO companies and their
respective matched companies over time for the pre-IPO period, during the IPO, and the
post-IPO period. The analysis of the level of performance is conducted to identify any
differences between IPO and matched companies throughout years -1, 0, +1, +2, and
+3. Similar to Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson et al. (1997), and Kim et al. (2004), the
analysis focuses on median performance due to the tendencies of accounting ratio to
have outliers in the data.
Panel A and Panel B of Table 9.3 provide analyses of the results of the level of
,
operating performance using the operating return on operating assets (OI/OA) and
operating return on sales (OI/Sales). Both the median and mean levels of Oi/OA of the
IPO companies are higher and significantly different at the 1 % level to that of their
matched companies in the year prior to the IPO and IPO year. But, only the mean level
of Oi/OA of the IPO companies overperforms their matched companies significantly at
the 5% level in the year immediately after the IPO. While IPO companies continue to
overperform matched companies in year +2, both median and mean levels are not
statistically significantly different. However, IPO companies underperform the matched
companies in the third year following the IPOs at the 1 % leveL. These results are
confirmed by a significant percentage positive with more (and less) than 50% observed
in year -1 and 0 (and year+3).
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Consistent with the results reported for the Oi/OA measures, median OI/Sales is also
higher for IPO companies compared to their matched companies in year - 1 and year O.
However, only performance in year 0 is significantly different at the 1 % leveL. This
result is confirmed by a significant percentage positive adjusted OI/Sales of 60% in year
O. Subsequent to year 0, the matched companies seem to dominate the IPO companies,
albeit both groups show a decline in performance from year - 1,. to year +3; however,
only year +3 shows a significant IPO underperformance. The percentage positive
adjusted OI/Sales at year +3 is only 39%, significantly different from 50%. For
comparison with prior studies, the results concerning the operating return on total assets
are reported in the Appendix (see Panel A of Table 9. lA). The results are qualitatively
similar to those reported for the operating return on operating assets.
Reported in Table 9.4 are the median and mean changes in operating return deflated by
operating assets (OI/OA). Panel A reports the results on the pre- and post-IPO changes,
while Panel B provides the results of the year-to-year changes. Panel A reports that all
the median OI/OA values decline from the pre-IPO leveL. All of them are significantly
different from zero at the 1 % leveL. The results are consistent with US studies by Jain
and Kini (1994) who found a decline of 9.09% in return on assets three years after the
IPO, and by Kim et aL. (2004).94
The matched company numbers exhibit a similar pattern of statistically significant
underperformance for the four years, reflecting economy-wide, industry-wide, pre-event
performance and size factors. The matched company-adjusted results control for such
94 Kim et al. (2004) report a 71 % decline to year +3 from the pre- IPO performance leveL. The equivalent
measure for the present study is a decline of 64%.
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factors and show a decline throughout the performance windows examined except for
the difference with year O. The median matched company-adjusted changes range from
-0.1% to -8.1 % and all (except the first) are statistically significant, indicating that IPO
companies have a higher rate of decline than their matched companies. This shows that
the decline in post-IPO Oi/OA is not simply an industry-effect, a reflection of mean
reversion or size related. The decline in Oi/OA from year -1 ,suggests that the IPO
companies may time the issues to occur after good performance.
Table 9.4 The median and mean changes in operating return on operating assets
(OI/OA)
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre-post-IPO changes (%) Year-I to 0 Year-I to +I Year-I to +2 Year-I to +3
IPa company
- 1.20' -2.94b -6.06' -S.51' -7.50" - 1 1.0S' -10.24a
-16.55"
p-value 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Matched company
-O.Sl -2.S2b
-2.S1' -4.76"
-3.60" -5.63a
-3.45" -4.46a
p-value 0.000 0.013 0.000 O.OQO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Matched company-adjusted
-0. OS 
-0.11 -4.36a -3.76b
-5.S7a -5.45' -S.07' -12.09a
p-value 0.976 0.942 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (%) Year-I to 0 YearOto +I Year +I to +2 Year +2 to +3
IPa company
-1.20a -2.94b -4.21' -5.5Sa -1.41' -2.56"
-1.97a -5.47'
p-value 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Matched company
-O.Sl -2.S2b
-0.96a -1.94 -0.34'
-0.S7 0.ü 1. 7
p-value 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.146 0.040 0.4S7 0.675 0.297
Matched company-adjusted
-O.OS
-0.11 -3.44" -3.65b -I.S4' -1.69 -I.Sl -6.64a
p-value 0.976 0.942 0.000 0.010 0.006 0.210 0.000 0.001
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
.andb Significantly different from zero at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
The year-to-year changes in Oi/OA reported in Panel B also show significant declines
in performance with the rate of decline slowing somewhat. After controllng for the
matched companies within a similar industry, pre-IPO performance and size, the
changes in OI/OA stil show significant declines except for the change from year -1 to
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O. Thus, it is clear that IPOs in Malaysia do show deterioration in accruals-based return
on operating assets for the three post-IPO years. Contrary to expectations, this study did
not find a large decline in OI/OA in the year - 1 to 0, but this was observed in year 0 to
+ 1. To test the robustness of the results, the operating return on total assets was also
measured and the results, presented in the Appendix (Table 9.2A), show similar
patterns.
Table 9.5 The median and mean changes in operating return on sales (Ol/Sales)
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre -post-IPO changes (%) Year -1 to 0 Year-1 to +1 Year-1 to +2 Year -1 to +3
IPO company 0.29 0.60 -2.91" -4.73' -4.46' -8.13' -7.04' -14.42"
p-value 0.255 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Matched company
_1.3' 1.5 _2.13'
-6.33b -3.30' -9.96' -2.59'
-9.53b
p-value 0.000 0.764 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.001 0,000 0.019
Matched company-adjusted 1.80'
-0.55 -1.4 1.60 -2.09 1.83 _4.64' -4.89
p-value 0.000 0.887 0.239 0.621 0.123 0.593 0.000 0.304
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (%) Year-1 to 0 YearOto +1 Year +1 to +2 Year +2 to +3
IPO company 0.29 0.60 -3.05' -5.33' -0.97' -3.40'
- 1.65' -6.29'
p-value 0.255 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003
Matched company
- 1.3' 1.5 _0.77' -7.48' -0.59b
-3.63 -0.05 0.43
p-value 0.000 0.764 0.006 0.058 0.030 0.333 0.368 0.920
Matched company-adjusted 1.80' -0.55 -2.90' 2.15 -1.2 0.23 -2.16' -6.72
p-value 0.000 0.887 0.000 0.587 0.183 0.952 0.000 0.159
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
',b, ,nd, Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Results for changes in the less downward-biased measure OI/Sales are reported in Table
9.5. Interestingly, as can be observed from Panel A that there is slight improvement in
performance in year 0 relative to year - 1 for the IPO companies. However, this
improvement is not statistically significant. Subsequent to the IPO, there is a significant
decline in performance in OI/Sales for both the IPO and matched companies. The
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year-to-year changes reported in Panel B indicate that the median OI/Sales for the IPO
companies peaks in the IPO year and then declines following the IPO. Consistent with
the Oi/OA results, the highest decline occurs in the year immediately after the IPO (year
o to + 1).
Table 9.6 The median and mean changes in return on equity
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre- post-IPO changes (%) Year -1 to 0 Year-1 to +1 Year-1 to +2 Year-1 to +3
IPO company
-6.74' - 12.46 -13.87' -21.79b -17.61' -27.81' -21.40' -34.41'
p-value 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004
Matched company
-1.24' 2.52 -3.1 l' -7.42' -4.93' -7.68 -5.75" -10.72
p-value 0.000 0.448 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.148
Matched company-adjusted
-5.71" -14.99c -8.49" -14.37 -10.05' -20.13b
- 1 5 .36' -23.69c
p-value 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.089
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (%) Year -1 to 0 YearOto +1 Year +1 to +2 Year +2 to +3
IPO company
-6.74' - 12.46 -5.35' -9.33' -1.91' -6.02b -2.47' -6.60
p-value 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.454
,
Matched company
- 1.24' 2.52 - 1.55" -9.95' -1.00' -0.25 0.11 -3.05
p-value 0.000 0.448 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.951 0.687 0.759
Matched company-adjusted
-5.71' -14.99c -2.61' 0.61 -1.06 -5.76 -3.19'
-3.55
p-value 0.000 0.094 0.002 0.890 0.1 18 0.235 0.001 0.788
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
a, b. andc Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
To confirm the decline in accrual-based measures, the results of the changes in return on
equity (ROE) and earnings per share (EPS) are also provided in Tables 9.6 and 9.7.
Table 9.6 shows that ROE suffers a larger post-listing fall from the pre-IPO level than
OCF/OA and OI/OA measures. The largest fall occurs from year -1 to O. The results
are as expected because the IPO companies have just raised equity but return on extra
assets has not had time to impact on operating returns. The year-to-year changes are
reported in Panel B to see whether the ROE decline in each post-IPO year. Also
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revealed is a significant decline of ROE for the IPO compames and matched
company-adjusted but the levels of decline are lower in year + 1, +2 and +3 than the one
observed in year O. Summarising the results of Table 9.6, it is clear that the ROE
performance of IPO companies deteriorates significantly over time.
Table 9.7 The median and mean changes in earnings per share
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre-post-IPO changes (RM) Year-1 to 0 Year-1 to +1 Year-1 to +2 Year -1 to +3
IPO company
-O.1l 20.56
-0.18" 20.44 -0.23" 20.4I
-0.26" 20.32
p-value 0.000 0.322 0.000 0.325 0.000 0.326 0.000 0.328
Matched company 0.00' -0.03 -0.03"
_0.10" -0.02" -O.ll _0.03" -0.09"
p-value 0.087 0.214 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001
Matched company-adjusted
-0.09" 20.59
-0.17" 20.53 -0.16" 20.51 -0.2l 20.41
p-value 0.000 0.321 0.000 0.323 0.000 0.323 0.000 0.325
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (RM) Year -1 to 0 YearOto +1 Year +1 to +2 Year +2 to +3
IPO company
-O.1l 20.56
-0.07"
-0.12" -0.01 b -0.03 -0.02"
-0.09"
p-value 0.000 0.322 0.000 O.QOO 0.031 0.240 0.001 0.004
,
Matched company 0.00'
-0.03 0.00
-0.07b 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01
p-value 0.087 0.214 0.213 0.045 0.221 0.756 0.242 0.515
Matched company-adjusted
-0.09" 20.59
-0.08" -0.06 -0.01 -0.02
-0.02" -0.10"
p-value 0.000 0.321 0.000 0.165 0.663 0.543 0.005 0.006
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
". b. and, Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Similar to ROE, Panel A of Table 9.7 shows that both median EPS for IPO companies
and matched companies significantly decline at the 1% level in the post-IPO. The
median adjusted EPS displays a similar pattern of declining performance. From this
table, it can also be observed that the declining performance of IPO companies is higher
than their matched company counterparts. The year-to-year changes reported in Panel
B show that the highest decline in EPS occurs during the IPO year. This might be
expected due to the increase in the number of shares outstanding in that year.
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In sum, the evidence suggests that the accrual-based operating performance of IPO
companies is higher prior to the IPO but declines thereafter, subject to a slight
improvement in operating margin in the IPO year (year - 1 to 0). This suggests that the
IPO companies may time their IPO to coincide with peak performance and/or may
increase their assets more rapidly than sales. There is also evident that IPO companies
underperform their matched companies from the year following tpe IPO. Moreover, the
evidence is consistent with previous empirical studies (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994,
Khurshed et at., 2003; Kim et at., 2004) which report a deterioration in accrual-based
operating performance following IPOs.
The following section presents the results of tests using the cash flow-based operating
performance approach.
9.4 Cash flow-based operating performan'ce approach
In addition to investigating accrual-based performance, this study also examines cash
flow-based measures to assess the robustness of the results. This may also indicate
whether the deterioration in performance in the post-IPO period is due to genuine
erosion in operating performance or the reversal of pre-event accruals. As in the
previous section, the analysis of the level of operating performance for the IPO
companies and matched companies is provided first.
Panel A of Table 9.8 reports the median and mean performance level ofOCF/OA for the
year before the IPO (year -1) to the IPO year (year 0) and three years after the IPO
(year + 1, year +2, and year +3) for the IPO companies and their matched companies.
IPO companies marginally overperform their matched companies prior to the IPOs but
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tend to underperform the matched compames after the IPOs, except in year +2.
However, only in year +3 is the median level of OCF lOA of the IPO companies weakly
significantly different (at the 10% level) from that of their matched companies. This
implies that the performance patterns for the two groups (IPOs and matched companies)
are similar in each year, except in the third year following the IPOs. While results
based on means show that IPO companies dominate their matche~ companies in year - 1,
0, +1, and +2 but underperform in year +3, none of the differences is statistically
significant. This is confirmed by the percentage positive OCF/OA adjusted
performance which is also not significantly different from 50% in any of the five years.
The results are apparently inconsistent with Cai and Wei (1997), who found that
Japanese IPO companies significantly overperform their industry median benchmarks
for all individual years examined. However, the results are consistent with Cai and
Wei's matched company benchmark. The results of the operating cash flow return on
,
total assets are also reported in the Appendix (Panel B of Table 9.1A). These are
qualitatively similar to the results based on operating cash flow return on operating
assets.
Comparing the results between the levels of accrual-based profit (OI/OA) reported in
Table 9.3 and cash flow-based (OCF/OA) reported in Table 9.8, this study found that
IPO companies are more outperformed on the accrual-based profit measure than the
cash flow-based measure in the pre-IPO year. IPO companies are also found to be more
underperformed on the accrual-based measure as compared to cash flow-based in year
+3.
It has been highlighted in Chapter 8 that the accounting performance scaled by assets
might result in a downward bias after IPOs, due to the large increase in the book value
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of assets with no immediate increase in operating cash flows. Therefore, the results of
operating cash flow return on sales (OCF/Sales) are also reported in Panel B of Table
9.8. In contrast to the results based on OCF/OA, the results for OCF/Sales are all
negative, indicating that the IPO companies performed worse than their matched
companies during both pre- and post-IPO periods. The differences in performance are
statistically significant at the 1 % level in year 0 and +3, at the 5% level in year -1, and
at the 10% level in year + 1. The percentage positive is significantly different from 50%
in year 0, +1, and +3. Based on the results reported in Panel A and B of Table 9.8, there
is evidence of underperformance of IPO companies in Malaysia as compared to
seasoned companies with the same industry, pre-IPO performance and asset size.
The distorting impact of outliers is ilustrated in the results based on mean performance,
where no clear patterns or significance occur.95 Again, comparing the accrual-based
measure (OI/Sales) reported in Table 9.3 and cash' flow-based (OCF/Sales) reported in
Table 9.8, the results confirmed that accrual-based measure display more
overperformance but this is insignificant in the pre-IPO period as compared to the cash
flow-based measure. Similarly, more significant underperformance is observed on the
accrual-based measure in year +3.
95 Confirmation that this is an outlier effect was obtained by calculating trimmed means. Using a 20%
trimmed mean for year +3 gave the following values: IPOs 12.5%, Matched companies 16.9%, with the
differences significant at the 1 % leveL.
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Table 9.9 reports both the median and mean changes of OCF/OA for IPO companies,
matched companies and matched company-adjusted. Panel A provides evidence of a
statistically significant (at the 1 % level) decline in performance for IPO companies from
the year prior to the IPO (year -1) to year 0, + 1, +2, and +3. Matched companies show
only weakly significant declines in performance from year -1 to +2, and from year -1 to
+3, so IPOs significantly underperform matched companies fqr all years except the
period to year +2.
Table 9.9 The median and mean changes in operating cash flow return on
operating assets (OCF/OA)
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre-post-IPO changes (%) Year-I to 0 Year-I to +I Year-I to +2 Year-I to +3
IPO company
-2.94a -3.W -2.38a -2.89b -2.32a -3.74a -2.89a -4.89a
p-value 0.001 0.028 0.006 0.042 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.000
Matched company
-0.11 -1.48 0.09 -0.61 -1.26' - 1.86'
- 1.64' -1.47
p-value 0.239 0.155 0.784 0.513 0.063 0.077 0.075 0.193
Matched company-adjusted
-4.00b
,
_2.iob-2.81' -1.66 -2.28 -3.67 -1.88 -3.42'
p-value 0.070 0.351 0.030 0.202 0.147 0.269 0.033 0.054
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (%) Year-I to 0 YearOto +I Year +I to +2 Year +2 to +3
IPO company
-2.94" -3.l4b -0.77 0.25
-0.43 -0.85 -0.48 -1.5
p-value 0.001 0.028 0.978 0.855 0.845 0.489 0.151 0.267
Matched company
-0.11 -1.48 0.69 0.88 -0.23 -1.25 0.03 0.39
p-value 0.239 0.155 0.289 0.372 0.151 0.155 0.465 0.670
Matched company-adjusted
-2.81' -1.66 -2.06 -0.62 1.05 0.40 -2.37
-1.55
p-value 0.070 0.351 0.3 15 0.723 0.342 0.792 0.102 0.270
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
a.b,and, Significantly different from zero at the 0.01,0,05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
The year-to-year performance for IPO companies shows a decline in all four years but
only the median decline of 2.9% in year - 1 to 0 is statistically significant (at the 1 %
level). The median year-to-year changes for the matched companies are all smaller than
for IPO companies, with two small improvements and two years of decline; all changes
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are statistically insignificant. IPOs underperform against control group but only
statistically significant in year - 1 to 0 at the 10% leveL. Results based on means are
broadly similar though generally less significant. The operating cash flow return on
total assets (OCF/TA) was also measured and the results, reported in Appendix (Table
9.3A), show similar patterns.
The results for changes of OCF /Sales, reported in Table 9.1 0 provide contrasting
results. As can be observed from Panel A, even though there is some evidence of
decline in post-IPO performance relative to the pre-IPO level, this is not statistically
significant except for the decline to year 0 for the IPO companies. The year-to-year
changes reported in Panel B of this table also show insignificant median declines,
except from year - 1 to 0 for IPO companies. Comparing the results when operating
assets and total sales are used as the denominator, the results support the argument that
post-IPO accounting performance deflated by as~ets suffers from a downward bias
(Barber and Lyon, 1996; Mikkelson et at., 1997).
It is clear that both accrual performance measures show higher pre- IPO performance,
consistent with Kim et at.'s (2004) study on the Thailand market. Post-IPOs, there is
evidence of IPO companies underperforming relative to their matched companies. This
is consistent with the Mikkelson et al.' s (1997) study on the US market and Cai and
Wei's (1997) findings on the Japanese market. There is also a much steeper decline in
performance relative to the pre-IPO year when accrual-based measures are used. The
year-to-year change confirmed that the accrual-based measures show more significant
decline from the previous year. The largest fall in accrual-based measure occurs from
year 0 to + 1. On the hand, the largest fall in cash flow-based measure occurs from year
-1 to +0. Overall, the results suggest that both accrual- and cash flow-based measures
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deteriorate following Malaysian IPOs. Comparing the results between the accrual- and
cash flow-based measures suggests that erosion in operating performance may be the
result of the reversal of pre-event accruals that have been used by IPO managers to
overstate pre-IPO earnings.
Table 9.10 The median and mean changes in operating cash flow return on sales
(OCF/Sales)
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre- post-IPO changes (%) Year-Ita 0 Year-I to +1 Year-l to +2 Year-l to +3
IPa company
-1.6b -1.03 0.06 1.57 -0.23 0.15 -0.70 3.12
p-value 0.049 0.570 0.890 0.382 0.895 0.946 0.729 0.436
Matched company
-0.02 -3.28 1.06 0.08
-0.65 -4.12 0.11 -1.2
p-value 0.948 0.330 0.388 0.972 0.298 0.158 0.227 0.766
Matched company-adjusted
-1. 1 2.25 -0.92 1.49 0.98 4.27
-3.78 4.44
p-value 0.213 0.556 0.689 0.601 0.570 0.237 0.134 0.444
PanelB:
Year-ta-year changes (%) Year-l to 0 YearOto +1 Year +1 to +2 Year +2 to +3
IPa company
_1.6b
-1.03 0.42 '2.60 0.26 -1.42 -0.14 2.97
p-value 0.049 0.570 0.109 ' 0.179 0.897 0.512 0.866 0.428
Matched company
-0.02 -3.28 1.02 3.36 -0.17 -4.19 0.56c 2.80
p-value 0.948 0.330 0.392 0.179 0.139 0.128 0.074 0.542
Matched company-adjusted
-1. 1 2.25 -0.34
-0.75 2.51 2.78 -2.37 0.17
p-value 0.213 0.556 0.999 0.821 0.272 0.435 0.142 0.976
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
a,b,andc Significantly different from zero at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
The next section provides an analysis of the potential sources of operating performance
changes.
9.5 Sources of changes in operating performance
To further investigate accounting-based operating performance, this study also
examines a variety of potential sources of deterioration in post-IPO operating
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performance. Jain and Kini (1994) find that companies have high growth in sales and
capital expenditure even though their performance declines following IPOs. The
present study considers whether the growth in sales, capital expenditure, and asset
turnover patterns of IPO companies changes over time. This could provide some of the
reasons for the observed inferior operating performance of IPO companies in the three
years following IPOs.
Due to the skewness of the data, the results on growth in sales, capital expenditure, and
asset turnover focus on medians. For example, inspection of the data reveals that there
are eight IPO companies and one matched company having a percentage growth rate in
sales of more than 1000% for individual observations in the post IPO period. The high
value of the growth rate in sales may be due to very low sales in the benchmark year.
For example, one outlier company has total sales of RM19 milion in year -1, rising to
RM125 milion by year +1, thereby producing a growth rate of 560%. However, for
completeness, the results based on means are also reported.
9.5.1 Growth in sales
Table 9.11 reports the median and mean percentage change (growth) in sales. With
respect to the sales growth from the pre-IPO year, this study discovers that IPO
companies have significantly higher growth in sales than their matched companies, over
time. However, this study makes an improvement on the analysis by looking at the
year-to-year growth in sales and finds that IPO companies perform in line with matched
companies except in the pre-IPO period. The results of the year-to-year changes
suggest that the increase in sales for IPO companies can be attributed exclusively to
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industry, mean reversion, and size effects, which is not consistent with the studies by
Jain and Kini (1994), Chan et aL. (2003), and Kim et aL. (2004).
Table 9.11 The median and mean growth in sales
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre-post-IPO growth (%) Year-I to 0 Year -I to +I Year-I to +2 Year-1 to +3
IPO company 17.83' 30.39' 27.13' 52.20" 40.05" 78.49" 46.55' 81.1'
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Matched company 13.42" 16.41' 21.97' 37.01' 25.98' 45.02" 33.48a 48.97'
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Matched company-adjusted 7.31' 13.98b 7.3 1 15.19 l5.96b 33.47b 16.32" 32.13b
p-value 0.007 0.011 0.1 13 0.125 0.027 0.044 0.005 0.013
PanelB:
Year-to-year growth (%) Year-1 to 0 YearOto +1 Year +I to +2 Year +2 to +3
LPO company 17.83' 30.39" 8.70a 12.76a 8.21' 22.76c 4.66' 8.12"
p-va1ue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.000
Matched company 13.42" 16.41' 9.00a 24.52" 6.79' 8.70" 7.02" 2.47
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.698
Matched company-adjusted 7.31' 13.98b 0.07 -11.76 0.73 14.06 0.87 5.65
p-value 0.007 0.011 0.816 0.1 0'6 0.282 0.255 0.266 0.399
,
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
a. b, andc Significantly different from zero atthe 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
9.5.2 Changes in capital expenditure
A reduction in post-IPO operating performance may be due to companies cutting back
on capital expenditure. Panel A of Table 9.12 reports a significant increase in capital
expenditure from the pre- IPO year for all windows examined, for both IPO and matched
companies. The year-to-year changes in capital expenditure reported in Panel B reveal
that capital expenditure increased during the IPO year and a year subsequent to the IPO.
However, the companies marginally cutback their capital expenditure from two years
after they went public.
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Table 9.12 The median and mean changes in capital expenditure
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre-post-IPO changes (%) Year-I to 0 Year-l to +1 Year-l to +2 Year-l to +3
IPO company 31.50" 238.00" 48.10" 585.09b 20.50" 647.79b 20.60" 524.42b
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.025
Matched company 5.35" 816.09 1.88" 335.6l 6.05" 404.98" 6.99" 333.17"
p-value 0.004 0.195 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.002
Matched company-adjusted 23.60b -584.20 29.90" 247.07 11.0 239.57 5.93 188.55
p-value 0.011 0.359 0.002 0.343 0.137 0.440 0.559 0.465
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (%) Year-l to 0 YearOto +1 Year +1 to +2 Year +2 to +3
IPO company 31.50" 238.00" 5.79" 375.66 -7.74 229.97 -3.68 92.5l
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.205 0.187 0.147 0.302 0.000
Matched company 5.35" 816.09 -6.8Ic 323.73" -5.72 122.35"
-5.11 370.llc
p-value 0.004 0.195 0.096 0.006 0.512 0.005 0.139 0.070
Matched company-adjusted 23.60b -584.20 1350 51.94 -1.80 107.62
-9.37 -276.94
p-value 0.011 0.359 0.316 0.871 0.972 0.513 0.475 0.178
Number of companies 252 252 254 254 254 254 253 253
Note:
".b.andc Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
9.5.3 Changes in asset turnover
Asset turnover is usually used to indicate a company's effciency in the use of its assets
to generate sales. Table 9.13 shows that the median change of asset turnover is
significantly negative at the 1 % level, both pre- and post-IPO. IPO companies perform
poorly compared with their matched companies over the four-year window from - 1 to
+3. Asset turnover falls by 30.3% for IPOs compared with a fall of 15.7% for matched
companies. The decline in asset turnover from year - 1 to year +3 indicates that IPO
companies increase their assets much faster than their sales. This finding is consistent
with the earlier results on the accrual-based operating performance measure, which
showed a higher rate of decline when assets rather than sales were used as the
denominator. With a large increase in assets and relatively low increase in sales, the
original level of efficiency cannot be maintained.
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Table 9.13 The median and mean changes in asset turnover
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre-post-IPO changes (%) Year-1 to 0 Year-1 to +1 Year-1 to +2 Year-1 to +3
IPO company
-12.18' -4.40 -18.71' -6.63 -26.39a -11.6b -30.27" -15.75a
p-value 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.003
Matched company
-2.94 -2.98
-7.84b -2.88
-13.49a -5.60c -15.65a -13.51'
p-value 0.062 0.146 0.033 0.270 0.002 0.063 0.000 0.000
Matched company-adjusted
-9.99' -1.42 -14.18a -3.75
-9.58a -5.96 -8.36' -2.25
p-value 0.009 0.730 0.000 0.513 0.000 0.312 0.008 0.717
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (%) Year-1 to 0 Year 0 to +1 Year +1 to +2 Year +2 to +3
IPO company
- 12.18' -4.40 -6.37" -5.29" -3.91' -5.04' -2.3 I b -1.99
p-value 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.022 0.371
Matched company
-2.94c -2.98
-2.93 4.42c -5.l6b 0.39 -3.88a -12.l2b
p-value 0.062 0.146 0.750 0.095 0.032 0.868 0.000 0.047
Matched company-adjusted
-9.99a -1.42 -6.36" -9.71' -3.06 -5.43c 3.98 10.13
p-value 0.009 0.730 0.004 0.002 0.164 0.062 0.141 0.144
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
a, b, and c Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
The year-to-year changes indicate that the decline attenuates up to year +2, while for
year +3 IPO companies perform approximately in line with their matched companies.
The decline in asset turnover is consistent with the findings of Jain and Kini (1994),
Chan et aL. (2003), and Kim et al. (2004).
In sum, the results of growth in sales and capital expenditure do not fully explain the
poorer operating performance of Malaysian companies following IPOs. However, asset
turnover partially explains the poorer operating performance.
9.6 Changes in market expectations
Potential investors may have high expectations of earmngs growth due to either
window-dressing of financial statements by managers prior to the IPO or to managers
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timing the offering when their performance is better (Jain and Kini, 1994). To
investigate this possibility, two measures of investor expectations (market-to-book
assets and market-to-book equity) were considered. The market expectations' measures
are reported from year 0 since there is no price information prior to going public.
Table 9.14 reports the results of median and mean changes of the market-to-book ratio
of assets (MTBA) for years + 1 to +3. Panel A shows that the MTBA ofIPO companies
declines considerably over time; on the other hand there is only a moderate decline in
MTBA for matched companies. Thus, the matched company-adjusted MTBA is
significantly negative for years +1 to +3 relative to year O. The year-to-year results
show that the significant negative adjusted performance actually occurs in the first
post-IPO year (year 0 to +1). The change from year +1 to +2 shows a slight
improvement, but declines again in year +3. To assess the robustness of this market
expectation measure, an alternative measure was ei'ployed: the market-to-book ratio of
equity (MTBE), and the results are reported in the Appendix (Table 9.4A). Broadly
similar patterns were observed.
The overall results suggest that the market expectation measures start with a higher
performance96 but decline significantly over time from the pre-IPO leveL. However, the
year-to-year changes indicate that the decline occurs mainly in year +1. To sum up,
these results are consistent with Jain and Kini's (1994) findings which suggest that by
observing the performance at the pre-IPO level, investors have developed an optimistic
96 The median MTBA (MTBE) ratios for IPO company are 2.23 (2.58) in year 0, decline to 1.68 (1.98),
1.48 (1.72), 1.24 (1.8) in years +1, +2, and +3 respectively. The median MTBA (MTBE) ratios for
matched company are 1.70 (1.97), 1.45 (1.67), 1.28 (1.5), 1.3 (1.1) in years +1, +2, and +3
respectively.
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judgment of earmngs growth for IPO compames, but these expectations are not
sustained.
Table 9.14 The median and mean changes in market-to-book assets
Panel A:
Pre-post-IPO changes (ratio)
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
YearOto +1 YearOto +2 YearOto +3
-0.14"
-0.34b -0.31" -0.44" -0.60"
-0.66"
0.000 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
-0.09" -0.2Ib -0.26" -0.25b -O.3l -0.45"
0.001 0.033 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000
-0.1 7c
-0.13 -0.21c -0.19 -0.36"
-0.21
0.061 0.388 0.067 0.245 0.002 0.222
¡PO company
p-value
Matched company
p-value
Matched company-adjusted
p-value
PanelB:
Year-ta-year changes (ratio) YearOto +1 Year +1 to +2 Year +2 to +3
-0.14" -0.34b 0.00 -0.10
-0.07b -0.23
0.000 0.010 0.698 0.387 0.013 0.129
-0.09" -0.21b
-0.05c -0.04 -0.06b
-0.20"
0.001 0.033 0.057 0.599 0.011 0.004
-0.1 7c
-0.13 0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02
0.061 0.388 0.~56 0.682 0.204 0.893
254 254 254 254 254 254
¡PO company
p-value
Matched company
p-value
Matched company-adjusted
p-value
Number of companies
Note:
".b.andc Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
9.7 Changes in leverage
In addition to investigating the sources of operating performance, and changes in market
expectations, the change in leverage is also analysed to assess the impact of the capital
structure decisions of the companies. Results for the leverage ratio measured as total
debt to total assets (TD/TA) are reported in Table 9.15.
IPO companies significantly reduce their leverage in absolute terms, and relative to the
control group, in the IPO year. In post-IPO years, IPO companies increase gearing,
relative to matched companies, by a small but significant percentage. Similar results
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were found using the debt-to-equity ratio (see Appendix, Table 9.5A). The results
indicate that IPO companies reduce their leverage in the year of going public. This is
one of the reasons why companies go public as the gross proceeds obtained from issuing
equity can be used to repay some of their borrowings. The small increase in the
leverage ratio post-IPO is consistent with companies seeking to obtain the benefit of
interest tax shields which may increase their value. Overall, tpis result is consistent
with Mikkelson et at. ' s (1997) finding that leverage ratios of US IPOs dropped from
year - 1 to year + 1 but increased thereafter. However, the results are in contrast to
evidence on UK IPOs in which leverage ratios were observed to decrease at the time of
IPOs but remained lower in the post IPO period (Khurshed et at., 2003).
Table 9.15 The median and mean changes in total debt to total assets (TD/TA)
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre-post-IPO changes (%) Year-l to 0 Year-l to +! , Year-l to +2 Year-l to +3
IPO company
-4.18" -6.51' -1.57c -1.24 0.66 0.44 1.3" 3.55c
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.598 0.158 0.810 0.003 0.069
Matched company 0.61' 3.19" 1.10" 3.36" 0.46" 4.60" 1.57" 3.55"
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003
Matched company-adjusted
-6.42"
-9.70" -3.59' -4.61 c -1.28 -4.16c 0.75 -0.01
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.058 0.225 0.062 0.828 0.998
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (%) Year-l to 0 YearOto +! Year+! to +2 Year +2 to +3
IPO company
-4.18" -6.51' 1.00' 5.26" 0.69" 1.69 0.97" 3.11'
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.305 0.000 0.000
Matched company 0.61' 3.19" 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.23 -0.02 -1.04
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.281 0.854 0.134 0.258 0.833 0.410
Matched company-adjusted
-6.42" -9.70" 1.57" 5.09" 1.90b 0.45 1.74 4.15a
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.026 0.804 0.002 0.006
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
a.b.andc Significantly different from zero at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
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The next part provides the univariate and multivariate analyses of post-IPO operating
performance to determine whether family relationships, retained ownership and
underpricing provide further explanations of the changes observed in operating
performance.
Part 3 Post-IPO performance: Univariate and multivariate analyses
of family relationships, retained ownership and underpricing
9.8 Family relationships and post-IPO operating performance
Prior research has suggested that there may be a link between family involvement and
company performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). In the present study, 246 companies
have prospectuses (8 of the original sample of 254 were missing). Of these 246
companies, 164 had family involvement in senior management prior to the IPOs and 82
,
companies had no family involvement. Table 9.16 shows the median change in
operating performance for the post-IPO period relative to the pre-IPO year for both
groups. Overall, the table provides no (or very little) evidence of family involvement
affecting post- IPO performance.
9.9 Retained ownership and post-IPO operating performance
The association between retained ownership and post-IPO operating performance is
examined to see whether there is a positive link between them, as suggested by Leland
and Pyle (1977) and Downes and Heinkel (1982). Similar to Jain and Kini (1994) and
Khurshed et aL. (2003), the median retained ownership (alpha) is used to split the
sample between low ownership and high ownership. With a median alpha of 79.2%,
each group consists of 127 companies.
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As revealed in Table 9.1 7, usmg accrual-based profit measures, the high retained
ownership group displays poorer post-IPO performance than the low ownership group,
with the difference being statistically significant. For example, the median change of
OI/Sales in year +3 from year -1 for the low ownership group is -5.7% and -9.0% for
the high retained ownership group over the same period. However, this differential
performance disappears when matched company-adjusted meaaures are used. These
accrual-based results in Malaysia are in contrast to the better performance for high
ownership groups found for the US by Jain and Kini (1994), and the UK by Khurshed et
al. (2003). There is no real pattern in the difference in cash flow-based operating
performance between low ownership and high ownership groups.
Due to the high median percentage of retained ownership (alpha) on the Malaysian
market, the present study also used quartiles' alpha value to split the sample, as a
robustness check.
,
Q 1 refers to the low ownership retention group (alpha below
73.08%) and Q4 refers to the high ownership retention group (alpha above 84.94%).
Each group consists of 63 companies. The results are presented in the Appendix (Table
9.6A) and show qualitatively similar to those reported using median alpha.
9.10 Underpricing and post-IPO operating performance
To test the signalling theory of underpricing, the association between underpricing and
post-IPO operating performance is also investigated and reported in Table 9.18. The
present study expects to observe a positive association between underpricing and
post-IPO operating performance. Following Jain and Kini (1994), and Khurshed et aL.
(2003) the sample of Malaysian IPOs is split into two sub-samples based on median
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underpricing. The median underpricing for the sample of 254 IPOs is 85.5%. Each
group consists of 127 IPO companies.
Based on the change measures of accrual-based performance the results show that both
of the low and high underpricing groups experience a decline in performance in the post
IPO period. There is a tendency for the high underpricing woup to show inferior
accrual-based operating performance in the long run. However, there is an opposite
pattern seen in the cash flow-based performance measure. The high underpricing group
show superior cash-flow-based operating performance in the long run, with the
difference between them being statistically significant. Thus, the cash flow-based
performance results provide support for the signalling model of underpricing. However,
the evidence on the accrual-based performance measure is in line with the studies of
Jain and Kini (1994) and Khurshed et aL. (2003), which conclude that underpricing has
insignificant explanatory power in predicting oper~ting performance following IPOs.
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9.11 Multivariate analysis of family relationships, retained ownership,
underpricing and post-IPO operating performance
To complement the univariate analysis in Sections 9.8, 9.9 and 9.10, this section also
presents the multivariate analysis of the relationship between the explanatory variables
(family relationships, retained ownership and underpricing) and the dependent variables
(raw and adjusted operating performance post-IPO). Dummy variables are used to
represent companies with family relationships, high retained ownership and high
underpricing. The results are reported in Table 9.19.
Focusing first on the family relationships variable, only the change from year - 1 to +1
using the accrual-based measure (OI/Sales) is found to show a significant (at the 5%
level) negative relationship with the post-IPO matched-company adjusted performance.
The result confirms the conclusion from the univaÎiate analysis that there is very little
evidence of family involvement affecting post-IPO performance.
With regard to the retained ownership variable, the result also confirms the conclusion
from the univariate analysis that there is a significant negative relationship (at the 5%
and 10% levels) between retained ownership and the change in post-IPO performance
from year -1 to +3, using the accrual-based measure. Similarly, no clear pattern in the
relationship between retained ownership and the cash flow-based performance measure,
post-IPO, is observed.
The underpricing variable shows a weak (at the 10% level) positive relationship with
post-IPO performance, after adjusting for the matched company performance. The
significant relationship can only be observed when the cash flow-based performance
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Chapter 9 - Results 11: Accounting-based performance
measures are employed. With the highest Adjusted R-Square value of 0.022, using the
OCF/OA measure after adjusting for the matched company performance, all of these
three variables (family relationships, retained ownership and underpricing) can only
explain 2.2% of the change in the post-IPO performance.97
The present study also employed the percentage values of retained ownership and
underpricing, rather than using a dummy (' l' or '0') for these explanatory variables.
These results are reported in the Appendix (Table 9.7A). Interestingly, similar (or even
weaker) results are observed.
97 To assess the robustness of the results, a univariate regression and a regression using a combination of
two independent variables (family relationships and/or retained ownership and/or underpricing) were
performed. All of the explanatory variables, with the exception of underpricing, have insignificant
relationships (based on using the adjusted change in OCF/OA from year -1 to +3 as the dependent
variable).
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9.12 Summary
This chapter reports the empirical results on the accounting performance of 254
Malaysian IPOs that went public during the period 1990 to 2000. Comparison of the
pre- and post-IPO accounting-based operating performance in terms of levels and
changes provides some interesting findings. Summarising the main findings of this
chapter, there is moderate evidence supporting the view that the average IPO in
Malaysia underperforms seasoned companies over a three-year period. However, there
is strong evidence of declining performance in the IPO year and up to three years
following IPOs, relative to the pre-IPO period. The year-to-year analysis reveals that
the decline in performance is greatest in the year immediately following the IPO. The
deterioration in performance is more pronounced when performance is measured using
accrual-based approaches. This finding is consistent with the results of prior studies
documenting the long run underperformance of IPOs. The difference in the results
between accrual- and cash flow-based measures suggests the possibility of earnings
manipulation by IPO managers that increase their reported earnings at the time of going
public.
IPO compames are also found to have post-IPO high growth in sales and capital
expenditure. The decline in operating performance does not appear to be caused by a
reduction in sales or cutting back of capital expenditure. The reduced efficiency in asset
usage (lower asset turnover) does impact on operating performance. The results of this
study, based on different market expectation indicators, consistently reveal a decline in
accounting performance following IPOs. These indicate that investors have high
expectations of future earnings growth based on performance observed prior to the
IPOs. However, this expectation is not fulfilled. It is also found that Malaysian IPO
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companies reduce their borrowings at the time of an IPO, and also in the first and
second years after going public, but these increase subsequently.
While an IPO company's total assets, its equity and the number of shares wil suddenly
increase immediately after listing, it may take a while for cash flow, profits or earnings
to grow. Therefore, accounting performance measured by ratios such as OCF/OA,
"
OI/OA, ROE, or EPS are expected to drop immediately after listing. However, the
consequences of this dilution should mainly influence the performance in the year of the
IPO (year 0). The general results of this study demonstrate a decreasing trend, starting
from the IPO year and lasting until three years post IPO. This indicates that the decline
in accounting performance is not only an effect of the financing of the IPO itself, but
reflects a genuine post-IPO deterioration in accounting performance.
Univariate analysis of IPOs involving family relationships shows slightly greater
post-IPO deterioration in performance than IPOs with no family involvement.
However, there is little evidence of family involvement significantly affecting post-IPO
performance. With regard to the high and low ownership groups, this study does not
support the signalling theory of ownership by Leland and Pyle (1977) and Downes and
Heinkel (1982). Univariate analysis of IPOs with high and low underpricing revealed
that there is a tendency for the high underpricing group to show inferior accrual-based
operating performance in the long run. However, an opposite pattern is seen in the cash
flow-based performance measure, which therefore provides some support for the
signalling model of underpricing.
Overall, the results of the present study demonstrate that operating performance (cash
flow-based and accrual-based), asset turnover and market expectations decline after
265
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listing. While sales gradually increase, capital expenditure increases but then declines
slightly, while the leverage ratio decreases and then increases slowly after IPOs.
Univariate analysis of the association between family relationships, retained ownership,
and post-IPO operating performance produces little evidence to explain the deterioration
in operating performance. However, underpricing partially explains the deterioration in
operating performance when the cash flow-based performance myasure is used.
The following chapter provides a review of the empirical evidence on earnmgs
management.
266
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Chapter 10
Review of empirical studies and research hypotheses:
Earnings management and IPO performance
10.1 Introduction
The mam objective of financial reporting is to provide valuable information to
investors, creditors and others for making operating, investing or financing decisions.
The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)98 allow managers flexibility in
using their judgement to report financial information in the best possible light.
However, managers may possibly exploit the GAAP's flexibility to manipulate
. b lkn' 99accountmg num ers, a process common y own as earmngs management.
The results observed in Chapter 9 demonstrate that the accounting-based operating
performance of Malaysian companies deteriorates following IPOs and is more
pronounced when the accrual-based performance measure is used. This indicates that
there is a likelihood that Malaysian IPO companies managed their earnings at the time
of their IPOs to 'window-dress' their financial reports. As noted by Teoh et aL. (1998a),
managers can report unusually high earnings in excess of actual cash flows by adopting
discretionary accounting accruals adjustments. In order to investigate in depth the
potential of earnings manipulation, a review of the earnings management literature is
98 The GAAP, established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, are a widely accepted set of
rules, conventions, standards, and procedures for managers in the process of reporting financial
information.
99 DuCharme et al. (2001) state that there are three broad classes of earnings management techniques
available to managers, namely choice of accounting methods, revision of estimates, and accrual
management.
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provided in the first section of the present chapter. The review covers the general
development of the earnings management tests through accrual choices, prior general
earnings management studies, and prior earnings management studies of IPO and SEO
performances. This gives a direction to Part 3 of this thesis which then follows the
research questions and the hypotheses to be tested in the present study. The final
section summarises the present chapter.
10.2 Review of empirical studies on earnings management
Schipper (1989), in her commentary paper on earnings management, defines earnings
management as a 'purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process,
with the intent of obtaining some private gain' (p. 92). ioo Prior to an IPO
announcement, managers may engage in earnings management due to the information
asymmetry between the issuer and outside investors pertaining to the value of IPOs, as
highlighted in Chapter 3. In general, earnings management is accomplished when
income is shifted from future periods to the present or vice versa. In this situation,
companies are said to borrow future income for the sake of managing earnings in the
IPO year. This leads to increases in earnings during the IPO year and decreases
thereafter. Specifically, managers can accelerate revenue recognition and defer expense
recognition without violating current accounting rules. Teoh et aL. (1998) state that high
reported earnings raise stock prices, which is desirable when a company is selling
equity. DuCharme et aL. (2004) note that the negative relationship between earnings
management and post-IPO performance raises serious questions pertaining to market
100 Earnings management is also referred to by her as disclosure management.
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efficiency with respect to widely available accounting information. Teoh et aL. (1998a)
argue that if the stock market were fully effcient, on average post-IPO stock price
underperformance would not be observed.
Healy and Wahlen (1999) separate the motivations to manage earnings into three main
areas: (i) the capital market; (ii) contracting; and (iii) regulatory. One motivation for
earnings management in the area of the capital market is to increase the offer price of
the shares sold and companies' value by increasing earnings. This wil increase the
worth of the shares retained by the owners, who wil receive more cash in a secondary
share issue at the expense of new investors. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004a) conduct a
study on a sample of companies selling shares in secondary offerings101 and find
evidence that companies in which management102 sell their own shares have higher
discretionary accruals on average than companies where management does not selL.
Managers may also attempt to increase reported earnings prior to the IPO to gain an
investor's confidence. By managing earnings, the IPO companies can make themselves
look better than they really are. In the situation of high reported earnings prior to the
IPOs, investors might expect that good performance would be sustained in the future.
However, studies (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b; DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik,
2001; among others) indicate that reported earnings that are managed upwards prior to
stock offerings are related to poor stock market and operating performance. DuCharme
et aL. (2001) argue that at least three types of costs are associated with the manipulation
101 The proceeds from a secondary offering go directly to the owners of the shares rather than to the
offering company as in a primary offering. Therefore, the company's capital structure does not change.
102 They define management as executive and directors.
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of reported earnings, namely litigation costs, diminution of personal and corporate
reputations, and loss of future accounting flexibility.
10.2.1 General development of earnings management tests through accrual
choices
The earnings management instruments used for manipulating reported numbers consist
of (i) real operating decisions (e.g., asset sales and change in R&D expenditure); and (ii)
pure financial reporting decisions (e.g., changes in accounting method such as changing
from accelerated to straight-line depreciation, and accrual choices). According to
Young (1999), accrual choices are widely employed because they are a relatively low
cost mechanism by which managers can affect reported numbers, and are by nature
relatively opaque. Examples of accrual management include the decision to write down
assets, to recognise or defer revenues, and to capitalise or expense certain costs such as
repair expenditures (DeAngelo, 1986); recognition or deferral of revenues is an example
of current accruals management.
Total accruals, which consist of discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals,
are normally used to measure earnings management. McNichols (2000) refers to this
approach as the aggregate accruals approach. In order to decompose total accruals into
a discretionary and a nondiscretionary component, a particular model is used.
Discretionary accruals have to be estimated from total accruals because the degree of
accruals management is not directly observable (Teoh et al., 1998a). Furthermore,
earnings management is diffcult to identify without knowing management's true
intentions (Wiedman, 2002). It is assumed that discretionary accruals are to be at the
discretion of management (Perry and Wiliams, 1994; Teoh et aL., 1998a). For example,
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if the allowance of doubtful accounts were changed because of management's self
interest, the change in accruals would be discretionary. In contrast, a nondiscretionary
accrual is an accrual component that naturally arises from the company's economic
activities. Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) specify three managerial discretion
hypotheses, namely (i) the performance measure hypothesis; (ii) the opportunistic
accrual management hypothesis; and (iii) the noise hypoth~sis. First, under the
performance measure hypothesis, discretionary accruals help managers to produce a
reliable and more timely measure of firm performance than using nondiscretionary
accruals alone. Second, the opportunistic accrual management hypothesis is that
discretionary accruals are used to hide poor performance or postpone a portion of
unusually good current earnings to future years. Finally, the noise hypothesis is that the
discretionary accruals introduce noise in reported earnings (Guay et at., 1996, p. 83).
1Several alternative models of expected accruals have been employed in previous studies
to detect earnings management or abnormal accruals. The first, known as the Healy
(1985) model, uses the level of total accruals to measure earnings management and
requires the assumption that nondiscretionary accruals are stable over time. By contrast,
the DeAngelo (1986) model, focuses on the changes in total accruals. In this model, the
nondiscretionary component of accruals is assumed to follow a random walk, so the
change in total accruals between the benchmark and test periods is assumed to be
discretionary. Friedlan (1994) argues that this random walk assumption is not valid for
IPOs because these companies tend to be growing and this may affect certain aspects of
companies' operations, including their accruals.
Researchers have typically employed a regression-based model, such as the Jones
(1991) model or the Modified Jones (1991) model (as suggested by Dechow, Sloan and
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Sweeney, 1995), to derive abnormal accruals. As argued by Perry and Wiliams (1994),
these models incorporate the economic activities of the companies during the test
period, which may provide improved benchmarks over the earlier random walk modeL.
The regression-based models discussed above use time-series estimation procedures,
which require a sufficiently long time-series of data to allow estimation of the
regression parameters (Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2000). According to Young (1999),
this may introduce survivorship bias. In addition, it assumes the nondiscretionary
accruals' coefficient estimates are stationary or stable through time. In a related study,
Peasnell et aL. (2000) examine specification and power issues relating to the Jones
(1991) and Modified Jones models that are used to estimate accruals cross-sectionally,
which was initiated by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) instead of the time-series
procedure. Under the cross-sectional approach, an industry specific portfolio is
,
constructed for each sample company. It would appear that even though the
cross-sectional approach may mitigate the survivorship bias, the bias in the estimation
of the discretionary accruals may stil be exist if all the companies in the industry
estimation portfolio are managing earnings (Iqbal, 2002). Peasnell et aL. (2000) also
develop and test an alternative procedure, labelled the 'margin model'. It differs from
existing procedures in that the drivers of normal accruals are derived from a formal
model linking sales, accruals and earnings. They find that each of the three
cross-sectional models is well specified when applied to a random sample of
company-years and has the capability to generate relatively powerful tests for earnings
management. They suggest that the cross-sectional accrual models may be more
powerful than the time-series estimation procedures. In particular, they find that the
Jones (1991) and Modified Jones models are more powerful for revenue and bad debt
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manipulations, while the margin model appears to be more powerful at detecting
non-bad debt expense manipulations.
In a more recent study, Kothari, Leona and Wasley (2005) introduce
performance-matched discretionary accrual measures, in which the discretionary
accruals from the Jones or Modified Jones models are adjusted for the corresponding
discretionary accruals of a company matched on prior year return on assets (ROA) and
industry. Even though their results suggest that performance matching is critical to
designing well-specified tests of earnings management, they caution that their measure
cannot and does not solve all the problems arising from bad discretionary accrual
models. Also, the diffculty in finding a good match, based on industry and
performance in some markets, casts doubts on the general applicability of this approach.
Table 10.1 describes several proxies used to test for earnings management as adopted in
the aggregate model approach and lists the authors hsing these proxies.
Table 10.1 Several discretionary accrual proxies under the aggregate accruals
models
Authors Discretionary accrual proxy
Healy (1985) Total accruals
DeAngelo (1986) Change in total accruals
Jones (1991) Residual from a regression of total accruals on change in sales and
property, plant and equipment
Dechow et al.(1995) Residual from a regression of total accruals on change in sales and on
property, plant and equipment, where revenue is adjusted for change in
receivables in the event period (known as Modified Jones model)
Kothari et al. (2005) Discretionary accruals from the Jones model or Modified Jones model
are adjusted for the corresponding discretionary accruals of a
performance-matched company on prior year return on assets (ROA) and
industry
Source: Papers published by the authors.
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Several researchers have also examined a number of specific accruals in order to test for
earnings management. These include provision for bad debts (McNichols and Wilson,
1988), bad debt expense (Teoh et al., 1998), claim loss reserves (Beaver, McNichols
and Nelson, 2003), tax expense (Dhaliwal, Gleason and Mils, 2004), and individual
accruals 
103 (Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004b). Another approach identified by
McNichols (2000) is the frequency distribution approach. One qf the tests for earnings
management under this approach is to determine whether the frequency of annual
earnings realisations in the region above (below) zero earnings and last year's earnings
is greater (less) than expected (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).
McNichols (2000) finds that the greatest number of studies uses an aggregate accruals
approach based on the Jones modeL. These studies suggest that it is widely accepted as
a proper proxy for earnings management. In the absence of strong evidence regarding
,
the superiority of alternative models, the cross-sectional Modified Jones model appears
to be the benchmark model for use in detecting earnings management.
10.2.2 Prior general earnings management studies
A concise review of the state of knowledge in the area of earnings management is given
by Healy and Wahlen (1999). Prior studies have investigated various incentives to
manage accruals in a variety of settings; these are ilustrated in Table 10.2.
103 The individual accruals are account receivable, inventory, accounts payable, accrued liabilities,
depreciation expense, and special items.
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Healy (1985) exammes the effect of bonus schemesl04 on managerial accounting
decisions. He postulates that executives remunerated by using a bonus plan based on
accounting earnings, select accounting procedures that increase their compensation. He
finds that accrual policies of managers are related to income reporting incentives of
their bonus contracts. This evidence suggests that managers are more likely to report a
decrease in earnings to increase future compensation. He alsq finds that changes in
accounting procedures by managers are associated with adoption or modification of
their bonus plan.
Table 10.2 Several published earnings management studies in different contexts
Setting Author(s), Year of publication
Management compensation Healy (1985)
Management buyout DeAngelo (1986), Perry and Wiliams (1994))
Union negotiations Liberty and Zimmerman (1986)
Companies with extreme income McNichols and Wilson (1988)
Bank regulations Moyer (1990)
Import relief Jones (1991)
Initial public offerings Aharony, Lin and Loeb (1993), Friedlan (1994), Teoh et at. (1998a),
Teoh et al. (1998), DuCharme et at. (2001,2004)
Debt covenants constraint DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994)
Stock mergers Erickson and Wang (1999), Louis (2004)
Seasoned equity offerings Rangan (1998), Teoh et at. (1998b), Shivakumar (2000), Kim and Park
(2005)
Price control regulations Bowman and Navissi (2003)
104 Bonus schemes award managers if annual earnings' targets (e.g., in terms of earnings per share, return
on total assets, or return on equity) are attained.
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Several studies examine earnings management prior to management buyouts and have
provided mixed results. DeAngelo (1986) investigates the accounting decisions made
by managers of 26 New York Stock Exchangel05 listed companies and 38 American
Stock Exchangel06 listed companies, using various combinations of prior years' accruals
as benchmarks. These companies proposed to purchase all publicly-held common stock
and 'go private' 
107 during the period 1973 to 1982. DeAnge10 0986) hypothesises that
managers understate earnings in order to lower the buyout compensation by paying
outsiders less than the fair value for their shares. However, her results reveal no
indication that managers systematically understate earnings in the periods prior to
buyout. Perry and Wiliams (1994) undertake a similar study with a sample of 175
management buyouts during the period 1981 to 1988, but using the Jones (1991) model
instead of the change in total accruals. They provide convincing evidence of
manipulation of discretionary accruals in the predtcted direction in the year preceding
the public announcement of management's intention to bid for control of the company.
Their results indicate that abnormal accruals are negative prior to management buyouts.
The authors suggest that the principal difference in results obtained from the
DeAngelo's (1986) study is due to the small sample used in DeAngelo's study, not the
methods.
105 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the oldest and largest stock exchange in the US
(htt://www.netxclient.comluniversaI2/invest_glosry_NNe.htm#N ew Y orkStockExchange, as at 18 J an
2005).
106 American Stock Exchange (AMEX) is the second largest stock exchange in the US. As a general rule,
the securities traded on the AMEX are those of small to mid-size corporations. The AMEX also trades
options of many NYSE securities and some OTC securities
(http://www.netxclient.comluniversa12/invest_glosry_AdAm.htm. as at 18 Jan 2005).
107 Going private is known as a management buyout transaction through which managers become the sole
owners of a public corporation by purchasing all of the common stock held by outsiders. A management
buyout in which the subsequent private company is highly leveraged is known as a leveraged buy out
(DeAngelo, 1986, p. 401, and note 1).
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Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) examine the hypothesis that managers reduce reported
earnings during union contract negotiations. They analyse earnings released before and
after contracts are negotiated for a sample of 105 unionised companies over the period
from 1968 to 1981. However, they find no evidence of lower than expected earnings
during labour contract negotiations. They suggest that managers in the unionised
companies had little incentive to reduce reported earnings becamse they were already
performing poorly.
McNichols and Wilson (1988) examine whether managers manipulate earnings when
income is unusually high or lOWl08 for 138 companies from 1967 to 1985. Their study
models a specific type of accruals (the provision for bad debts), rather than a collection
of accruals. As with aggregate accruals studies, they model provision for bad debts to
identify its discretionary and nondiscretionary components. They use the residual from
,
a regression of specific accruals (provision of bad debts as a function of the beginning
balance in the allowance for bad debts, write-offs during the year, and write-offs in the
year after) to proxy for managerial accounting discretion. 109 They hypothesise that
companies with unusually high income wil take income-decreasing II 0 actions.
Consistent with their hypothesis, they find evidence that managers manage earnings by
choosing income-decreasing accruals, when income is high.
108 This refers to companies with extreme earnings that are above or below target in which the
observations are ranked based on deviations from the benchmark. Companies in the top (bottom) deciles
are considered as companies with unusually high (low) earnings.
109 According to McNichols and Wilson (1988), management can exercise discretion through three ways:
(i) accounting method choice; (ii) operating, investing, and financing policies; and (iii) choice of
estimates for a given accounting method (p. 2, note 3).
110 Discretionary (managed) accruals are on average zero. Large positive discretionary accruals are taken
as evidence of income-increasing earnings management. In contrast, large negative discretionary accruals
are taken as evidence of income-decreasing earnings management (Wiedman, 2002).
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Moyer (1990) exammes the incentives of a commercial bank manager to reduce
regulatory costs that are imposed when the bank's capital adequacy ratio falls below its
regulatory minimum. This is due to the fact that banks with inadequate capital are
likely to incur greater regulatory costs than banks with adequate capital. She finds that
some managers adjust accounting measures to reduce regulatory costs imposed by ban
regulators. Her results are generally consistent with the hypothe~is that managers adopt
ratio-increasing accounting adjustments as the primary capital adequacy ratio declines
relative to its regulatory minimum.
It appears that companies also manage earnings to obtain import relieë 1 1 (i.e. import
protection). Jones (1991) studies import relief investigation by the United States
International Trade Commission (ITC) in order to provide evidence on a specific motive
for earnings management. She tests whether companies that would benefit from import
relief attempt to decrease earnings through earnings management. The profitability of
the industry is one of the factors to increase the likelihood of obtaining import relief
and/or increase the amount of relief granted. Her results support the earnings
management hypothesis, suggesting that managers decrease earnings through earnings
management during the year of import relief investigations.
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) examme the abnormal accruals of a sample of 94
companies that reported debt covenant violations in annual reports from 1985 to 1988.
They find that abnormal accruals are significantly positive in the year prior to violation,
ill Jones (1991) provides two examples of 
import relief, namely tariff increases and quota reductions.
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to loosen the companies' debt constraints. Their results indicate that debt agreements
motivate managers to manipulate earnings.
Erickson and Wang (1999) examme earnings management around stock for stock
mergers, using a sample of 55 mergers and show that acquiring companies overstate
earnings in the pre-merger quarters. Their explanation for this is that target companies
,
anticipate the mergers. These companies adjust for anticipated earnings management
when negotiating the purchase price. Therefore, both the number of shares they must
use in the exchange and the cost of buying the target companies wil be reduced. Using
a large sample of 373 mergers (236 pure stock swaps and 137 pure cash purchases),
Louis (2004) examines earnings management around and after merger announcements.
In line with Erickson and Wang (1999), Louis (2004) finds strong evidence suggesting
that acquiring companies overstate their earnings reports in the quarter preceding a
stock swap announcement, whereas it is statisticaiiy insignificant for acquirers that pay
with cash.
In order to test the construct validity of the earnings management model, Bowman and
Navissi (2003) investigate the relationship between abnormal returns and earnings
management in the context of price control regulations in New Zealand. They find that
price control regulations affect companies' security prices negatively. Their results also
reveal that companies make income-decreasing discretionary accruals. This wil
increase the probability of approval for a company's price increase application, based
on financial hardship criteria. The results from their further analysis suggest that
companies that are affected more negatively by price regulations are more aggressive in
. .
managmg earmngs.
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In sum, various incentives to manage earnings have been reported in general earnings
management studies. The evidence is confined not only to companies that make equity
offerings. The results show that managers make income-increasing or decreasing in
different settings by way of managing earnings. However, several studies examining
discretionary accruals of the same settings find inconsistent findings of earnings
management (e.g., DeAngelo, 1986 and Perry and Wiliams, ,1994). Young (1999)
highlights that, one possible explanation is the measurement error induced by
alternative approaches to the estimation of discretionary accruals. It can be said that the
estimation approach employed to detect earnings management remains an open
empirical question. The difficulty in modelling and measuring discretionary and
nondiscretionary accruals may cause the different results observed in earnings
management studies.
A review of the earnings management studies od IPOs and SEOs is provided in the
following section.
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10.2.3 Prior earnings management studies on equity offerings
10.2.3.1 Initial public offerings (IPOs)
There are relatively few published articles about earmngs management by IPO
companies and these are all based on US data, with one exception based on the
Netherlands and one working paper on Malaysia; Table 10.3 summarises these studies.
Earlier studies (e.g., Aharony et at., 1993; Friedlan, 1994; and Neil, Porciau and
Schaefer, 1995) focus only on earnings management behaviour prior to IPOs. Aharony
et at. (1993) investigate whether IPO issuers make income-increasing discretionary
accruals prior to going public. They find that the practice of increasing reported net
income is not pervasive. Their findings further indicate that earnings management, on
average, is more pronounced for smaller companies and for those with large financial
,
leverage. However, they find only weak evidence that earnings management is related
to the reputation of the underwriter and the quality of the auditors employed by
companies prior to an IPO. They explain the weakness of their results may be due to
their sample selection method which may be biased towards selecting larger and less
risky (lower leverage) IPO companies.
On the other hand, Friedlan (1994) who also addresses the issue of the accounting
choices of IPO companies, finds evidence that IPO issuers make income-increasing
discretionary accruals in the financial statements released in the prospectus before the
IPOs. His results also indicate that IPO issuers manage their earnings to influence the
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effect of accounting-based contractsl12 on wealth distributionl1. Neil et al. (1995)
complement the work undertaken by Aharony et al. (1993) and Friedlan (1994) by
examining directly the accounting method choices of IPOs instead of estimating
unexpected accruals. The accounting method choices considered are the
depreciationmethod and the inventory cost flow assumptionY4 They also found
evidence that IPO issuers use accounting choices to enhance reported income prior to
the IPOs.
Empirical studies that focus on the relationship between earnings management and IPO
performance began to appear in the late 1990s (e.g., Teoh et at., 1998a; Teoh et al.,
1998; DuCharme et at., 2001, 2004; Roosenboom et at., 2003). Teoh et at. (1998a)
examine whether issuers of initial public offerings increase accruals and thereby report
earnings in excess of cash flows prior to IPOs. They also examine whether
discretionary accruals predict the cross-sectional variation in post-IPO long run stock
return performance. Their sample of 1,649 IPO companies is sorted by their
asset-scaled discretionary accruals into quartiles. IPO companies with the lowest
discretionary current accruals are labelled as 'conservative' IPOs while the quartile of
IPOs with the highest discretionary current accruals is labelled as 'aggressive' ones.
11 Some examples of accounting-based contracts are bonus schemes (Healy, 1985; Gaver, Gaver and
Austin, 1995), and capital adequacy ratio regulations (Moyer, 1990).
113 The offering price has a significant effect on the wealth of 
the IPa issuers. This is because a higher
offering price wil increase the offering proceeds. DuCharme et al. (2001) state that there are two ways a
higher offering price benefits issuers: i) shares retained by the entrepreneur are worth more; and ii) more
cash is received for the secondary shares sold, in which the proceeds go directly to the owners (p. 370,
note 1).
114 They classify a company using both accelerated depreciation and UFO as a 'conservative' method
company (making income-decreasing accounting choice), one using neither accelerated depreciation nor
UFO as a 'liberal' method company (making income-increasing accounting choice), and all other
companies as 'mixed' method companies.
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They find evidence that issuers with unusually high accruals in the IPO year experience
poor stock return performance in the three years thereafter, which supports the
opportunistic earnings management hypothesis. They find that 'aggressive' quartile
IPOs earn a cumulative abnormal return of approximately 20 to 30% less than the
cumulative abnormal return of 'conservative' IPOs. Moreover, they argue that investors
may be misled by high earnings numbers reported at the time of 
,JP 
Os, and then put too
high a price on the new issues.
A similar study by Teoh et aL. (1998) investigates the magnitude of accruals in the IPO
year and several years after. In the IPO-year, they find that IPO companies, on average,
have high positive earnings performance 
1 15 and abnormal accruals. However, they find
that earnings performance and stock returns performance are poor in the long run. They
report that the post-IPO earnings performance is significantly below the industry
average, predicted by high abnormal current accruats during the IPO year. In line with
Teoh et aL. (1998a), they find that abnormal accruals in the IPO year predict greater
post-issue stock return underperformance. DuCharme et aL. (2001), who investigate the
earnings management of 171 companies prior to making IPOs during the period 1982 to
1987, also find a significant relationship between abnormal accruals and post-IPO stock
returns. However, they do not find a significant negative relationship between
abnormal accruals and post-IPO accounting performance. Soffer (2001) comments that
the mixed results observed by DuCharme et aL. (2001) are a little bit confusing and he
suggests that their results may not be due to earnings management.
115 Three alternative measures of post-issue earnings performance are examined, which are the return on
sales, the industry-adjusted return on sales and matched-company relative returns on sales.
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The first earmngs management study of European IPOs was undertaken by
Roosenboom et aL. (2003), who examine the pattern of discretionary current accruals
(DCA) using a sample of 64 Dutch IPOs. They find that managers manage their
company's earnings in the first year as a public company but not in the years before the
IPO. Their result is consistent with earlier findings of Teoh et aL. (1998a) who also
report that IPO companies in the US make income-increasing a9cruals in the first year
as a public company, and Aharony et aL. (1993) who find little evidence of earnings
management of US IPOs in the years before going public. They also investigate the
impact of earnings management on the long run stock price performance and find a
negative relationship between the size of the DCA in the IPO year and long run stock
price performance over the next three years. Their results indicate that IPO managers
who over-report earnings in the IPO year subsequently suffer poor returns.
Recently, DuCharme et aL. (2004) have further studied the relation among earnings
management, stock offers, post-offer stock returns and related shareholders lawsuits of
5,324 IPOs and 4,908 SEOs from 1988 through 1997. They find that abnormal
accounting accrual measures of earnings management are unusually high around stock
offers and tend to reverse subsequently, and are inversely related to post-offer stock
returns. They report that abnormal accounting accruals are especially high for
companies whose offers subsequently attract lawsuits. Sued companies are found to
have much lower stock returns as compared to non-sued counterpars. They suggest that
some companies opportunistically manipulate earnings upwards before stock issues,
thereby exposing themselves to litigation.
The only study on the earnings management of Malaysian IPOs is the working paper by
Abdul Rahman and Wan Abdullah (2003), using a sample of 187 IPOs over the period
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1989 to 1998. They find significant positive discretionary current accruals (DCA) prior
to IPOs. However, they find no evidence to suggest that the pre-IPO DCA is able to
predict the post-IPO negative abnormal returns. 
116 They suggest that the significant
share price underperformance in the post-IPO period may be due to unfavourable
earnings information revealed by media, analysts' reports and subsequent financial
statements after the IPOs. However, they do not investigate th~ relationship between
earnings management and post-IPO accounting-based operating performance.
10.2.3.2 Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)
Rangan (1998), Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b), and Shivakumar (2000), examine the
role of earnings management on US SEOs. Using a sample of 230 SEOs in the years
from 1987 to 1990, Rangan (1998) investigates whether earnings management
surounding the offerings can explain a portion oJ the poor stock price and earnings
performance. His results indicate that earnings management in the period surrounding
the offering predicts both the changes in earnings and market-adjusted stock returns in
the year following the offering year. These results suggest that the issuing companies
are temporarily overvalued by the stock market, which is then disappointed by
predictable declines in earnings caused by earnings management. Teoh et aL. (1998b)
also hypothesise that investors fail to recognise earnings management at the time of
SEOs. They argue that investors naively extrapolate the increase in the pre-offering
earnings, and consequently overvalue the new issues. They report that discretionary
current accruals grow before the offering, peak in the offering year, and decline
116 They examine the first, second, and third year stock price performance relative to 'control' companies
matched by industry and size (total assets).
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thereafter. This accruals pattern causes net income to follow a similar trend. Moreover,
they find a negative relationship between pre-issue discretionary current accruals and
post-issue earnings and stock returns.
On the other hand, the work carried out by Shivakumar (2000) proposes a
non-opportunistic motive for earnings management. He tests whether companies do
,.
mislead investors by overstating earnings before SEOs. He finds evidence of earnings
management around equity offerings, which is consistent with Rangan (1998), and Teoh
et aL. (1998b). However, in contrast to their conclusions, he shows that investors infer
earnings management and umavel its effects at the time of equity offering
announcements, as the pre-announcements abnormal accruals predict the two-day
negative price reaction observed. He argues that the earnings management of the SEOs'
issuers may not be designed to mislead investors. Conversely, it may merely reflect the
issuers' rational response to anticipated market b'ehaviour at the announcement date.
His results support the managerial response hypothesis, in which investors expect
companies announcing equity offerings to manage earnings and, consistent with this
expectation, issuers overstate earnings before announcing their offerings. He also
comments that the negative relationship between pre-offering accruals and post-offering
returns found by Teoh et aL. (1998a) and Rangan (1998) appear to be due to test
misspecification, such as skewness in long horizon returns data.
In a related study but using UK data, a working paper by Iqbal, Espenlaub and Strong
(2004) investigates the long run operating and stock price performance of 181 UK open
offers made during the period 1991 to 1995 in the context of the earnings management
hypothesis, which predicts both pre-issue improvements and post-issue declines in
operating and stock price performance of SEO companies. They find that an aggressive
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earnings management pre-offer leads to worse operating and return performance
post-offer. Consistent with the US findings, their regression results exhibit a significant
negative relation between pre-offer DCA and two-year post-offer returns, but no
relation between pre-offer DCA and two-day offer announcement returns. They suggest
that their results are more consistent with the earnings management hypothesis as in
Teoh et al. (1998b) and Rangan (1998) studies but do not SllPport the managerial
i
response hypothesis observed by Shivakumar (2000). They argue that the significant
negative relationships between pre-offer DCA and post-offer returns is due to investors
not taking full account of the information available before the offer.
In summary, most of the IPO and SEO studies estimate the extent of earnings
management around the time of equity offerings and suggest that earnings are managed
prior to, or at the time of, IPOs and SEOs. Several studies relate the earnings
management at the time of IPOs and SEOs with post-issue stock market and earnings
performance. Although different models for estimating earnings management are
employed, the evidence is generally consistent across the studies, suggesting that
earnings management at the time of equity offerings is negatively correlated with
subsequent stock market and earnings performance. However, in the IPO setting, only
the study undertaken by Teoh et aL. (1998) relates the earnings management and
post-IPO accounting-based operating performance but investigate solely the change in
return on sales for years + 1 to +3 relative to IPO year.
It would appear that no published research to date has examined the earnmgs
management issue for Malaysian IPOs. In fact, earnings management studies on
Malaysian companies in general are sparse. A working paper by Abdul Rahman and
Wan Abdullah (2003) is the only study examining the Malaysian IPO market. Another
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study by Wan-Hussin and Ripain (2003) examines the income smoothing behaviour on
a sample of 92 IPO companies with profit guarantees during to the period 1996 to 1999.
However, income smoothing is not the subject of the present thesis. Abdul Rahman and
Wan Abdullah's (2003) paper has examined earnings management only prior to IPOs
and its relationship with the post-IPO share returns for a sample period up to 1998. The
level of earnings management over time are not investigateq by them, nor is the
relationship with the post-IPO operating performance considered. Moreover, they
estimated the expected accruals for IPO companies using data of 'control companies'.
The methods employed by them are somewhat ambiguous as to whether the 'control
companies' defined by them are the industry-wide peers or a size-matched sample. In
addition, they have employed only a simple calculation of long run holding period
returs that ignores the effect of compounding, in which only capital gains based on the
stock price on first trading day, and the stock price on the first, second and third year are
,
computed. Given that there is no published study on the earnings management from the
IPO year and up to three years post-IPO, and its association with both stock market and
operating performance using more recent data, therefore a more comprehensive study is
needed.
10.3 Research questions
As reviewed in Section 10.2, prior evidence revealed that the subsequent poor stock
market performance and accompanying operating performance may be due to earnings
that are managed upwards at the time of IPOs. The accounting discretion allowed by
GAAP may provide IPO managers with both incentives and opportunities to manage
earnings at the time of IPOs to increase the stock price, which in turn increases the offer
proceeds to the company and existing shareholders (Roosenboom et at., 2003). Teoh et
290
Chapter 10 - Literature review & hypotheses ILL: Earnings management
aL. (1998) argue that if the IPO companies boost earnings at the time of IPOs, the initial
financial statements of these companies will contain unusually high positive accruals.
They suggest that earnings in the post-IPO period wil decline since these accruals wil
not reflect favourable long run prospects for IPO companies and the high positive
accruals wil reverse in the post IPO period.
A review of both the earnings management and IPO literatures suggests the following
general research questions:
1. 'Do Malaysian IPO companies manage earnings at the time of IPOs? '
If so,
2. 'Does more aggressive IPO year earnings management lead to worse
,
subsequent stock market and operatingperformance?'
10.4 Formal hypotheses
The present study seeks to investigate whether earnings management at the time of IPOs
may contribute to the poor operating performance observed in Chapter 9. Investigating
the pattern of earnings management over time (the levels of accruals in the IPO year and
post-IPO) may provide further explanation for the greater deterioration in the
accrual-based operating performance measure than the cash-flow measure, as revealed
in Chapter 9. Therefore, the main hypothesis of this study is that Malaysian IPO
managers manage their reported earnings more at the time of IPOs than in the
subsequent years. Given that the sample period of this study covers the East Asian
crisis year 1997-1998, it is also hypothesised that companies may engage in more
291
Chapter 10 - Literature review & hypotheses 111: Earnings management
earnings management during this unfavourable economic environment, due to the need
to increase investors' confidence on new issues. It is also expected that companies that
are involved in aggressive earnings management at the time of IPOs show more
deterioration in subsequent stock market and operating performance. Hence the present
study formulates the following four hypotheses:
HI: The lèvel of earnings management of IPO companies is higher in the IPO
year than in subsequent years.
H2: The level of IPO year earnings management is higher during the East Asian
crisis years of 1997-1998 than the rest of sample period.
H3: The more aggressive earnings management at the IPO year leads to worse
post stock market and operating performance.
,
H4: There is a diference in the level of post-IPO stock market and operating
performance between IPO companies in the aggressive earnings
management quartile (Q4) and conservative earnings management quartile
(Q1).
10.5 Summary
This chapter has reviewed previous research on earnings management in general and
during IPOs in particular. The empirical evidence discussed in Section 10.2, suggests
that earnings management does occur in various contexts. The research question and
formal hypotheses for the present study are also identified. The following chapter
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explains the research design employed to investigate earnings management and its
association with post-IPO performance.
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Chapter 11
Research design to investigate earnings management and
IPO performance
11.1 Introduction
Following the review of the literature in Chapter 10, the present chapter provides the
research design used to investigate the likelihood of opportunistic earnings management
by Malaysian companies at the time of IPOs. The remainder of this chapter is
structured as follows: In the next section, the sample selection and data sources utilised
in the present study are briefly discussed. This is followed by an explanation of the
method used to measure the variables of interest, the earnings management model and
,the analysis to be undertaken. The final section summarises the present chapter.
11.2 Sample selection and data sources
The present study uses the same sample of companies and selection criteria as described
in Chapter 8. It requires stock return data to be available on the Datastream database
and uses the available data employed for the accounting-based operating performance
study (Chapters 7 to 9). The accrual variables examined at the time of IPOs were
obtained from the first public annual reports, which include the financial information of
both pre-IPO and post-IPO years. 
m The first public annual reports rather than the
11 Teoh et al. (1998) and Teoh et aL. (1998a) also examined the IPO year accruals and used the first
public annual reports to examine the earnings management of US IPOs.
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pre- IPO financial statements are used due to the fact that two years of data are required
to compute the earnings management proxy, and the lack of full pre-IPO data, as
described in Chapter 8. Moreover, there is likelihood that earnings management
incentives are likely to persist in the months immediately after the offerings (Teoh et a!.
1998a). This is because the promoters of certain sectors of Main Board companies and
all Second Board companies must hold at least 45% of the issuep paid-up shares of the
company for one year after the company's admission to the KLSE. Following Teoh et
al.'s (1998a) argument, the promoters of these companies may support a high stock
price after IPOs as they may wish to sell their personal holdings after the lock-in period.
Another reason is that Malaysian IPO companies may stil manage earnings a few
months after IPOs to meet the mandatory earnings forecast disclosed in the offering
prospectuses and maintain a high market price.
11.3 Methods
11.3.1 Measure of earnings management
The present study predicts that managers are most likely to manage earnings upwards at
the time of IPOs in order to increase their offering proceeds and maintain a high market
price after IPOs. It is generally assumed that earnings are managed in several ways,
such as through discretion over accruals (e.g., Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Teoh et a!.,
1998a), through timing of real investment or financing decisions (e.g., Hand, 1989), and
through choices of accounting methods (e.g., Neil et aL., 1995). Following Teoh et aI,
(1998a), among others, the present study measures earnings management using
discretionary accruals. As argued by DuCharme et al. (2001), 'accruals not only reflect
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the choice of accounting methods but also the effect of recognition timing for revenues
and expenses, asset write-downs, and changes in accounting estimates' (p.376).
Earnings reported in the annual report consist of cash flows from operations and
accounting adjustment called accruals.
Net income = Total accruals + Cash flow from operations (111)
Total accruals then can be expressed as:
Total accruals = Net income - Cash flow from operations (11.2)
Based on Teoh et aL. (1998a), total accruals may be decomposed into two categories,
with four components: time period (current and ,long term accruals) and managerial
control (discretionary and nondiscretionary variables). In other words, the four
components are: (i) discretionary current accruals (DCA); (ii) discretionary long term
accruals (DLA); (iii) nondiscretionary current accruals (NDCA); and (iv)
nondiscretionary long term accruals (NDLA).
Current accruals are adjustments made to short term assets and liabilities. One way to
increase current accruals is by accelerating recognition of revenues (e.g., recognising
profit on work in progress) but delaying the recognition of expenses (e.g., bad debt
expenditure or stock valuation). Current accruals usually reverse in the following year.
On the other hand, long term accruals adjustment involves long term assets and
liabilities. They can be increased by decelerating depreciation, decreasing deferred
taxes or realising unusual gains. Discretionary variables are 'managed' or 'abnormal
(or unexpected)' components that are subject to management discretion to manipulate
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earmngs. Meanwhile, nondiscretionary variables are 'unmanaged' or 'normal (or
expected)' components that are constrained by rules, institutions, and economic
circumstances (Teoh et al., 1998a; Roosenboom et al., 2003). Since managers have
more discretion over short term than over long term accruals, as argued by Teoh et aL.
(1998a,b), the present study employs discretionary current accruals (DCA) 
11 8 to proxy
for earnings management, as also used by Roosenboom et aL. (2,003) and DuCharme et
aL. (2001, 2004). In addition, another reason to focus on DCA is that the Malaysian
industry-wide data to compute discretionary long term accruals (DLA) was not
available from Datastream.
11.3.2 Earnings management model
In order to test for earnings management using accrual management approaches, the
discretionary and nondiscretionary components, of current accruals need to be
distinguished. According to Wiedman (2002), the assumption behind separating these
components is that changes in current accruals move proportionately with changes in
sales. When changes in current accruals do not move proportionately with changes in
sales relative to other companies in the same industry and year, then the unexpected or
discretionary portion of current accruals is assumed to be the managed portion.
Current accruals are defined as the change in noncash current assets minus the change in
operating current liabilities. Change is measured from year to year. Examples of
noncash current assets are accounts receivables, inventory, and other current assets
118 Discretionary curent accruals also refer to current working capital accruals.
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while operating current liabilities are accounts payable, tax payable, and other current
liabilities. The definitions are:
Current accruals (CA) = I1(Current assets - Cash) -11(Current liabilties-
Current maturity of long term debt) (11.3)
As the model used to estimate nondiscretionary accruals is subject to criticism and
remains an empirical question, the present study employs the most frequently used
model, as suggested by Dechow et aL. (1995). The model is referred to as the Modified
Jones modeL. As shown by Dechow et aL. (1995), it is the most powerful model in
detecting earnings management among several alternative models of earnings
management. The use of this model is justified since the purpose of this study is to
provide evidence only on the existence of opport~nistic earnings management and not
on the methodological issue per se. This model has been adopted by Teoh et aL. (1998a)
and Roosenboom et aL. (2003), and is utilised to separate the total current accruals into
expected (nondiscretionary) and abnormal (discretionary) components. It is a modified
version of the model introduced by Jones (1991), the only difference being that the
nondiscretionary accruals are estimated from the cross-sectional i 19 Modified Jones
model, in which only changes in sales need to be adjusted for changes in trade
receivables, as in equation 11.5 This wil mitigate the possibility of credit sales
manipulation by the issuer resulting from managers timing the recognition of revenues
119 As reviewed in Chapter 10, the time-series approach is infeasible for IPOs because it requires a
suffciently long time-series of data to allow estimation of the regression parameters (Peasnell et aL.,
2000), which may introduce survivorship bias (Young, 1999). In addition, it assumes the
nondiscretionary accruals coeffcient estimates are stationary or stable through time (Young, 1999). On
the other hand, the cross-sectional approach assumes the coeffcients are the same for all companies
within a particular year and industry (Kasznik, 1999).
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(Dechow et al., 1995). Using the accruals model as suggested by Dechow et at. (1995),
the expected current accruals for each of the IPO sample companies in a given year are
estimated using an estimation portfolio of all level 3 industry peers120 available on the
Datastream and P ACAP databases using the following cross-sectional model:
CAj,t (1 J (""Saiesj,t J
= ao +a¡ +BjtTAj,t_¡ TAj,t_l TAj,t_l ' j E estimation portfolio (114)
where:
CA Current accruals,'
j Companies are in the same level 3 Datastream industry subsector but
excluding the issuer and companies involved in an IPO in the previous
three years,'
Males j,t = change in sales for company j in the industry estimation portfolio in year t,'
,
TAj,t_I = lagged total assets for company j in the industry estimation portfolio.
Bj,t regression disturbances, assumed cross-sectionally uncorrelated and
normally distributed with zero means.
Similar to prior studies (e.g., Teoh et at., 1998a; Roosenboom et at., 2003; DuCharme et
at., 2004) all the variables are scaled by lagged total assets to reduce heteroscedasticity
and to control for differences in company size. The change in sales is included to
control for changes in nondiscretionary accruals caused by the change of economic
conditions. A cross-sectional regression is performed separately in each fiscal year for
each industry portfolio to estimate the coefficients ao and a¡, to control for changes in
120 The IPO companies in that year and the previous three years are not included in the regression.
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nondiscretionary accruals and to allow the nondiscretionary accruals to vary from
period to period for different industries. Thus, the effect of changes in industry-wide
economic circumstances in each specific year on current accruals can be controlled. In
addition, the coefficients ao and a¡ are allowed to change across years to allow for
possible structural changes, such as management changes (DeFond and Jiambalvo,
1994).
An estimation portfolio is assigned for each of the IPO companies in the sample in order
to estimate the coefficients ao and ai' The present study restricts the analysis to
estimating industry portfolios that consist of 10 companies12l or more in the same level
3 Datastream industrial classification of the IPO companies in the same fiscal year. IPO
companies and companies that made an IPO in the previous three years are excluded
from the industry portfolios. Due to the shortage of companies in certain industries,
,
several similar industries are combined together. This results in six industry groups: (i)
Basic; (ii) Consumer Goods (Cyclical and Non Cyclical); (iii) Services (Cyclical and
Non Cyclical); (iv) General Industrials and Information Technology; (v) Resources and
Utilities; and (vi) Real Estate Development.
Table 11.1 gives the number of companies in each estimation portfolio in each
industry-year. The number of IPO companies related to each industry grouping is
reported in brackets. There are 84 separate industry-year estimation portfolios observed
during the period 1990 to 2003, which consist of 4,308 seasoned company-years. A
121 Iqbal et al.(2004) restrict their observation to six or more to estimate the portfolio, while Peasnell et
al. (2000), Teoh, et aL. (1998), and DuCharme et aL. (2001) restrict theirs to at least 10.
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seasoned company refers to a company trading on the KLSE at any time during the
period 1990 to 2003 that did not have an IPO in the previous three years.
After estimating the coefficients ao and ai from the current accruals model, the
nondiscretionary accruals for each IPO company in each year are then predicted using
the estimated coefficients ao and ai from each industry-year estimation portfolio. The
nondiscretionary current accruals are the portion of current aocruals that are not
influenced by managerial discretion but are driven by the companies' sales growth.
From the model in equation 11.4, the nondiscretionary variables are the expected
accruals; while the discretionary variables are residuals. Following Dechow et al.
(1995) the change in trade receivables is subtracted from the change in sales to control
for the possibility of credit sales manipulation by the issuer. The approach assumes that
any change in the level of credit sales during the period reflects earnings management
activity (Young, 1999). The nondiscretionary current accruals are then calculated as:
/\ r 1 J /\ rMaieS¡ i - !1TR¡ i JNDC41 =ao - +ai ' ,
, TA¡,t_1 TA¡,t_1 (115)
where:
/\
ao
= estimated intercept,'
/\
ai = the slope coeffcient for IPO company i in year t,'
Males¡,i = change in sales for IPO company i in year t;
!1TR¡,t = the change in trade receivables for IPO company i in year t,'
TA¡,I_1 = lagged total assets for IPO company i in year t.
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Finally, the discretionary current accruals (DCA), which are subject to managerial
manipulation, are calculated as the difference between total current accruals and
nondiscretionary current accruals. If non-zero DCA is observed, it can be interpreted
that earnings management exists during the year. Positive DCA can be interpreted as
income-increasing earnings management, and vice versa. The definition is:
CADCA = l,t - NDCAl,t TA i,I
l,t-I
(11.6)
where:
CA¡,t current accruals of IPO company i in year t;
TAt-1 = lagged total assets 
for IPO company i in year t;
NDCA
i,t
nondiscretionary current accruals for IPO company i in year t.
11.3.3 Measure of long run stock market performance
The present study relates the accruals from the first fiscal year financial statements of
the IPO companies to the stock market performance starting from four months after the
fiscal year end. Unfortunately, as ilustrated in Part 1 of this thesis, the choice of
measure of long run stock market performance is contentious. In the absence of a
dominant method, compounded buy-and-hold returns are used. While the limitations of
this approach are described in Chapter 5, Teoh et al. (1998a) suggest that buy-and-hold
returns are more relevant for investors. The long run abnormal performance of IPO
companies is estimated as the difference between the raw buy-and-hold return of an IPO
company and the raw buy-and-hold return on the benchmark. Two benchmarks are
employed: (i) the KL Composite Index (KLCI); and (ii) a matched company. The
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KLCI is used to represent the market benchmark. The matched company is chosen
based on the same criteria identified in Chapter 8.
In Malaysia, companies are required to issue their annual audited financial statements
within a period not exceeding four months after the close of their financial year.
Therefore, the stock return data used in this study starts four months after the financial
reporting date. It is assumed that the fourth month after fiscal year 0 is the month when
the IPO companies make public their first annual report and allow for a reporting lag.
This procedure is similar to the one used by Teoh et aL. (1998a) and Roosenboom et al.
(2003). Figure 11.1 ilustrates the time line for stock return data due to this reporting
lag.
11.3.4 Measure of post-I PO operating performance
The present study also relates discretionary accruals to accounting-based operating
performance changes. Since in Part 2 of this thesis the accrual-based operating
performance measure was found to exhibit a greater deterioration in performance, the
analysis focuses only on this measure. In addition, many earnings management
opportunities arise from the estimates and judgements inherent in the accrual accounting
system (Wiedman, 2002). Two measures are used: (i) operating return on operating
assets (OI/OA), and (ii) operating return on sales (OI/Sales). Detailed explanations of
these measures are provided in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 11 - Research design ILL: Earnings management
11.3.5 Analysis undertaken and test statistics used
Two types of analyses are undertaken. The first analysis is of the time-series and
cross-sectional patterns of earnings management. The second analysis is of the
distribution of long run stock market and operating performance changes, based on the
level of earnings management observed at the time of IPOs.
11.3.5.1 Time-series and cross-sectional patterns of earnings management
A similar time index as used in Chapter 8 is employed in the present study to analyse
the time-series pattern of earnings management. The IPO year is coded as '0', the first,
second, and third years after IPOs are coded as '+1, +2, and +3', respectively. The
detailed timing convention is also explained in Figures 8.2 and 8.3. The cross-sectional
pattern of IPO year earnings management is also analysed to investigate the impact of
the Malaysian economic environment during the sample period. The earnings
management observed at the time of IPOs (year 0) is segregated based on the year of
listing (1990 to 2000).
The Wi1coxon signed-ranks test is used for the medians and the parametric t-est is
adopted for the means to test whether the medians and means are statistically different
from zero. In addition, the Kruskall-Wallis test is applied to assess whether there is
evidence of variability in the median DCA over the sample period years of listing and
Mann- Whitney U test is employed to test differences between individual years. The
equivalent tests used for mean differences are ANOV A and Tukey HSD procedures.
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11.3.5.2 Post-IPO performance changes by DCA quartiles
Univariate analysis of the long run stock market and operating performance changes is
employed, based on the quartile of discretionary current accruals (DCA) observed at the
time of IPOs. To do this, the IPO companies are ranked by their IPO year DCA, and are
divided into quartiles, Q1 to Q4. Q1 is for the smallest DCA and is labelled as the
'conservative' quartile, while Q4 is the largest DCA and is labelled as the 'aggressive'
quartile. The stock market returns are calculated for SiX122 holding periods, as described
in Figure 11.1. The Mann Whitney U test for median and the independent t-est for
means are used to analyse the differences in post-IPO stock market and operating
performance between Q1 and Q4.
11.4 Summary
The present chapter provides the research design applied to investigate the likelihood of
earnings management around Malaysian IPOs and its association with the long run
stock market and operating performance. The sample selection and sources of data
employed in the present study are provided. This is followed by an explanation of the
methods employed. The next chapter provides the analysis of earnings management
and its association with IPO performance.
122 Teoh et aL. (1 998a) and DuCharme et aL. (2001) examine the stock returns for only one holding period
(months 5 to 40) after IPOs, while Abdul Rahman and Wan Abdullah (2003) investigate the stock returns
for three holding periods (first, second, and third year) after the IPa date.
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Chapter 12
Results on earnings management and IPO performance
12.1 Introduction
Having reviewed the earnings management literature in Chapter 10 and described the
research design in Chapter 1 1, this chapter provides the results concerning the existence
of possible opportunistic earnings management by Malaysian IPO companies' managers
around the offerings. The time-series and cross-sectional patterns of earnings
management are reported first, followed by the analysis of the distribution of the stock
market and operating performance changes by the IPO year discretionary current
accrual (DCA) quartiles. The final section summarises the present chapter.
12.2 Time-series and cross-sectional patterns of earnings management
Table 12.1 presents the evidence for the likelihood of earnings management around the
Malaysian IPOs. This table reports the time-series profile of discretionary current
accruals (DCA) that are used to proxy for the earnings management, in percent, from
the fiscal year of the IPOs to three years after. All values are expressed as a percentage
of lagged total assets.
The median (mean) DCA is higher at the time of the IPOs (year 0), at 3.24% (5.74%) of
lagged total assets, then declines steadily to -0.56% (-0.05%) in year +3. The present
study relies on the medians for statistical inference since some skewness is indicated in
the sample by a higher mean measure than median measure in year O. In addition, the
test of normality based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic of 0.156 (p-value = 0.000)
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indicates that the data differs significantly from a normal distribution, thus violating one
f h . f . 123o t e assumptions 0 parametflc tests.
Table 12.1 The median and mean levels of discretionary current accruals (DCAr
% of lagged total assets
Year 0 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3
Median 3.24" 1.47b 1.6
-0.56
p-value 0.001 0.023 0.104 0.860
Mean 5.74" 3.47b 0.1 l -0.05
p-value 0.007 0.019 0.970 0.978
Number of companies 254 254 254 254
Note:
aandb Significantly different from zero at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is used for the medians and the parametric t-test is used for means.
* Test of normality for DCA at year 0: Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic = 0.156 (p-value = 0.000).
The results of the present study strongly support the likelihood of earnings management
at the time of IPOs, indicated by a significant positive (at the 1 % level) DCA. The level
of earnings management at the time of IPO is slightly lower than the results observed by
,
Teoh et al. (1998), Teoh et aL. (1998a), and Roosenboom et al. (2003), who reported
median values of 5.5%, 4.0%, and 3.9%, both two in the US and Netherlands,
respectively. However, as reported by Roosenboom et al. (2003), other studies have
observed similar levels of earnings management, ranging from 1.5% to more than 5% of
lagged total assets. The level of earnings management is still significantly positive (at
the 5% level) in the first year after the IPOs. This indicates that Malaysian IPO
companies manage their earnings upward through working capital accruals at the time
of going public, and maintain their earnings for the fiscal year immediately after the
IPOs. This result is similar to Teoh et aL. (1998), and Teoh et aL. (1998a), who found a
significant decline but positive DCA of 1.60% and 2.24% respectively in year +1.
123 Another two assumptions of parametric tests are independence of observations (serial correlation) and
equality of variance.
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However, the result of the present study contradicts those of Roosenboom et al. (2003),
who found a significant decline and a negative DCA of -4.4% in year +1. The
continuance of earnings management in the post-IPO year may reflect managers' needs
to ensure that actual earnings are close to those forecast in the IPO prospectus and also
in the two years of maintainable earnings following the IPOs. As discussed in Chapter
2, the mandatory requirement to provide earnings forecasts and,the provision of profit
guarantees by certain Main Board applicant companies and all Second Board companies
to meet 90% of the profit forecast in the prospectus and 90% of the forecast profits for
the two years following the IPOs are unique to the Malaysian environment.
Overall, the evidence reported in Table 12.1 is consistent with Teoh et al. (1998) and
Teoh et al. (1998a), and suggests that the managers of Malaysian IPO companies
opportunistically advance accruals in an attempt to improve earnings during the IPO
year. However, the high level of DCA in the iPO'year is not sustained in the post-IPO
years. Thus, the evidence provides a possible explanation for the observed decline in
operating performance reported in Chapter 9.
The sample period of the present study includes the East Asian crisis period of 1997 and
1998. Given that accounting earnings convey information about company values to
investors (DuCharme et aI., 2004), earnings management might be more prevalent in
such a period of high uncertainty; managers might perceive a greater need to increase
investors' confidence in their new share offerings. Thus, it is interesting to investigate
whether earnings management is affected by the economic environment at the time of
the IPO.
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Table 12.2 shows the distribution of the mean and median DCA in the IPO year,
classified by year of listing. There are four outlier IPO companies (one each in 1991
and 1998, and two in 1993) that exhibit extreme levels of DCA (taken as those which
have a DCA lower than the first quartile minus three times the interquartile range, or
higher than the third quartile plus three times interquartile range) and serve to distort the
results based on means. Results are reported for the full data set and also for a reduced
data set excluding these four IPOs. However, the inference is also based on medians
since the normality test on the DCA data, even after outlier removal, stil shows that the
data are not normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic = 0.091, p-value =
0.000).
Table 12.2 Distribution of IPO year DCA classified by year of listing
Full sample, 254 IPOs Reduced sample, 250 IPOs
DCA at year 0 (% of lagged total assets) DCA at year 0 (% of lagged total assets)
Year of listing Median . Mean" Median# Mean+n p- p- 'I p- p-(%) value (%) value (%) value (%) value
1990 16 -0.32 0.856 -1. 1 0.768 16 -0.32 0.856 -1.1 0.768
1991 17
-0.78 1.000 15.19 0.421 16 -1.72 0.660 -2.73 0.539
1992 19 0.66 0.825 -3.24 0.534 19 0.66 0.825 -3.24 0.534
1993 20 2.70 0.271 1.79 0.842 18 2.70 0.191 4.22 0.225
1994 29 4.67 0.289 0.47 0.920 29 4.67 0.289 0.47 0.920
1995 22 -0.69 0.820 -1.84 0.735 22 -0.69 0.820 -1.84 0.735
1996 46 0.87 0.129 5.32c 0.067 46 0.87 0.129 5.32c 0.067
1997 43 10.00' 0.001 9.78" 0.000 43 10.00" 0.001 9.78' 0.000
1998 15 19.58b 0.016 29.87c 0.094 14 l8.35b 0.028 l4.07b 0.023
1999 11
-5.35 0.450 -5.22 0.349 11 -5.35 0.450 -5.22 0.349
2000 16 3.58 0.103 13.57 0.121 16 3.58 0.103 13.57 0.121
Total 254 3.24' 0.001 5.74' 0.007 250 2.92' 0.001 3.78' 0.006
Note:
a, b, and c Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. The Wi1coxon
signed-ranks test is used for the medians and the parametric t-test is used for means.
. Kruskal Wallis test for median difference for all years (Chi-Square = 19.246, p-value=0.037).
" Oneway ANOVA test for mean differences for all years (F = 1.610, p-value = 0.104).
# Kruskal Wallis test for median difference for all years (Chi-Square = 19.061, p-value=0.039).
+ Oneway ANOVA test for mean differences for all years (F = 1.955, p-value = 0.039).
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Interestingly, as shown in Table 12.2, median earnings management is higher for IPOs
in 1997 and 1998 (statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% levels respectively) for both
samples. During the crisis period of 1997 and 1998, investors may have been more
selective in buying the shares of the better performing companies. The high positive
DCA during this period is as hypothesised, since IPO companies may manage their
earnings to attract investors to buy their shares, as well as increas,e investors' confidence
that good performance wil be sustained.
The results of further tests as to whether some years are different from others are
reported at the bottom of Table 12.2. With p-values of 0.037 and 0.039 obtained from
the Kruskal- Wallis test for the full sample and the reduced sample, respectively, it can
be said that at least one of the years has a significantly different median DCA from the
others. However, when oneway ANOV A is performed, none of the years has a
statistically significant different mean DCA from 'the others (p-value = 0.104) for the
full sample, although for the reduced sample, at least one of the years is significantly
different from the rest of the years (p-value = 0.039). Due to the non-normality in the
data, as mentioned earlier, this study relies on median results in making statistical
inferences.
Since the years 1997 and 1998 are found to show higher levels of earnings management
than the remaining years, it is interesting to further investigate whether these two years
are different from each of the other sample years. Table 12.3 reports the results for the
full sample and the reduced sample. The difference between 1997 and each of the
sample years is reported in the top par of the table, while the results for 1998 are
reported in the bottom part. Focusing first on year 1997, six out of ten years are
statistically significantly different in the median level of earnings management from
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year 1997 for both samples. Similarly, it is found that earnings management for seven
out of ten years is statistically significantly different from year 1998. However, the
results based on the Tukey HSD procedure of ANOV A indicates that none of the years
has earnings management that is statistically significant from either 1997 or 1998 in
both samples. In sum, the results suggest that earnings management is higher during the
East Asian crisis years of 1997 and 1998, and at least one of tlle years is significantly
different from the rest of the years. There is also evidence that the level of earnings
management in years 1997 and 1998 is significantly different from that recorded for
several of the sample years examined.
Table 12.3 Median and mean difference of IPO year DCA between two different
years of listing
Difference Full sam le, 454 IPOs Reduced sam le, 450 IPOs
Median tests Mean tests Median tests Mean tests
Year vs. year z-stat for p- Mean p- z-stat for p- Mean p-A B difference value difference value difference value difference value
(A-B) (A-B) (A-B) (A-B)
1997 1990 2.13b 0.033 11.09 0.988 2.13b 0.033 11.09 0.776
1991 2.30b 0.021
-5.41 1.000 2.30b 0.021 12.51 0.624
1992 2.56b 0.011 13.02 0.944 2.56b 0.011 13.02 0.471
1993 1.03 0.303 8.00 0.998 1.41 0.159 5.57 0.997
1994 1.58 0.114 9.31 0.986 1.58 0.114 9.31 0.751
1995 1.89' 0.059 11.62 0.963 1.89' 0.059 11.62 0.570
1996 1.72' 0.085 4.47 1.000 1.72' 0.085 4.47 0.996
1998
-1.2 0.221 -20.08 0.646 -1.22 0.221 -4.29 1.000
1999 2.29b 0.022 15.00 0.963 2.29b 0.022 15.00 0.567
2000 0.12 0.905 -3.79 1.000 0.12 0.905 -3.79 1.000
1998 1990 2.20b 0.028 31.8 0.256 2.20b 0.028 15.39 0.647
1991 2.54b 0.011 14.67 0.977 2.54' 0.011 16.80 0.516
1992 2.62" 0.009 33.10 0.139 2.62" 0.009 17.31 0.409
1993 1.46 0.145 28.08 0.333 1.9 0.074 9.86 0.965
1994 2.02b 0.043 29.40 0.178 2.02b 0.043 13.60 0.655
1995 2.0ib 0.044 31.0 0.152 2.01b 0.044 15.91 0.495
1996 1.96b 0.050 24.55 0.327 1.96b 0.050 8.76 0.955
1997 1.22 0.221 20.08 0.646 1.22 0.221 4.29 1.000
1999 2.35b 0.019 35.09 0.232 2.35b 0.019 19.29 0.450
2000 0.71 0.480 16.30 0.957 0.71 0.480 0.50 1.000
Note:
a. b, and, Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. The Mann-Whitney
U test is used for the medians and the Tukey HSD procedure of ANOV A is used for means.
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Due to the fact that companies that went public in the East Asian crisis years 1997 and
1998 show higher levels of earnings management than in the rest of the sample period,
the study further investigates whether these companies are those that voluntarily or
non-voluntarily chose the three-year profit guarantee agreements. The profit guarantee
regulation, as explained in Section 2.3, is one of the unique features of Malaysian IPOs.
It is expected that Malaysian companies manage their earnings to meet the guaranteed
profits reported in their prospectuses (first guaranteed profit - DCA year 0) and the
following two financial years (second and third guaranteed profits - DCA year + 1 and
DCA year +2).
Table 12.4 Number of companies reporting a three-year profit guarantee
(optionally or mandatory)
Year 1997 1998 Combined year (1997&1998)
MB SB MB SB MB MB Total
Profit Guarantee o
7
2
9
37
8
37
18
3
58
No Profit Guarantee
25
8
o
3
o
3
. 12
o
o
12
o
10
2
12 46
Missing prospectus
Number of companies 34
Source: IPO prospectuses.
Table 12.4 shows the breakdown of IPO companies that voluntarily (Guidance Notes
10-19 on 1 January 1996) and non-voluntarily (Updates and Revisions to the Policies on
Issues/Offer of Securities on 1 July 1997) choose to provide the profit guarantee. None
of them are from the Main Board, since the Main Board applicant companies only have
an optional rather than a mandatory requirement to provide the profit guarantee. There
were 37 (25 in 1997 and 12 in 1998) Second Board applicant companies that provided
the profit guarantee (optionally or mandatory). However, there were 15 companies in
1997 (seven Main Board and eight Second Board application companies) and only three
Main Board applicant companies in 1998 that did not report the voluntarily and
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non-voluntarily profit guarantee requirements. None of the companies in 1998 are from
the Second Board since the profit guarantee has been a mandatory requirement for those
Second Board applicant companies since 1 July 1997.
Table 12.5 shows the level of earnings management for the companies which reported
profit guarantee for the years 1997 and 1998 both voluntarily and non-voluntarily. As
can be seen from Panel A, profit guarantee companies for the year 1997 have high
levels of earnings management during their first (DCA year 0) and second (DCA year
+ 1) guaranteed fiscal year end, which are statistically significant at the 1 % and 10%
levels, respectively. As hypothesised, companies managed their earnings during these
years, not merely due to the economic crisis but also due to the requirement to meet
their first and second guaranteed profits.
However, they are no longer engaged in earnings'management in the third guaranteed
(DCA year +2) and no guaranteed (DCA year +3) fiscal year end. The non-profit
guarantee companies also appear to engage in earnings management but only with a low
significance level up to their first fiscal year end (DCA year 0). The high level of
earnings management for the non-profit guarantee companies up to their first fiscal year
end may be due to the need to increase investors' confidence in their companies'
performance because ofthe economic crisis. However, there is no significant difference
in the level of earnings management between the profit guarantee companies and the
non-profit guarantee companies for all fiscal year ends (DCA year 0 to DCA year +3).
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Table 12.5 Earnings management by profit guarantee and non-profit guarantee
companies
DCA YRO DCA YR+l DCA YR+2 DCA YR+3
1st guaranteed 2nd guaranteed 3rd guaranteed No guaranteed
PanelA: Year 1997
Profit guarantee (n=25)
Median 8.76" 5.60c -0.57 -2.09
p-value 0.007 0.090 0.554 0.647
Mean 8.6l 4.74c -2.95 6.26
p-value 0.006 0.067 0.320 0.204
Non-profit guarantee (n=15)
Median 10.00c
-0.19 -2.74 -2.49
p-value 0.083 0.932 0.977 0.410
Mean 9.6lc 1.2 0.41 -12.4
p-value 0.075 0.713 0.909 0.305
z-stat for difference
-0.27 1.0 0.15 0.52
p-value for difference 0.802 0.276 0.889 0.615
t-stat for difference
-0.18 0.93 -0.74 1.48
p-value for difference 0.862 0.358 0.467 0.155
Panel B: Year 1998
Profit guarantee (n=12)
Median 22.23b 5.43 5.78c 1.9
p-value 0.021 0.784 0.065 1.000
Mean 37.6lc 0.65 11.5
-3.59
p-value 0.090 0.899 0.101 0.529
Non-profit guarantee (n=3)
Median 0.02
-9.22 -3.98 4.20
p-value 1.000 0.181 0.789 0.789
Mean
-1. 1
-10.09b
-3.64 1.92
p-value 0.896 0.012 0.721 0.760
z-stat for difference 1.88c 1.0 0.87
-0.58
p-value for difference 0.071 0.220 0.427 0.613
t-stat for difference 1.80c 2.08c 1.9
-0.71
p-value for difference 0.098 0.062 0.238 0.506
Panel C: Year 1997 & 1998
Profit guarantee (n=37)
Median 11.62" 5.60 2.37
-0.33
p-value 0.000 0.135 0.556 0.809
Mean 18.0ib 3.41 1.5 3.07
p-value 0.015 0.149 0.567 0.417
Non-profit guarantee (n=18)
Median 8.86c
-1.1
-3.21
-1.6
p-value 0.098 0.514 0.862 0.601
Mean 7.83c
-0.75
-0.26
-9.97
p-value 0.092 0.784 0.935 0.3 19
z-stat for difference 1.04 1.47 0.59 0.36
p-value for difference 0.302 0.144 0.560 0.727
t-stat for difference 1.23 1. 7 0.46 1.25
p-value for difference 0.224 0.247 0.649 0.224
Note:
a, b, and c Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. The Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test is used for the medians and the parametric t-test is used for the means. The difference in median and mean DCA
between profit guarantee and non-profit guarantee companies is based on the Mann- Whitney U test and the independent t-test.
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With regard to the IPO companies in the year 1998, the profit guarantee companies have
a high level of earnings management during the three guaranteed years (statistically
significant at the 1 % and 10% levels, respectively, in the first and third guaranteed fiscal
year ends). Interestingly, there is no evidence that the small number of non-profit
guarantee companies engage in earnings management during the same period.
However, only the first guaranteed fiscal year end exhibits a ,statistically significant
level of earnings management between the profit guarantee and non-profit guarantee
compames.
To improve the reliability of results due to the small sample, Panel C reports the level of
earnings management by combining the sample companies in 1997 and 1998. As can
be seen from this Panel, profit guarantee companies have high levels of earnings
management in the first, second and third guaranteed years, statistically significant at
,
the 1 % level for the first guaranteed year. On the other hand, non-profit guarantee
companies have high level of earnings management only in the first guaranteed year,
which is significant at the 10% leveL. In addition, none of the fiscal year ends show a
statistically significant level of earnings management between the profit guarantee and
non-profit guarantee companies.
As reviewed in Chapter 10, another motivation for earnings management is to increase
the offer price of the shares sold and companies' value by increasing earnings. The
worth of the shares retained by the owners wil increase and more cash wil be received
by them in a secondary share issue. The incidence of high retained ownership on the
Malaysian market, observed in Chapter 9, has drawn attention to the need to fuher
investigate the distribution of earnings management across ownership retention
categories. Managers that retained less (more) shares post-IPO (i.e. sell more (less)
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shares) are expected to engage in high earnings management to increase the worth of
their shares.
Table 12.6 Distribution of IPO year DCA classified by median ownership
retention
Full sample, 254 IPOs ,
DCA at year 0 (% oflagged total assets)
Reduced sample, 250 IPOs
DCA at year 0 (% oflagged total assets)
Ownership retention n Median p-
(%) value Mean p-(%) value n Median p- Mean p-(%) value (%) value
Below median alpha: 127
(alphao(79 .24 %)
Above median alpha: 127
(alpha/79.24%)
z-stat/ t-stat for difference
(above-below median alpha)
p-value (above-below median alpha)
0.98 0.955
-1.1 0.546 126 1.03 0.832 -0.16 0.920
6.24" 0.000 12.69" 0.001 124 5.59" 0.000 7.80" 0.000
-3.653"
-3.343"
-3.299" -2.995"
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003
Total 254 3.24" 0.001 5.74" 0.007 250 2.92" 0.001 3.78" 0.006
Note:
" Significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level, using a two-tailed test. The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is used for the medians
and the parametric t-test is used for the means. The difference in median and mean DCA between below and above median
ownership retention companies is based on the Mann- Whitney U test and the independent (-test.
Table 12.6 shows the distribution of mean and metlian DCA in the IPO year, classified
by median ownership retention. Similar to Table 12.2, the results are reported for the
full data set and also for a reduced data set (excluding four outliers). Contrary to
expectations, managers with higher share retention post-IPO are found to have a higher
level of earnings management for both samples (statistically significant at the 1 % level).
There is also a significant difference in the level of earnings management between the
high and low ownership retention groups. This rather puzzling result is inconsistent
with the results reported by Marquardt and Wiedman (2004a) who found that US
companies whose management sell their own shares in SEOs have higher earnings
management than companies where management does not selL.
In sum, it appears that Malaysian IPO companies managed their earnings during the
East Asian crisis period of 1997 and 1998 to attract investors and improve confidence in
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their companies' performance. There is also some (weak) evidence that they did so to
meet their requirement to provide guaranteed profits for three years. In addition,
managers with higher share retention post-IPO are found to have a higher level of
earnings management.
12.3 Association between earnings management and post-IPO
performance
The association between DCA and post-IPO performance is examined to see whether
companies with high levels of earnings management at the time of the IPO experience a
greater deterioration in their stock market and operating performance in subsequent
years. This section provides an analysis of the post-IPO performance by DCA quartiles
(Q1 to Q4). Ql refers to 'conservative' IPOs (IPO companies with the lowest DCA)
and Q4 refer to 'aggressive' IPOs (IPO companies with the highest DCA). The
conservative quartile (Q1) has a DCA of less than -6%, Q2 has a DCA of -6% to +3%,
Q3 has a DCA of +3% to 15%, and the aggressive quartile (Q4) has a DCA exceeding
15%. Section 12.3.1 and Section 12.3.2 provide the analyses of the stock market
performance and the operating performance, respectively.
12.3.1 Post-I PO stock market performance
Table 12.7 reports the data on long run stock market performance by DCA quartile
using market and matched company benchmarks. Panel A shows the median and mean
raw IPO returns (top) and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) using a market
benchmark (middle) and a matched company benchmark (bottom). The returns are
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calculated for 12-, 24-, and 36-month periods commencmg immediately at the
beginning of the fifth month of the IPO year fiscal year end to allow for a reporting lag.
Panel B shows the results for the first (months 5 to 16), second (months 17 to 28), and
third (months 29 to 40) years. The BHARs for each IPO company are computed as the
raw IPO return minus the equivalent period KL Composite Inçlex return or matched
company return.
It is hypothesised that companies that engage in more aggressive earnings management
at the time of IPOs experience worse subsequent stock market performance. As can be
seen from Table 12.7, the raw IPO returns are only negative in the three-year holding
periods (months 5 to 40). The aggressive IPO companies underperform the
conservative IPO companies by -7.7% (-24.03% for Q4 minus -16.33% for Q1) in
median raw returns for this period. However, this' underperformance is not statistically
significant (z-statistic for difference = -0.52).
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Chapter 12 - Results ILL: Earnings management
As can be observed from the middle part of Panel A, IPO companies overall
underperform the market benchmark in the one-, two-, and three-year holding periods
but the underperformance is only significantly different (at the 1 % level) in the
three-year holding period, with a median BHAR of -26.72%. Analysis of the magnitude
of the three-year BHAR based on the IPO year DCA quartiles indicates that aggressive
earnings management IPOs (Q4) underperform more than th~ conservative earnings
management IPOs (Q1). The results of the Mann-Whitney U test, which tests the
difference in medians between Q 1 and Q4 for the three-year holding period, show that
the difference between them is weakly significant at the 10% level (z-statistic for
difference = -1.88). This result is consistent with the results reported by Teoh et aL.
(1998a) and Roosenboom et al. (2003) who found that the aggressive IPOs
underperform the conservative IPOs in raw returns and market-adjusted returns for the
holding periods from five to forty months after the release of the first post-IPO financial
,
statement. However, the results cannot be compared to the one- and two-year holding
periods since these were not reported by them.
The distorting impact of outliers on mean performance is ilustrated in the results based
on market-adjusted returns. Confirmation that this is an outlier effect was obtained by
calculating median and mean BHARs for the three-year holding period (months 5 to 40)
after removing the extreme outlier companies. The procedure used to remove the
outliers is similar to the one used in Section 12.2. After removing 10 outliers, the
median and mean BHARs for the three-year holding period were now both negative at
-28.21 % and -8.25% (significant at 1 % and 10% levels), respectively. Interestingly, the
mean BHARs (months 5 to 40) for Q1, Q2, and Q4 were all now negative, with values
of -9.12%, -12.12%, and -15.68%, respectively. However, Q3 has a mean BHAR of
3.86%.
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To ensure the robustness of the results, the matched company benchmark is also used to
adjust the IPO company returns, and the results are reported in the bottom part of Panel
A. In general, IPO companies slightly overperform the matched companies in the one
and two-year holding periods, with median BHARs of 2.60% and 2.72% respectively.
There is a slight underperformance in the three-year holding period (median BHAR =
-4.99%) but this is not statistically different from zero. Con~istent with the results
observed when the market benchmark is used, aggressive earnings management IPOs
are found to significantly underperform their matched companies from months 5 to 40
(BHAR = -19.71%), while IPO companies in the conservative group do not
underperform (BHAR = 1.67%). However, the quartile returns are non-monotonic in all
holding periods. Interestingly, the present study finds that the aggressive earnings
management group (Q4) leads to poor stock market performance in all three different
holding periods as compared to the Q 1 group wh~n their returns are adjusted for the
,
returns on the matched companies. However, only the difference between the BHAR of
Q 1 and the BHAR of Q4 is statistically significant at the 1 % and 10% levels for the
one-year and three-year holding periods, respectively.
In order to check when the underperformance occurs, the annual holding period returns
are also analysed. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 12.7. The IPO
companies produce positive median raw returns in the first-, second- and third-year
holding periods. However, the IPO companies appear to underperform the market in
the first- and third-year holding periods, with median market-adjusted buy-and-hold
returns of -2.33% and -6.94%, respectively, although none of them are statistically
significantly different from zero.
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Analysis of the magnitude of the difference in returns between aggressive and
conservative IPOs indicates that the aggressive IPOs only underperform the
conservative IPOs in their median raw returns by -18.32% and -9.55% in the second
(months 17 to 28) and third (months 29 to 40) years, respectively. However, the median
differences in raw returns between Q1 and Q4 groups are only significant in the
third-year holding period. When the raw IPO returns are adjustecl by the market returns,
the aggressive IPO only underperforms the conservative IPO in the third-year holding
period. For example, the aggressive IPO significantly underperform the market with a
BHAR of - 1 4.31 %, while conservative IPOs insignificantly overperform the market
benchmark, with a BHAR of 2.29%. The test of the median difference of BHARs
between Q 1 and Q4 in the third-year holding period shows that the difference is
statistically significant at the 1% level (z-statistic for difference = -2.64). However,
there are no clear patterns to suggest that the ,aggressive IPOs underperform the
conservative IPOs in the first- and second-year holding periods when the market
benchmark is used.
IPO companies insignificantly underperform their matched companies in the third year,
with a BHAR of -1.94%. The aggressive earnings management group (Q4) is found to
underperform their matched companies more than the conservative earnings
management group (Q 1) in the first- and third-year holding periods, with a median
difference in BHARs between both groups that is statistically significant at the 1 % and
10% levels, respectively.
As seen from the table, the raw and adjusted buy-and-hold returns in each quartile are
non-monotonic except for the BHAR in the third-year holding period (months 29 to 40),
when the market benchmark is used. Similar non-monotonic patterns are also observed
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by Teoh et aL. (1998a) and DuCharme et aL. (2001). However, their studies analysed the
stock market performance only for the three-year period from 5 to 40 months following
the end of the fiscal year of the IPOs.
In sum, the results suggest that there is some evidence that Malaysian IPO companies
underperform the market or matched companies in the long run. This
underperformance can be observed only for longer holding periods (months 5 to 40) and
occurs the most in the third-year holding period (months 29 to 40). There is evidence
that aggressive earnings management at the time of IPOs leads to poor long run stock
market performance. However, the weaker stock market performance for the aggressive
earnings management group is observed only when longer holding periods returns are
investigated (months 5 to 40), which is consistent with the reported results by Teoh et
aL. (1998a), Teoh et aL. (1998), DuCharme et aL. (2001) and Roosenboom et aL. (2003).
,Unfortunately, comparison with a shorter holding period cannot be made since no
results were reported by these studies. In addition, there are non-monotonic trends in
quartiles returns, which are also observed by Teoh et al. (1998a), DuCharme et aL.
(2001) and Roosenboom et aL. (2003).124
12.3.2 Post-I PO operating performance
Tables 12.8 and 12.9 provide an analysis of whether post-issue operating performance
changes of Malaysian IPOs differ systematically according to the level of DCA at the
124 Roosenboom et aL. (2003) split their DCA sample into three equal-sized groups (top tier, middle tier,
and bottom tier) in preference to quartiles. Teoh et aL. (l998a) find a monotonIC pattern only when buy
and hold returns ofIPOs are adjusted by the NASDAQ Composite Index, while DuCharme et aL. (2001)
find this pattern only when CRSP value-weighted index was used.
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time of IPOs. Table 12.8 and Table 12.9 report the median and mean changes in
operating return on operating assets (OI/OA) and operating return on sales (OI/Sales) by
DCA quartiles, respectively. Panel A and Panel B provide the analysis of changes from
year 0 and changes from the prior year, respectively. Each panel reports the raw
operating performance (top) and matched company-adjusted operating performance
(bottom).
Focusing first on Panel A of Table 12.8, the median Oi/OA significantly declines from
year 0 to years + 1, +2, and +3, and in all quartiles, except for the decline from year 0 to
+ 1 for Q2, when the Oi/OA of IPO companies is adjusted for the Oi/OA of matched
companies. The aggressive earnings management group (Q4) show more deterioration
in raw Oi/OA from year 0 to + 1 and in adjusted OI/OA from year 0 to + 1 and year 0 to
+2. However, none of the declines in OI/OA between Ql and Q4 groups is statistically
significantly different.
The year-to-year analysis, as indicated in Panel B, shows that the greatest decline in
OI/OA occurs immediately after the IPO (year 0 to + 1). Even though all quartiles show
significant declines in raw and matched company-adjusted OI/OA, IPO companies in
the aggressive quartile (Q4) DCA are found to experience a greater deterioration (raw
median = -5.60%; matched company-adjusted median = -6.87%). Nevertheless, the
deterioration in OI/OA in each quartile is non-monotonic, not only from year 0 to +1
but in all post-IPO periods. In addition, the median performance deterioration between
companies engaging in more aggressive earnings management (Q4) is not significantly
different from the conservative earnings management group (Q1) for all post-IPO
periods.
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Chapter 12 - Results ILL: Earnings management
To demonstrate the robustness of the results, Table 12.9 reports an alternative operating
performance measure, the operating return on sales (OI/Sales). The results confirm the
earlier findings, in that the median OI/Sales deteriorates in each quartile from year 0 to
years + 1, +2, and +3. The more aggressive earnings management group is found to
experience worse subsequent operating performance than the conservative earnings
management group, either before or after adjusting for the, OI/Sales of matched
companies, except for the raw OI/Sales from year 0 to +3. However, only the
deterioration in median performance from year 0 to + 1 between Q 1 and Q4 groups is
weakly significant at the 10 percent leveL.
The analysis of changes from the prior year, as reported in Panel B of Table 12.9, also
shows that the greatest decline in OI/Sales occurred in the year immediately after the
IPOs (year 0 to +1). IPO companies in the aggressive DCA quartiles experience the
greatest decline in performance (raw median = '-5.1 1 %; matched company-adjusted
median = -4.44%) as compared to the IPO companies in the conservative DCA quartiles
(raw median = -1.50%, matched company-adjusted median = -2.91 %).
In general, the operating performance deteriorates in the post-IPO periods. There is
evidence that aggressive earnings management IPOs tend to experience a greater
deterioration in operating performance than the conservative earnings management
groups. However, the differences in deterioration between the two groups in most
periods are not statistically significant. The year-to-year analysis reveals that the
greatest deterioration occurs in the year immediately after the IPO year. In addition,
non-monotonic patterns are observed in the pattern of operating performance based on
quartiles.
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12.4 Summary
The present chapter provides an analysis of the earnings management practices of a
sample of Malaysian IPOs. Analysis of current accruals shows that the level of earnings
management is higher in the years when the IPO occurs and lower in subsequent years.
Companies that were listed during the years of the East Asian frisis, 1997 and 1998,
have higher levels of earnings management in these years compared to the other years in
the sample period. In addition, further analysis that focuses on the companies that went
public in 1997 and 1998 reveals that those companies that provide profit guarantees
have higher levels of earnings management than non-profit guarantee companies. These
findings suggest that Malaysian IPO companies employ income-increasing accounting
accruals at the time of their IPOs to increase their offering proceeds. The evidence of
higher earnings management during the East Asian crisis period suggests that
,
companies were endeavouring to increase investors' confidence in their performance.
In addition, companies also manage earnings to meet the voluntarily and
non-voluntarily profit guarantee agreement. In sum, the results of the present study
support the hypothesis that Malaysian IPO companies employ income-increasing
strategies around offerings, and that this strategy was more prevalent during the East
Asian crisis period, especially for those companies that provided a profit guarantee.
Analysis of the association between the magnitude of earnings management in the IPO
year and post-IPO performance provides some evidence to support the view that
aggressive earnings management at the time of an IPO leads to poor stock market and
operating performance, post-IPO. While operating performance deteriorates for the
one-, two-, and three-year periods, the year-to-year analysis indicates that the greatest
deterioration occurs in the year immediately after the IPOs. Furthermore, the
333
Chapter 12 - Results ILL: Earnings management
deterioration is non-monotonic in each quartile; the difference in the stock market and
operating performance between companies engaging in aggressive and conservative
earnings management is only significantly different for some of the periods examined.
Overall, the results of the present study reveal that Malaysian IPO companies
opportunistically manage earnings at the time of IPOs. However, the market fails to
realise that the earnings management symbolises a transitory increase in earnings.
Consistent with the arguments of Teoh et aL. (1998a) and Rangan (1998), the negative
association between the aggressive earnings management group and the three-year
median holding period returns groups indicates that the market is disappointed and
adjusts its valuation downwards in the post-IPO periods. In sum, the results provide a
degree of support for the earnings management hypothesis.
The following chapter provides the overall summary and conclusion of the thesis.
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Chapter 13
Overall summary and conclusions
13.1 Introduction
This last chapter contains an overall summary of the thesis and its conclusions. The
chapter is organised as follows: Section 13.2 presents a general overview of the study;
Section 13.3 provides a summary of the main results from the three empirical studies;
Section 13.4 discusses the implications of the studies; Section 13.5 describes the
limitations of the study; Section 13.6 offers some suggestions for future research; and
finally, Section 13.7 summarises and concludes the research.
13.2 Overall view of the study
The principal aim of this thesis is to investigate the performance of Malaysian initial
public offerings (IPOs) and the possible influence of earnings management. Even
though similar studies have been undertaken in many developed markets, the evidence
from less developed markets, such as Malaysia, is sparse. Previous Malaysian studies
(e.g., Wu, 1993; Mohamad et at., 1994; Paudyal et al., 1998, Jelic et al., 2001; Corhay
et at., 2002) exhibit weaknesses in terms of the sample period employed, the sampling
procedure, the abnormal returns models used, and their limited scope. The thesis
provides the first thorough study of IPOs incorporating both long run stock market and
operating performance. It also investigates the earnings management explanation for
the performance observed on the Malaysian market, which has a different legal,
institutional and cultural setting to that of more developed markets.
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An IPO takes place when a security is sold to the general public for the first time in
order to obtain a listing on a stock exchange, and is a significant source of finance for
Malaysian companies. A total of RM49.9 bilion was raised through IPOs over the
period from 1973 to 2004. In addition, companies making equity IPOs in Malaysia are
required by law to reserve 30% of the shares allocated to the public for Bumiputera
(local indigenous people) applicants in order to comply with gov~rnment policy.
The economic crisis suffered by Malaysia in 1997 and 1998 profoundly affected the
IPO market and increased the need to gain investors' confidence about IPO companies'
performance. Interestingly, at the same time, certain companies were affected by the
requirement to provide a guarantee that they would achieve 90% of the profits forecast
in the prospectus and 90% of the forecast profits for the two years following the offcial
listing. The significance of the IPOs as a means of raising capital, the existence of
,
unfavourable economic conditions, and the unique requirement of IPO profit
guarantees, makes the study of the performance of Malaysian IPOs, and the earnings
management activity of these companies of great interest. This study contributes to the
existing knowledge of the performance of Malaysian IPOs and earnings management.
To address IPO performance, this thesis applied two alternative research methods: (i)
market-based; and (ii) accounting-based. Share price data was drawn on to investigate
the stock market performance of 454 Malaysian IPOs. The sample comprised 91 % of
the potential number of IPOs available and covered 83.6% of newly-listed companies
during the period 1990 to 2000. Of the 454 IPOs, 435 were private and 19 were
privatisation. Accounting data was also employed to investigate the operating
performance of 254 IPOs which had a full five years of data. Although just half of the
potential numbers of Malaysian IPO companies remained in the sample, the large
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sample size suggests that it is likely to be representative. The only previous study
investigating the operating performance of Malaysian IPOs, by Sun and Tong (2002),
used a sample of just 24 privatisation IPOs. The present study comprises 239 private
IPOs and 15 privatisation IPOs. In addition to the alternative performance
investigations, the earnings management activity of Malaysian IPOs is analysed as a
potential explanation for the post-IPO performance. The same ,sample as used in the
operating performance study is utilised.
Since the early 1990s, research on countries such as the US (e.g., Ritter, 1991;.
Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 2003) and the UK (e.g., Levis, 1993;
Khurshed et at., 1999; Espenlaub et at., 2000) has found that IPO companies
underperform their benchmarks in the long run. However, this evidence on long run
post-IPO stock market performance is controversial, with different researchers reporting
,
contrasting results depending on the method used to measure returns. In addition,
several critiques have been put forward regarding the appropriateness of the expected
and abnormal returns models, together with the appropriateness of different techniques
for testing for statistical significance. A number of empirical studies propose several
explanations for long run return underperformance, including measurement problems
(Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Fama, 1998) and earnings management (Teoh
et at., 1998a; Roosenboom et al., 2003; DuCharme et at., 2004). According to the
measurement problem explanation, underperformance appears to occur either because
researchers fail to control properly for risk, or as a result of problems related to the
measurement of returns over long horizons, or the wrong choice of benchmark (Fama,
1998). Meanwhile the earnings management explanation suggests that managers
manage their earnings upwards through income-increasing accruals at the time of IPOs
in order to increase offering proceeds. Investors misinterpret the increases in earnings
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and fail to realise their transitory nature. Due to the reversal of accruals in the
aftermarket, earnings do not persist. Consequently, investors are disappointed and
adjust their valuation downwards, which leads to post-IPO underperformance.
13.3 Summary of the main results
This thesis has presented three empirical studies concerning the performance of
Malaysian IPOs and earnings management; the results of each are summarised in this
section.
13.3.1 Market-based performance results
The results of the initial returns are in agreement with existing international evidence
and are also consistent with the results observed ip. Malaysia. However, the findings
concerning long run returns are contrary to the results discovered in developed markets.
This study finds a significant overperformance when the event-time cumulative
abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used, except when the
equally-weighted weighting scheme is applied to matched companies' benchmarks.
The significant overperformance disappears when the Fama-French (1993) three-factor
regressions are used. This is in line with the argument of Gompers and Lerner (2003),
that the relative performance of an IPO sample depends on the method used to examine
performance. As argued by Ritter and Welch (2002), and Ritter (2003), the sample used
in terms of the time period and selection criteria also contributes to the different
findings across studies on the long run performance of IPOs. The results reported in the
first study, using the event-time approach, suggest that investors who invest in IPO
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companies wil obtain positive returns in the long run but do not gain any abnormal
returns when calendar-time analysis is employed.
This study reveals that, contrary to the results observed by Loughran and Ritter (1995),
when the sample is segmented by the year of listing and the long run performance is
compared with size-matched companies, the underperformance is not concentrated in
certain listing years that have large numbers of IPO companies. The long run
performance does not significantly differ across sectors. Moreover, there is no
significant difference in performance between IPO companies listed on the Main Board
and the Second Board of the KLSE. Private IPOs produce insignificant
underperformance while privatisation IPOs produce insignificant overperformance over
the three-year post-listing period. The low initial returns group is shown to have the
worst aftermarket performance compared to their matching companies, while the small
,
gross proceeds group is reported to have a significant overperformance over the
three-year horizon. Finally, an investment in large IPO companies suffers greater
negative returns compared to a portfolio of matched companies of a similar size.
In sum, the results of the first empirical study show that the IPO companies perform
inconsistently in the long run when different benchmarks and weighting schemes are
used. In particular, both the event-time and calendar-time approaches produce different
results. These findings are consistent with the measurement problem explanation,
namely that the long run stock market performance depends on the method used to
calculate the returns.
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13.3.2 Accounting-based performance results
A companson of the pre- and post-IPO accounting-based operating performances
provides strong evidence of declining performance in the IPO year and up to three years
following the IPO, using both accrual- and cash flow-based approaches. It is more
severe when the performance is measured using accrual-based approaches. This finding
is consistent with the existing international evidence documenting the long run
underperformance of IPOs. The difference in the results between accrual-based and
cash flow-based measures suggests the possibility of earnings manipulation by IPO
managers who report increased earnings at the time of the IPOs.
Assessments of the potential sources of operating performance changes show that IPO
compames have higher growth in sales and capital expenditure than matched
compames. This indicates that the deterioration,'in operating performance does not
appear to be caused by a reduction in sales or cutbacks in capital expenditure.
However, the reduced effciency in asset usage does have an impact on operating
performance. Additional analyses based on different market expectation indicators
consistently reveal a decline in post-IPO operating performance. These show that
investors have a high expectation of future earnings growth based on the performance
observed prior to the IPOs. However, this expectation was not fulfilled. Malaysian IPO
companies are also found to reduce their borrowings at the time of an IPO, and also in
the first and second years after IPOs, but these increase afterwards.
Univariate analysis of IPOs involving family relationships shows slightly greater
post-IPO deterioration in performance than IPOs with no family involvement.
However, there is little evidence of family involvement significantly affecting post-IPO
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performance. There is also no real pattern to the deterioration in performance between
high and low ownership groups. Therefore, this study does not support the signalling
theory of ownership of Leland and Pyle (1977) and Downes and Heinkel (1982).
Univariate analysis of IPOs having high and low underpricing found that there is a
tendency for the high underpricing group to show inferior accrual-based operating
performance in the long run. Conversely, there is a revers~ pattern in the cash
flow-based performance measure, indicating support for the signalling model of
underpricing.
Overall, the results of this study show that operating performance (cash flow- and
accrual-based), asset turnover and market expectations decline after IPOs. While sales
gradually increase, capital expenditure increases but then slightly declines; the leverage
ratio decreases and then increases slowly after IPOs. Univariate analysis of the
association between family relationships, retained ownership and post-IPO operating
performance produces little evidence to explain the deterioration in operating
performance. However, underpricing partially explains the deterioration when the cash
flow-based performance measure is used.
13.3.3 Earnings management results
The earnings management analysis based on discretionary current accruals (DCA)
shows that the level of earnings management is higher in the years when the IPOs occur
and in the year immediately following the IPOs. This indicates that there is evidence
that Malaysian IPO companies manage their earnings upwards at the time of going
public, and maintain their earnings for the fiscal year immediately after the IPOs. The
continuance of earnings management in the post-IPO year may reflect the managers'
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need to ensure that actual earnings are close to those forecast in the IPO prospectus as
well as in the two years of maintainable earnings following the IPOs. Overall, the
evidence suggests that the managers of Malaysian IPO companies opportunistically
advance accruals in an attempt to improve earnings during the IPO year. However, the
high level of earnings management in the IPO year is not sustained in the post-IPO
years. Thus, the evidence provides a possible explanation for tlie observed decline in
operating performance.
There is also evidence that earnings management was higher during the East Asian
crisis years from 1997 to 1998. The level of earnings management in these years is
significantly different from that recorded for several of the sample years examined. It
appears that companies managed their earnings during these years, not merely due to the
economic crisis to attract investors and improve confidence in their companies'
performance, but also due to the requirement to ~eet their first and second year of
guaranteed profits.
Analysis of the association between the magnitude of earnings management in the IPO
year and post-IPO performance provides some evidence that aggressive earnings
management at the time of an IPO leads to poor long run stock market and operating
performance. While operating performance deteriorates for the one-, two-, and
three-year periods, the year-to-year analysis indicates that the greatest deterioration
occurs in the year immediately after the IPOs. Furthermore, the deterioration is
non-monotonic in each quartile; the difference in the stock market and operating
performance between companies engaging in aggressive and conservative earnings
management is only significantly different for some of the periods examined.
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In general, the results of the third study reveal that Malaysian IPO companies appear to
opportunistically manage earnings at the time of IPOs. However, the market fails to
realise that the earnings management symbolises a transitory increase in earnings. In
line with the arguments of Teoh et al. (1998a) and Rangan (1998), the negative
association between the aggressive earnings management group and the three-year
median holding period returns groups indicates that the market is disappointed and
adjusts its valuation downwards in the post-IPO periods. In sum, the results provide a
degree of support for the earnings management hypothesis.
In conclusion, the results summarised in this section suggest that the long run stock
market performance is variable and its assessment depends on the method used to
measure returns. The results concerning post-IPO operating performance suggest that
the accrual-based performance measure shows more deterioration in earnings, which
may contribute to post-IPO underperformance. 'The earnings management results
indicate the existence of earnings management at the time of an IPO, especially during
an economic crisis period, and for companies that provide voluntary and non-voluntary
profit guarantees in their IPO prospectuses.
13.4 Implications of the study
Several general implications of this thesis can be drawn for investors, security analysts,
companies and accounting standard setters. Given the conflcting results of poor
post-IPO stock market performance, investors may do better holding Malaysian IPO
shares for a short period with a likelihood of achieving a high gain. In addition, the
results of univariate analyses help investors to identify which characteristics are
associated with more underperformance or overperformance, which is informative to
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them when formulating their investment strategies. For security analysts, the
conflicting results afford more opportunities for them to extend their consultation
services and expertise to investors by recommending stocks that might overperform in
the long run. The decline in operating performance has implications for the IPO issuers.
They need to assure investors that their stocks are worthwhile investments in the long
run. The implication of the earnings management results is that investors should be
cautious about investing in IPOs to avoid losses. It would be advisable for them to
invest in companies with a low level of current accruals at the time of IPOs especially
when economic conditions are unfavourable. IPO companies may want to consider how
reasonable accounting choices can lower their cost of equity capitaL. Moreover, the
findings are useful for Malaysian accounting standard setters, who may draw on the
earnings management results to evaluate how much discretion should be allowed for
company managers to adjust reported accounting figures. This is to ensure that
,
managers do not use their private information to deceive the market or to gain private
benefits at the expense of investors.
13.5 Limitations of the study
The results and implication of this study should be considered in the context of the
following limitations. First, the post-IPO period scrutinised in this study spanned three
years and this may be an inadequate length of time for gains/losses to be revealed by the
IPO companies. In addition, the pre-IPO period analysed is only one year for operating
performance due to the difficulty of getting pre-IPO data. However, as explained in
Chapters 5 and 8, extending the post-IPO period beyond three years was not feasible
due to data availability and sample size problems. Furthermore, the three-year period is
consistent with prior research on stock market performance (e.g., Ritter, 1991; Levis,
344
Chapter 13 - Overall summary and conclusion
1993; Lee et al., 1996a,b; Ljungqvist, 1997; Khurshed et al., 1999; Durukan, 2002) and
operating performance (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1995, Pagano et at., 1998; Chan et al., 2003;
Khurshed et at., 2003; Kim et at., 2004).
Second, this study calculates the long run stock market performance from the end of the
first day of trading. Some studies (e.g., Goergen, 1998; Khurshed et at., 1999) have
argued that price support (stabilisation) in the first few trading days may introduce a
downward bias in long run returns; they suggest measuring returns after the first month
of trading. In contrast to the US and the UK, stabilisation does not appear to be subject
to regulation in Malaysia. However, stabilisation is only relevant when share issues are
overpriced, which occurs in only a small proportion (6%) of the sample of 454
Malaysian IPOs. Thus, the overall impact on reported results is likely to be very smalL.
Further, the potential downward bias from using the first day price would merely serve
to dampen the generally observed long run overperformance of Malaysian IPOs.
Third, this study does not differentiate between private IPOs and PIPOs when analysing
operating performance and earnings management since the number of PIPOs in the
sample is small (15 companies out of 254). However, this is unlikely to affect the
results. In addition, the results based on the stock market performance analysis indicate
that there is no significant difference in performance between private IPOs and PIPOs.
Fourth, the findings on earnings management are subject to a caveat because of the
diffculty in measuring earnings management. The 'correct' estimation approach
employed to detect earnings management remains an open empirical question that is
largely beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, because of data limitations, this
study used only discretionary current accruals to proxy for earnings management. As
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demonstrated by Dechow et aL. (1995), all the earnings management models have
weaknesses, and by omitting long term accruals, it presumably weakens the power of
the earnings management model even further. However, even when using a model with
limited power, earnings management is stil observed in this study.
Finally, this study examines the association between company iOl IPO characteristics
and post-IPO performance using univariate analysis instead of performing a regression
analysis. This is due to the fact that an examination of the determinants of the stock
market and operating performance is not the focus of this study. The scope of this
thesis encompasses an examination of long run stock market and operating
performance, the cross-sectional patterns in performance and the earnings management
around the IPOs. The determinants of the post-IPO performance using the regression
approach are left for future research.
13.6 Suggestions for future research
The examination of long run stock market and operating performance, together with
earnings management, is a fruitful area of research, not only for IPO events but also for
other corporate events such as SEOs, mergers and acquisitions, and management
buyouts, among others. A further extension of this study might be to examine the long
run stock market and operating performance of companies making SEOs and
incorporate the earnings management issues around the SEOs; to date, there are no
studies examining these issues for SEO companies in Malaysia. In addition, it would be
interesting to see whether the conflcting results on the long run returns of Malaysian
IPOs are also observed for Malaysian SEOs. It is also expected that the operating
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performance will decline following Malaysia SEOs and companies engaging in earnings
management at the time of issuing additional equity.
It is suggested that future research employs the regression analysis approach to
investigate the determinants of performance. In this way, the extent of the relationship
between explanatory variables and performance can be assessed.. The precise causes of
long run underperformance remain an issue that is worthy of further investigation.
Other potential factors such as the degree of multi-nationality of IPO companies, their
level of product diversification, and their ownership structure might explain the long run
stock market, operating performance and earnings management, and are avenues for
future research (e.g., Goergen, 1998; Khurshed et aL., 1999). A further innovative
direction for future research would be to study MESDAQ Market listed companies to
analyse the relationship between venture capital financing prior to IPOs and their
relationship with long run performance. , .Future research may also test alternative
earnings management measures such as specific accruals. It would also be worthwhile
to investigate in greater detail whether IPO companies manage earnings to meet their
earnings forecast threshold by looking at an individual company's forecasts to identify
whether there is any deviation of 10% or more between the reported earnings in the
audited accounts following the IPO and any forecasts previously made in the
prospectus.
13.7 Summary and conclusions
An overall summary of the thesis is provided in this chapter. In general, the results
support the existing debate on the long run returns anomaly, suggesting that long run
stock market performance depends on the methods used to measure returns. The results
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based on accounting-based operating performance show that operating performance
declines in the post-IPO period using both accrual- and cash flow-based measures of
operating performance. The higher decline perceived in the accrual-based measure
suggests the existence of earnings management at the time IPOs occur and partial
reversals in accrual following IPOs. Inconsistent results observed between stock market
and operating performance strongly support the likelihood that the analysis of long run
stock market performance is driven by measurement errors. Moreover, there is some
evidence that Malaysian IPO companies manage their earnings at the time of IPOs,
which is more prevalent during unfavourable economic conditions and among those
companies that provided profit guarantees in their IPO prospectuses. In summary, this
thesis supports the measurement problems and earnings management explanations of
long run IPO performance.
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Appendices
Table 9.2A The median and mean changes in operating return on total assets
(OI/TA)
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre-post-IPO changes (%) Year -1 to 0 Year-1 to +1 Year-1 to +2 Year-1 to +3
IPO company -1.27' -3.38" -5.31' -7.76' -7.06' -IO.Ol -9.-04' -14.94"
p-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Matched company -0.72' -2.62' -2.52" -4.08' -2.87" -4.98" -3.38' -4.11'
p-value 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Matched company-adjusted -0.42 -0.76 -3.36' -3.67b -5.19' -5.03' -6.31' -10.83'
¡
p-value 0.153 0.570 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (%) Year-1 to 0 YearOto +1 Year +1 to +2 Year +2 to +3
IPO company
-1.27" -3.38" -3.22' -4.38" -1.21' -2.25' -1.85' -4.93"
p-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
Matched company
_0.72" -2.62" -0.63' -1.47 -0.55' -0.89 0.01 0.87
p-value 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.182 0.012 0.421 0.895 0.363
Matched company-adjusted -0.42 -0.76 -2.99' -2.91' - 1.8b -1.5 - 1.50" -5.80"
p-value 0.153 0.570 0.000 0.012 0.013 0.247 0.000 0.002
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
',and b Significantly different from zero at the 0.0 I and 0.05 levels, respectivel,Y, using a two-tailed test.
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Table 9.3A The median and mean changes in operating cash flow return on total
assets (OCF/TA)
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre-post-IPO changes (%) Year-1 to 0 Year-1 to +1 Year-1 to +2 Year-1 to +3
IPQ company -3.67" -2.96" -2.44" -2.22' -2.21" -3.03" -2.60" -4.04"
p-value 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.055 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000
Matched company -0.56 -1.09 0.25 -0.18 -1.45b -1.4lc -1.24c -1.27
p-value 0.240 0.237 0.797 0.829 0.048 0.094 0.071 0.186
Matched company-adjusted -4.31 b -1.87 -3.67b -2.04 -3.20 -1.62 _1.3b _2.77c
p-va1ue 0.011 0.210 0.019 0.169 0.109 0.231 0.039 0.059
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (%) Year-1 to 0 Year 0 to +1 Year +1 to +2 Year +2 to +3
IPO company -3.67" -2.96" -0.22 0.74 -0.26 -0.81 -0.65 -1.01
p-va1ue 0.000 0.010 0.579 0.514 0.721 0.410 0.147 0.248
Matched company -0.56 -1.09 0.50 0.91 -0.58c -1.22c -0.04 0.13
p-value 0.240 0.237 0.340 0.303 0.056 0.097 0.761 0.862
Matched company-adjusted -4.3 1 b -1.87 -1.66 -0.17 0.82 0.41 -1.46 -1.4
p-value 0.011 0.210 0.513 0.912 0.298 0.741 0.138 0.323
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
". b. "ndc Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
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Table 9.4A The median and mean changes in market-to-book equity
IPO company
p-value
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Year 0 to +1 YearOto +2 YearOto +3
-0.14" -0.33b -0.30" -0.21 -0.68" -0.79'
0.008 0.036 0.006 0.302 0.000 0.080
_o.iib 0.61 -0.31" 0.58 -0.38" -1.67
0.029 0.353 0.000 0.393 0.000 0.231
-0.15 -0.94 -0.16 -0.79 ' -0.25b 0.88
0.101 0.173 0.454 0.267 0.048 0.546
Panel A:
Pre-post-IPO changes (ratio)
Matched company
p-value
Matched company-adjusted
p-value
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (ratio) YearOto +1 Year +1 to +2 Year +2 to +3
-0.14" -0.33b 0.02 0.12 -0.12b -0.57
0.008 0.036 0.348 0.501 0.031 0.196
_o.iib 0.61 -0.08 -0.03 -0.1 Ob -2.25'
0.029 0.353 0.104 0.877 0.019 0.071
-0.15 -0.94 0.09 0.15 -0.13 1.68
0.101 0.1 73 0.191 0.565 0.212 0.204
254 254 254 254 254 254
IPO company
p-value
Matched company
p-value
Matched company-adjusted
p-value
Number of companies
Note:
".b.and, Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
,
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Table 9.5A The median and mean changes in total debt to equity
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Panel A: 
Pre-post-IPO changes (%) Year-1 to 0 Year-1 to +1 Year-1 to +2 Year-1 to +3
LPO company -11.72' -29.83" -4.79" -10.50 -0.05 8.78 0.46 -9.62
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.278 0.814 0.376 0.119 0.834
Matched company 0.96" -6.58 1.21b 8.54 0.48" 0.40 2.76" -171.8
p-value 0.000 0.574 0.012 0.241 0.005 0.983 0.003 0.367
Matched company-adjusted -16.97' -23.25 -8.91" -19.05 -3.53 8.37 -0.92 161.65
p-value 0.000 0.108 0.001 0.1 11 0.345 0.693 0.834 0.407
PanelB:
Year-to-year changes (%) Year-1 to 0 YearOto +1 Year +1 to +2 Year +2 to +3
LPO company -11.72" -29.83" 1.66" 19.32' 2.52' 19.28" 0.53" -18.40
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.716
Matched company 0.96" -6.58 0.00 15.13 0.00 -8.14 0.00 -171.68
p-value 0.000 0.574 0.264 0.211 0.173 0.700 0.529 0.316
Matched company-adjusted -16.97" -23.25 3.14" 4.20 3.25' 27.42 1.67c 153.28
p-value 0.000 0.108 0.005 0.747 0.018 0.209 0.051 0.391
Number of companies 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Note:
".b.andc Significantly different from zero at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, re~pectively, using a two-tailed test.
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